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Preference domains and the monotonicity of condorcet extensions

Paul J. Healy, Michael Peress
<span title="">2015</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/qq4ijsawy5cuxl5pxjq6mo6zoy" style="color: black;">Economics Letters</a> </i> &nbsp;
A social choice correspondence (SCC) is a Condorcet extension if it selects exactly the set of Condorcet winners, whenever a Condorcet winner exists.  ...  Examples can be constructed easily using the necessary conditions from Dutta and Sen (1991) .  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.02.028">doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2015.02.028</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/32hxh4vlwvfrpesytuzxkue7ai">fatcat:32hxh4vlwvfrpesytuzxkue7ai</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170705070905/http://healy.econ.ohio-state.edu/papers/Healy_Peress-CondorcetExtensions.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/61/c4/61c428b41877417201196406e0088b691a9e87d4.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.02.028"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> elsevier.com </button> </a>

Dealing with incomplete agents' preferences and an uncertain agenda in group decision making via sequential majority voting [article]

Maria Pini, Francesca Rossi, Brent Venable, Toby Walsh
<span title="2009-09-24">2009</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
We therefore study how to determine collectively optimal decisions (also called winners) when preferences may be incomplete, and when the agenda may be uncertain.  ...  They help understand the complexity of tasks such as determining if a decision can be taken collectively, as well as knowing if the winner can be manipulated by appropriately ordering the agenda.  ...  In (Lang et al. 2007 ) a Condorcet winner is called a necessary winner.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/0909.4441v1">arXiv:0909.4441v1</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/epuvlwk2cbe3baq5cavqryx5ky">fatcat:epuvlwk2cbe3baq5cavqryx5ky</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://archive.org/download/arxiv-0909.4441/0909.4441.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> File Archive [PDF] </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/0909.4441v1" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

The Incidence of Some Voting Paradoxes Under Domain Restrictions

Hannu Nurmi
<span title="2020-08-17">2020</span> <i title="Springer Science and Business Media LLC"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/fq5wzxvym5ca7cvep6e6liigem" style="color: black;">Group Decision and Negotiation</a> </i> &nbsp;
In this article we study some well known voting paradoxes under the assumption that the underlying profiles are drawn from the Condorcet domain, i.e. a set of preference profiles where a Condorcet winner  ...  The motivation for this restriction is the often stated assumption that profiles with a Condorcet winner are more likely than those without it.  ...  This domain contains the single-peakedness profiles as single-peakedness is a sufficient condition for there being a Condorcet winner. It is, however, not necessary as shown by Table 3 .  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-020-09697-9">doi:10.1007/s10726-020-09697-9</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/dwm6rw7mgbdczbwvgg4ko7ng5e">fatcat:dwm6rw7mgbdczbwvgg4ko7ng5e</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20201108160042/https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10726-020-09697-9.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/87/e5/87e5ad843b0dec7af6ce467a17bdb8d16b9e80d2.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-020-09697-9"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="unlock alternate icon" style="background-color: #fb971f;"></i> springer.com </button> </a>

Borda efficiency of constant scoring rules with large electorates

William V. Gehrlein
<span title="">1981</span> <i title="EDP Sciences"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/inei2pvlvnaw7lwfzvf7meb67e" style="color: black;">Reserche operationelle</a> </i> &nbsp;
The Condorcet Criterion requires that the Condorcet winner should be selected as the winner when a Condorcet winner exists.  ...  The Condorcet efficienty of Rule C k on m alternatives^ denoted by E™, is the probability that Rule C k will piek the Condorcet winner given that a Condorcet winner exists.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/1981150302871">doi:10.1051/ro/1981150302871</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/43iturphcnhfndsuzbdio5daii">fatcat:43iturphcnhfndsuzbdio5daii</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180719155025/https://www.rairo-ro.org/articles/ro/pdf/1981/03/ro1981150302871.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/65/0e/650e22940ba20a6a90e776862b32306e18f77aa5.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/1981150302871"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="unlock alternate icon" style="background-color: #fb971f;"></i> Publisher / doi.org </button> </a>

The Borda rule, Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability

Eyal Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan
<span title="2003-10-01">2003</span> <i title="Springer Nature"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/ctdypx5b5vc7dgs6m6avzta2e4" style="color: black;">Economic Theory</a> </i> &nbsp;
Such inconsistency occurs when the Condorcet winner (the alternative which is preferred to any other alternative by a simple majority) is not selected by the Borda rule.  ...  This note exposes the relationship between the Borda rule and the Condorcet q-majority principle as well as the Condorcet q-majority voting rule.  ...  of a Condorcet q-rule winner under any preference profile.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0318-3">doi:10.1007/s00199-002-0318-3</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/r253vmidtrarxjr62xaiweemki">fatcat:r253vmidtrarxjr62xaiweemki</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20041030183440/http://faculty.biu.ac.il:80/~nitzans/pdf/5.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/03/32/03328203be4f46a4a6dce1f40a6ca2d4cd304238.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0318-3"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> springer.com </button> </a>

