Satisfaction Guaranteed: When Moral Hazard meets Moral Preferences [report]

James Andreoni
2017 unpublished
Theorists and policy analysts have convincingly argued that greater trust makes a more efficient society by eliminating costly contracts or expensive reputations. Concurrently, experiments suggest that reciprocity is a potent substitute for law when compliance with contracts is imperfectly enforced. This paper examines these issues within the context of a common trustbuilding contract device: satisfaction guaranteed. We find that satisfaction guaranteed indeed builds trust and improves
more » ... d improves efficiency. Interestingly, sellers offering a guarantee are more trustworthy than those who don't, even when honoring it is fully voluntary, but the guarantee only elicits the trust of buyers when it has legal backing.
doi:10.3386/w23352 fatcat:pnd6cffogre37jdyvz7t66fxcm