Skeptical Thoughts Concerning Explanationism and Skepticism

Clayton Littlejohn
2014 Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences  
According to the explanationist, we can rely on inference to best explanation to justifiably believe familiar skeptical hypotheses are false. On this view, commonsense beliefs about the existence and character of familiar, medium-sized dry goods provides the best explanation of our evidence and so justifies our belief that we're not brains-in-vats. This explanationist approach seems prima facie plausible until we press the explanationist to tell us what the data is that we're trying to explain
more » ... y appeal to our beliefs about external objects and how we could have access to it.
doi:10.5840/symposion2014116 fatcat:fx5b25fp7fd5benejvha3xcmwy