Condorcet winners on median spaces

Berno Buechel
<span title="2013-05-30">2013</span> <i title="Springer Nature"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/camnssxuprevbc2yeve4w3dtku" style="color: black;">Social Choice and Welfare</a> </i> &nbsp;
Our main result is the following: If a Condorcet winner (i.e. a winner in pairwise majority voting) exists, then it coincides with the appropriately defined median ("the median voter").  ...  The assumption that a Condorcet winner exists is necessary for both part (i) and part (ii) of Prop.  ...  For the first part (i) the assumption of heterogeneous preferences is not necessary, but it is necessary for the second part.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0744-0">doi:10.1007/s00355-013-0744-0</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/h5leofbmqrdwrfhqrj6bcdqvta">fatcat:h5leofbmqrdwrfhqrj6bcdqvta</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20171111014555/https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/12035615.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/09/75/0975f7478e4f156f7862319574a8446b971efbd7.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0744-0"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> springer.com </button> </a>

Page 162 of Automation and Remote Control Vol. 53, Issue 2 [page]

<span title="">1992</span> <i title="Springer Science &amp; Business Media"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://archive.org/details/pub_automation-and-remote-control" style="color: black;">Automation and Remote Control </a> </i> &nbsp;
Informally, the Condorcet set consists of the Condorcet winner (if it exists) or, if the Condorcet winner does no exist, then it consists of a so-called upper cycle, i.e., the minimal set of vertices forming  ...  These concepts are nontrivial because there exist voting procedures that do not satisfy the Condorcet principle, i.e., some preference profiles do not include the Condorcet winner in the group choice.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://archive.org/details/sim_automation-and-remote-control_1992-02_53_2/page/162" title="read fulltext microfilm" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Archive [Microfilm] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://archive.org/serve/sim_automation-and-remote-control_1992-02_53_2/__ia_thumb.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a>

Lewis Carroll, Voting, and the Taxicab Metric

Thomas C. Ratliff
<span title="">2010</span> <i title="Informa UK Limited"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/fey2bvke3bfdfpomrczrnz2gue" style="color: black;">The College Mathematics Journal</a> </i> &nbsp;
Since this method is computationally expensive, several techniques have been proposed for approximating the Dodgson winner.  ...  In this pamphlet, Dodgson uses a specific criterion to critique other voting methods, and although he does not explicitly propose it as a method to determine the winner, this criterion has come to be known  ...  For each candidate in the top cycle, determine the number of adjacency switches in voters' preferences that are necessary to make the candidate the Condorcet winner.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.4169/074683410x510308">doi:10.4169/074683410x510308</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/2nydrj2xnzf3jeu6fbhm5bnvie">fatcat:2nydrj2xnzf3jeu6fbhm5bnvie</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170810025328/https://www.maa.org/sites/default/files/pdf/cmj_ftp/CMJ/September%202010/3%20Articles/6%2009-229%20Ratliff/Dodgson_CMJ_Final.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/66/e6/66e6a25066a62c05b9f63d9ce2fa089d824dc041.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.4169/074683410x510308"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> Publisher / doi.org </button> </a>

Condorcet Winners for Public Goods

Lihua Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Qizhi Fang, Feng Tian
<span title="">2005</span> <i title="Springer Nature"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/kov3rwzipzf2dmxyohqwfpxrsm" style="color: black;">Annals of Operations Research</a> </i> &nbsp;
A location of the public facility is a majority rule winner if there is no other location in the network where more than half of the voters would have been closer to than the majority rule winner.  ...  In Section 4, we give a sufficient and necessary condition for a point to be a weak quasi-Condorcet winner for cycles in the case the edge-length function is a constant, and present a much more interesting  ...  Condorcet winners and weak quasi-Condorcet winners, but has no strong Condorcet winners.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-005-2258-3">doi:10.1007/s10479-005-2258-3</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/wnczzmuiuvdy3npmpovu6gzoxi">fatcat:wnczzmuiuvdy3npmpovu6gzoxi</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190226210641/http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/7730/9ca70479a7d395a9dea2c97749113fbd8030.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/77/30/77309ca70479a7d395a9dea2c97749113fbd8030.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-005-2258-3"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> springer.com </button> </a>

A Problem with Referendums

Dean Lacy, Emerson M.S. Niou
<span title="">2000</span> <i title="SAGE Publications"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/vbnmb3d32fhgdhe3zlx36blrvi" style="color: black;">Journal of Theoretical Politics</a> </i> &nbsp;
KEY WORDS • Condorcet winner • nonseparable preferences • referendums • sequential voting • strategic voting • vote-trading 1.  ...  When some voters have nonseparable preferences across multiple binary issues, majority rule may not select a Condorcet winning set of outcomes when one exists, and the social choice may be a Condorcet  ...  Explicit vote-trading is not necessary to select a Condorcet winner since sequential voting by sophisticated voters will also produce a Condorcet winner when one exists.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0951692800012001001">doi:10.1177/0951692800012001001</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/jnb3jezpmvdfvdtrcghlvbl3we">fatcat:jnb3jezpmvdfvdtrcghlvbl3we</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160705073153/http://sites.duke.edu:80/niou/files/2011/06/referendum-JTP.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/63/d9/63d9ad1bd3c5e08be822d122cffb6bef36abf310.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0951692800012001001"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> sagepub.com </button> </a>

