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Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas

Daniel Fragiadakis, Atsushi Iwasaki, Peter Troyan, Suguru Ueda, Makoto Yokoo
2016 ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation  
We consider the school choice problem allowing schools to have minimum (in addition to the standard maximum) quotas. Standard properties such as strategyproofness, fairness, and nonwastefulness become incompatible with minimum quotas. Taking strategyproofness as necessary, we introduce new definitions of nonwastefulness and fairness that are compatible with minimum quotas. We provide new mechanisms that satisfy all minimum quotas and that are as nonwasteful and as fair as possible. We use
more » ... sible. We use computer simulations to show that significantly more students prefer our more flexible mechanisms to the commonly used solution of artificially imposing lower maximum quotas and then using standard mechanisms such as deferred acceptance. JEL Classification: C78, D61, D63, I20
doi:10.1145/2841226 fatcat:hhbrfjeg5fhkzjn24wyo43br6u