Efficient Bailouts?

Javier Bianchi
2012 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Papers  
This paper develops a non-linear DSGE model to assess the interaction between ex-post interventions in credit markets and the build-up of risk ex ante. During a systemic crisis, bailouts to the financial sector relax balance sheet constraints and accelerate the economic recovery. Ex ante, the anticipation of such bailouts leads to an increase in risk-taking, making the economy more vulnerable to a financial crisis. We find that the optimal intervention in the economy requires a bailout of
more » ... two percentage points of GDP during a credit crunch. We also show how bailouts may increase financial fragility in the absence of prudential policy.
doi:10.24149/gwp133 fatcat:cesq6tuusnbpdiufv5oqugeb6i