In the United States Circuit Court, South Carolina District, March Term, 1853. Brooks, Barden, et al., vs. The Ship William Penn, and Her Owners

1853 The American Law Register (1852-1891)  
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more » ... ntent at http://about.jstor.org/participate--jstor/individuals/early-journal--content. JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not--for--profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS. RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS. heirs of the grantor. The two rules seem to stand upon different foundations. The reason of the first rule seems to have been that the heir claimed, through the ancestor, it is true, but from the lord, and that title was unaffected by the power of alienation which the feudatory acquired. If the feudatory aliened, that is, conveyed the estate to a stranger, he defeated the title of the heir; if he did not alien, then the heir took by virtue of the gift from the lord. The power of alienation which the fundatory acquired, was not a power to convey to himself, nor was it a power to convey to his heirs; but it was a power to convey from himself and from his heirs. A limitation to himself or his heirs was, therefore, simply nugatory. The other rule-the rule in Shelley's case-seems to have originated, and to have had its reason in the definition of an estate of inheritance as conceived by the common law.1 In conclusion, we desire to enter a protest against an estate for life in real property, being called "a chattel in reference to property," (p. 68,) or to any thing else. It is true that is a "usufruct," yet it was always so, and yet it was always a freehold, and never a chattel. Let us not disturb landmarks with too nice a philosophy. Montgomery, Ala., June 9th, 1853.
doi:10.2307/3302050 fatcat:cihvvpcp3zdctbwyxhifzewjxu