Mysteries regarding the nature of the mind remain the main subject of philosophical investigations from past to present. Theories put forward to eliminate these mysteries, in a general framework, can be roughly classified as the dualist view, which states that the mind is immaterial, and the body is material; and the monist view, which claims that only matter (materialism) or only mind (idealism) exists as a single substance. The primary aim of this paper is to present al-Ghazzālī 's views on

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... e soul, as a theologian, in a systematic way and to reveal al-Ghazzālī's position on the issue. In order to achieve this aim, the paper first examines the existing definitions of the soul, then discusses how al-Ghazzālī defines the soul and the elements related to the soul, such as the nafs, the aql, the heart, and the problems created by the results of these definitions. Finally, the paper claims that al-Ghazzālī can be identified as a dualist agnostic/mysterian regarding the nature of the soul.