Strategic party formation on a circle [component]

Peeters R.J.A.P., Saran R.R.S., Yüksel A.M.
2010 unpublished
We study a spatial model of party formation in which the set of agendas is the unit circle. We characterize the sets of pure-strategy Nash equilibria under the plurality and proportional rules. In both rules, multiple configurations of parties are possible in Nash equilibrium. We refine our predictions using a new notion called "defection-proof" Nash equilibrium. Under the plurality rule, only those Nash equilibria in which either two or three parties exist are defection-proof, whereas multiple
more » ... f, whereas multiple parties exist in any defectionproof Nash equilibrium under the proportional rule. These results are mostly consistent with the predictions of Duverger (1954).
doi:10.26481/umamet.2010045 fatcat:fm2zuwi6t5fnzaqwcr7fqohnca