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Optimal allocation with costly inspection and discrete types under ambiguity
Optimization Methods and Software
We consider the following problem: a principal has a good to allocate among a collection of agents who attach a private value to receiving the good. The principal, instead of using monetary transfers (i.e. charging the agents) to allocate the good, can check the truthfulness of the agents' value declaration at a cost. Under the assumption that the agents' valuations are drawn from a discrete set of values at random, we characterize the class of optimal Bayesian mechanisms which are symmetric,doi:10.1080/10556788.2016.1277996 fatcat:7qaleiljwnbq3pxhaci32pwuwe