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A minimax procedure for electing committees

Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour, M. Remzi Sanver
2007 Public Choice  
The manipulability of these procedures, and their applicability when election outcomes are restricted in various ways, are also investigated.  ...  4 A new voting procedure for electing committees, called the minimax procedure, is described.  ...  In fact, 4 of the 12 minimax winners differ from the minisum winners.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s11127-007-9165-x fatcat:hp4o2o5uxzalndz4d7drrye4sm

Some results on approximating the minimax solution in approval voting

Rob LeGrand, Evangelos Markakis, Aranyak Mehta
2007 Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - AAMAS '07  
Here, we study a voting protocol for multi-winner elections, called approval voting, and we investigate the complexity of computing the minimax solution, concentrating on elections for committees of fixed  ...  Finally, we address the issue of manipulating minimax outcomes.  ...  Complexity considerations for winner determination in multi-winner elections have also been addressed recently (Procaccia, Rosenschein, & Zohar 2007) but not for the minimax solution.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1329125.1329365 dblp:conf/atal/LeGrandMM07 fatcat:dfdk4xczkva7xklusp3bnxezya

Computational Aspects of Approval Voting [chapter]

Dorothea Baumeister, Gábor Erdélyi, Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jörg Rothe
2010 Studies in Choice and Welfare  
of an election: manipulation, control, and bribery.  ...  Finally, we study local search heuristics for minimax approval voting, a variant of approval voting proposed by Brams, Kilgour, and Sanver [BKS04] (see also [BKS07a, BKS07b]) for the purpose of electing  ...  Acknowledgments We are grateful to Claudia Lindner for many helpful proofreading comments and suggestions.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_10 fatcat:arteomngqfdannmzaubhzhkbwa

On Choosing Committees Based on Approval Votes in the Presence of Outliers [article]

Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
2015 arXiv   pre-print
Our first result shows that outlier consideration makes committee selection problem intractable for approval, net approval, and minisum approval voting rules.  ...  We study the computational complexity of committee selection problem for several approval-based voting rules in the presence of outliers.  ...  In the context of social choice theory, the notion of outliers are intimately related to manipulation and control of election by removing voters and candidates [Bartholdi et al., 1992 , Bartholdi III  ... 
arXiv:1511.04190v1 fatcat:eeeemn6gvvd4nevevtjr5tbhsu

Voting: Beyond Simple Majorities and Single-Winner Elections (Dagstuhl Seminar 17261)

Dorothea Baumeister, Piotr Faliszewski, Annick Laruelle, Toby Walsh, Marc Herbstritt
2017 Dagstuhl Reports  
This report documents the program and the outcomes of Dagstuhl Seminar 17261 "Voting: Beyond simple majorities and single-winner elections".  ...  The seminar was mostly focused on multiwinner elections (from discussions of their algorithmic properties to political-science considerations), but the topics of real-life voting experiments and strategic  ...  A committee is then elected by applying the minisum or minimax approach to minimize the voters' dissatisfaction.  ... 
doi:10.4230/dagrep.7.6.109 dblp:journals/dagstuhl-reports/BaumeisterFLW17 fatcat:l7w33zdcivheras6b2m2lctb7a

Collaborating institutions [chapter]

2016 The Financial System We Need  
We propose a general procedure to determine a weighting vector that permit us to consider different criteria to measure the separation of each alternative from the ideal point, minimax and minisum criteria  ...  In cases where minimax criterion are considered, we propose a lexicographical procedure that determines such solution that best represents such criterion.  ...  We also prove the density of the polynomials in these spaces and, finally, we find conditions under which the multiplication operator is bounded in the space of polynomials.  ... 
doi:10.18356/b4968a28-en fatcat:v75hvlhqebfglfsx7q4qwwlc34