Complexity of Terminating Preference Elicitation [article]

Toby Walsh
<span title="2009-03-06">2009</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
Finally, we study the connection between predicting the winner of an election and preference elicitation.  ...  They proved that for any scoring rule, possible and necessary winners are polynomial to compute, as are possible and necessary Condorcet winners.  ...  CONDORCET WINNER The Condorcet winner is the candidate who beats all others in pairwise elections. Unfortunately, not all elections have a Condorcet winner.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/0903.1137v1">arXiv:0903.1137v1</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/blb5eesgjfhqvond6f5hxfdevm">fatcat:blb5eesgjfhqvond6f5hxfdevm</a> </span>
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Reducing the Computational Time for the Kemeny Method by Exploiting Condorcet Properties

Noelia Rico, Camino R. Vela, Raúl Pérez-Fernández, Irene Díaz
<span title="2021-06-15">2021</span> <i title="MDPI AG"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/ye33srllvnanjouxn4tmrfgjsq" style="color: black;">Mathematics</a> </i> &nbsp;
In this work, we propose an enhanced version of this algorithm based on pruning the search space when some Condorcet properties hold.  ...  Among the most prominent methods for ranking aggregation, the Kemeny method has been proved to be the only one that satisfies some desirable properties such as neutrality, consistency and the Condorcet  ...  but are not the Condorcet winner (if any).  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.3390/math9121380">doi:10.3390/math9121380</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/ha6z2xnanrhbtbuh6apxx2qtai">fatcat:ha6z2xnanrhbtbuh6apxx2qtai</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20210616121328/https://res.mdpi.com/d_attachment/mathematics/mathematics-09-01380/article_deploy/mathematics-09-01380.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/84/dd/84ddb2562e064781c23938d13e732f5705023853.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.3390/math9121380"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="unlock alternate icon" style="background-color: #fb971f;"></i> mdpi.com </button> </a>

A note on the query complexity of the Condorcet winner problem

Ariel D. Procaccia
<span title="">2008</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/5xfy4fcdxvcvdiybp6iqbffqc4" style="color: black;">Information Processing Letters</a> </i> &nbsp;
(known as a Condorcet winner in social choice theory) is exactly 2n − log(n) − 2. This stands in stark contrast to the evasiveness of this property in general digraphs.  ...  Theorem 2.2. 2n − log(n) − 2 queries are necessary to determine whether a Condorcet winner exists in a given tournament T .  ...  In a tournament, a candidate that dominates every other candidate (that is, has an outdegree of n − 1) is known as a Condorcet winner. 2 The question of the existence of a Condorcet winner has a special  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ipl.2008.07.012">doi:10.1016/j.ipl.2008.07.012</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/4fascly4avctvjaredppx33qi4">fatcat:4fascly4avctvjaredppx33qi4</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130108014234/http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~arielpro/papers/concrete.ipl.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/f1/bc/f1bc56dcd695825e8d38a929f7ed56afd5692ccd.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ipl.2008.07.012"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> elsevier.com </button> </a>

Winner determination in voting trees with incomplete preferences and weighted votes

Jérôme Lang, Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi, Domenico Salvagnin, Kristen Brent Venable, Toby Walsh
<span title="2011-04-05">2011</span> <i title="Springer Nature"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/7rdrzlhoxjb5ho2u76erh6zpni" style="color: black;">Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems</a> </i> &nbsp;
winners and a subset of the necessary winners which are based on the completions of the (incomplete) majority graph built from the incomplete profiles.  ...  In each setting, we address the complexity of computing necessary (respectively, possible) winners, which are those candidates winning for all completions (respectively, at least one completion) of the  ...  We also define possible and necessary Condorcet winners [21] , and possible and necessary fair winners: Definition 12 (possible and necessary Condorcet winners) Let P be an incomplete profile and A a  ... 
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Daunou's voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities

Salvador Barberà, Walter Bossert, Kotaro Suzumura
<span title="2020-08-24">2020</span> <i title="Springer Science and Business Media LLC"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/camnssxuprevbc2yeve4w3dtku" style="color: black;">Social Choice and Welfare</a> </i> &nbsp;
Pierre Daunou, a contemporary of Borda and Condorcet during the era of the French Revolution and active debates on alternative voting rules, proposed a rule that chooses the strong Condorcet winner if  ...  A study of the history of opinion is a necessary preliminary to the emancipation of the mind. I do not know which makes a man more conservative-to know nothing  ...  winners or strong Condorcet losers.  ... 
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