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On the (Parameterized) Complexity of Almost Stable Marriage
[article]
2020
arXiv
pre-print
In the Stable Marriage problem. when the preference lists are complete, all agents of the smaller side can be matched. However, this need not be true when preference lists are incomplete. In most real-life situations, where agents participate in the matching market voluntarily and submit their preferences, it is natural to assume that each agent wants to be matched to someone in his/her preference list as opposed to being unmatched. In light of the Rural Hospital Theorem, we have to relax the
arXiv:2005.08150v1
fatcat:yjrxu2ea6jd6dpdw6ertrymstu