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... ntent at http://about.jstor.org/participate--jstor/individuals/early-journal--content. JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not--for--profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. RECENT CASES. 357 and the cases of Lanark v. Dozugher4v, and Coal Co. v. Holmquist (above cited), reported since the writing of the note on this subject, are undoubtedly, as Mr. Prentice suggests, to be regarded as rendering the doctrine of Comparative Negligence obsolete and no longer law. RICE v. D'ARVILLE AND JOHNSON V. GIRDWOOD AFFIRMED. -Rice v. D'Arvilie, 8 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, 172, has been affirmed by the Supreme Court of Massaclhusetts, which seems explicitly to deny, as Mr. Justice Holmes did below, the English case of Liumley v. Wagner, I De G. M. & G. 604. But the nmain ground of the decision, so far as the incomplete report at hand shows, is that the plaintiff was tunable to do his part of the affirmative contract, and therefore not entitled to equitable relief in the negative branch. The decision above is then by no means so farreaching as the principle laid down below. 7ohnson v. Girdwood, 28 N. Y. Suppl. 151, commented on 8 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, 222 ("Can onie cheated into pleading guilty maintain an action for it? "), had been affirmed in the Court of Appeal, without opinion or reasons for the decision, on October 9. It is to be regretted that the commendable zeal of that court to keep up with its docket should deprive the profession of discussion on a case of the first impression with such novel facts and raising so interesting a question. RECENT CASES. AGENCY -EMPLOYER'S STATUTORY LIABILITY-WAYS, WORKS, AND MACHIN- ERY. -Held, that loaded freight cars received by a railroad compaiiy from and belonging to another road, are part of "the ways, works, and machinery " of the railroad, within the meaning of a statute similar to the English Employer's Liability Act. Bowers v. Connecticut River R. R. Co., 38 N. E. Rep. 5o8 (Mass.). While this case turns upon the construction of a statute, yet it is interesting because of the prevalence of statutes of this kind. A different construction was given the statute on facts which are hardly distinguishable in Coffee v. R. R. Co., 155 Mass. 2I, where it was held that empty cars belonging to another company and being returled to that company by the defendant, were not part of " the ways, works, and machinery " of the defendant. The point is now settled in Massachusetts in accordance with the principal case by St. I893, c. 359, which expressly provides that any car in the use of, or in the possessioni of a railroad company, shall be considered a part of its ways, works and machinery. AGENCY -PAROL AUTHORITY. -A Statute of Illinois provides that city councils should allow street railroads to be built only when the land-owners petition for such railroad. There was a petition in this case and the city council granted permission to the defendanit railway company to build a line. Plainitiff I1ow seeks to enjoin the buildinig of it oni the ground that the names of some of the land-owners were signed by agents, as appears on the face of the petition, and that the authority does not appear. The theory was that the authority had to be in writing. Held, a parol authority to signi was good, and injunction will not be granted. Tibbets v. Westand Southz Towns St. Ry. Co., 38 N. E. Rep. 664 (Ill.) . In Illinois an authority to sell or lease lands must be in writing, and the argument of the counsel for plaintiff was that practically land was sold here so the petition could be signed only by the owner, or an agent authorized by writing. The court answered that "there was nothing in the statute changing the common-law rule by which an agent may sign the name of his principal to a writing, under an authority not in writing." They said the fee of the street belonged to the city of Chicago, and that the petitions did not operate as a grant anyway. AGENCY -RATIFICATION BY PRINCIPAL NON-EXISTING AT DATF OF CONTRACT. -One of the promoters of defendant corporation contracted with plaintiff on behalf of 358 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. defendant, to pay plaintiff $I,ooo 0for services to be rendered the corporation. The contract was entered into before the corporation had come into existence. The promoter afterwards became president of the corporation and ratified the contract, it beilng within the scope of his authority to make or ratify contracts of this nature. Held, that such ratificationi made the contract binding upon defendant, Gray and Fitch, JJ., dissenting. Oakes v. Cattarazgus Wazter Co., 38 N. E. Rep. 46I (N. V.) . This decision entirely disregards the established rule of law that acts done on behalf of a non-existing principal cannot afterwards be ratified by that principal. The minority, however, stand by the doctrine. Technically, the established rule cannot be gain. said, for the ratification relating back to the time' whein there was no principal, seems an absurdity. But practically it has often beeni necessary for the courts to look behinid the corporation and at the stockholders, and it would not require such a very great stretch to do so in this case. The body of men who form the corporation are in existence at the date of the contract, and are acting in order to bind themselves, only under another name, that is, the name of the corporation. Is it not better then to say that the court in a case of this kind will look behind the corporate entity and at the real principals, thus avoiding techniical rules, effectuating the intention of the parties, and bringing about more substantial justice ? See I Morawetz Private Corporations, ?? 547-549.