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1986 Grazer Philosophische Studien  
A recent trend in Husserl scholarship takes the Logische Untersuchun gen (LU) as advancing an inconsistent and confused view of the non-conceptual content of perceptual experience. Against this, I argue that there is no inconsistency about non-conceptualism in LU. Rather, LU presents a hybrid view of the conceptual nature of perceptual experience, which can easily be misread as inconsistent, since it combines a conceptualist view of perceptual content (or matter) with a non-conceptualist view
more » ... onceptualist view of perceptual acts. I show how this hybrid view is operative in Husserl's analyses of essentially occasional expressions and categorial intuition. And I argue that is also deployed in relation to Husserl's analysis of the constitution of perceptual fullness, which allows it to avoid an objection raised by Walter Hopp -that the combination of Husserl's analysis of perceptual fullness with conceptualism about perceptual content generates a vicious regress.
doi:10.1163/18756735-90000281 fatcat:6fkiy5peubgh7gerwtxajkmjfu