Scheduling without Payments [chapter]

Elias Koutsoupias
2011 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We consider mechanisms without payments for the problem of scheduling unrelated machines. Specifically, we consider truthful in expectation randomized mechanisms under the assumption that a machine (player) is bound by its reports: when a machine lies and reports valuet i j for a task instead of the actual one t i j , it will execute for timet i j if it gets the task-unless the declared valuet i j is less than the actual value t i j , in which case, it will execute for time t i j . Our main
more » ... nical result is an optimal mechanism for one task and n players which has approximation ratio (n + 1)/2. We also provide a matching lower bound, showing that no other truthful mechanism can achieve a better approximation ratio. This immediately gives an approximation ratio of (n + 1)/2 and n(n + 1)/2 for social cost and makespan minimization, respectively, for any number of tasks.
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_14 fatcat:odivegd6lvdd7dane6nqncvnve