Egalitarianism of Random Assignment Mechanisms [article]

Haris Aziz and Jiashu Chen and Aris Filos-Ratsikas and Simon Mackenzie and Nicholas Mattei
2015 arXiv   pre-print
We consider the egalitarian welfare aspects of random assignment mechanisms when agents have unrestricted cardinal utilities over the objects. We give bounds on how well different random assignment mechanisms approximate the optimal egalitarian value and investigate the effect that different well-known properties like ordinality, envy-freeness, and truthfulness have on the achievable egalitarian value. Finally, we conduct detailed experiments analyzing the tradeoffs between efficiency with
more » ... freeness or truthfulness using two prominent random assignment mechanisms --- random serial dictatorship and the probabilistic serial mechanism --- for different classes of utility functions and distributions.
arXiv:1507.06827v1 fatcat:jzx7ihd7njf4neto76ecwluqhu