Cyber Deterrence and Stability [report]

Rustam Goychayev, Geoffrey A. Carr, Rachel A. Weise, David A. Donnelly, Samuel L. Clements, Jacob M. Benz, Kabrena E. Rodda, Rachel A. Bartholomew, Archibald D. McKinnon, Richard B. Andres
2017 unpublished
These attacks and others like them affect America's strategic position. Where we have relied on a combination of economic might, technological know-how, and close relationships with allies to support a peaceful and prosperous world system, our adversaries strike directly at each of these via cyberspace. Attacks on private industry have restricted U.S. economic growth, infiltration of critical civilian and defense infrastructure have created significant military risks, and Russia's information
more » ... sia's information operations in Europe and elsewhere have undermined America's relationships with some of its closest allies. Over the last decade, a number of us have oscillated between cyber-threat-related committees at National Defense University, the White House, Fort Meade, and the Pentagon. Each year the warnings grow louder, the evidence grimmer, and our frustrating lack of ability to solve problems greater. Often, the conversation turns to the potential importance of diplomacy, deterrence, and arms control, but seldom does the discussion expand beyond a vague desire to somehow apply these tools to improve the situation. This report represents a clear-eyed and systematic first step toward exploring how diplomacy and arms control can contribute to deterring cyber-attacks. This report describes the ways arms control agreements can help to deter conflict, defines key Cold War agreements and how their mechanisms might or might not apply to cyber conflict, and concludes by describing how an assortment of arms control and deterrence tools might be used to reduce the threat in cyberspace.
doi:10.2172/1405058 fatcat:lqwv6labdnbdznk6oj4larrglu