The article is devoted to outlining crucial aspects of defended approach to actions and agency in comparative with primarily J. Hornsby's views. The proposed approach is continuation of developed in the defended by the author candidate (PhD) and doctoral dissertations ideas. J. Hornsby is an outstanding classical philosopher of nowadays, her legacy is connected primarily with analytic tradition; and within it with philosophy of action and agency, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind,

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... hysics, epistemology. Particularities of and relations between such important, but remaining to be vague notions as actions, events, facts, norms, values, evaluations were clarified (using the method of tables). These tasks disclosed ontological (metaphysical) modes actual for both philosophy of action and agency from one side and ontology (metaphysics) – from another. Ontology of action involves metaphysical processing (performing of action) and metaphysical results (achievements by action). The mentioned seem in accordance with J. Hornsby's views. Standard treatments of actions and agency were critically mentioned. The critics against them is due to missing or rather losing in and by them the need of the notion of an agent; because it is intention that causes an action. In the defended approach, as well as in J. Hornsby's theory, the role of an agent has priority. But the most interesting notion from her findings is proved to be trying or attempt to act. It was diversely described, used and shown promising. When successful trying to action coincides with this action. Trying to action is a reason for action. Trying to action does not represent, but present an action. Thus, justification of an action is directly within the action; because action performatively shows itself. Actions performatively validate correspondent events, facts, norms, values, evaluations.