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Metric Distortion of Social Choice Rules: Lower Bounds and Fairness Properties
[article]
2017
arXiv
pre-print
We study social choice rules under the utilitarian distortion framework, with an additional metric assumption on the agents' costs over the alternatives. In this approach, these costs are given by an underlying metric on the set of all agents plus alternatives. Social choice rules have access to only the ordinal preferences of agents but not the latent cardinal costs that induce them. Distortion is then defined as the ratio between the social cost (typically the sum of agent costs) of the
arXiv:1612.02912v2
fatcat:cqulsgce65gzjigb7c22caqhgi