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System-level Non-interference for Constant-time Cryptography
2014
Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security - CCS '14
Cache-based attacks are a class of side-channel attacks that are particularly effective in virtualized or cloud-based environments, where they have been used to recover secret keys from cryptographic implementations. One common approach to thwart cache-based attacks is to use constant-time implementations, i.e. which do not branch on secrets and do not perform memory accesses that depend on secrets. However, there is no rigorous proof that constant-time implementations are protected against
doi:10.1145/2660267.2660283
dblp:conf/ccs/BartheBCLP14
fatcat:wg2ibaucqnbj3c2lo5yv34tv2e