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Which Is the Worst-Case Nash Equilibrium?
[chapter]

2003
*
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
*

,

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-45138-9_49
fatcat:now2k3qnmfazjodfrkmscgxz7i
*is**the**worst*-*case**Nash**equilibrium*. ... In particular, we are interested in identifying*the**worst*-*case**Nash**equilibrium*-*the*one that maximizes social cost. ...*The**worst*-*case**Nash**equilibrium**is*one that maximizes social cost. ...##
###
Safe Equilibrium
[article]

2022
*
arXiv
*
pre-print

On

arXiv:2201.04266v5
fatcat:rc7d2esn5fex5idihxycnjdysy
*the*other hand, a maximin strategy assumes that all opposing agents are playing to minimize our payoff (even if it*is*not in their best interest), and ensures*the*maximal possible*worst*-*case*payoff, ...*The*standard game-theoretic solution concept,*Nash**equilibrium*, assumes that all players behave rationally. ... realistic than*the**worst*-*case*assumption. ...##
###
Beyond equilibrium

2010
*
Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory on Conference on Future Directions - BQGT '10
*

It

doi:10.1145/1807406.1807449
dblp:conf/bqgt/Wright10
fatcat:ua23q7lrijelbabnb5csq462nm
*is*standard in multiagent settings to assume that agents will adopt*Nash**equilibrium*strategies. ... However, studies in experimental economics demonstrate that*Nash**equilibrium**is*a poor description of human players' actual behaviour. ... First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Kevin Leyton-Brown, for introducing me to behavioural game theory in*the*first place, and for his continued guidance in every aspect of research. ...##
###
Conditional strategy equilibrium
[article]

2022
*
arXiv
*
pre-print

In this note, we prove

arXiv:2103.06928v3
fatcat:oawkkok5mrdalasud5qlsp4rpm
*the*existence of an*equilibrium*concept, dubbed conditional strategy*equilibrium*, for non-cooperative games in*which*a strategy of a player*is*a function from*the*other players' ... We study*the*properties of efficiency and coalition-proofness of*the*conditional strategy*equilibrium*in n-person games. ... benchmark model, we assume that a conditional strategy profile that produces a disagreement induces*the**worst*utility in*the*game to*the*players,*which**is*similar to*the*disagreement outcome in*the**Nash*...##
###
Legitimate equilibrium

2021
*
International Journal of Game Theory
*

AbstractWe present a general existence result for a type of

doi:10.1007/s00182-021-00768-y
fatcat:grnewjeybnda3ae3ufcc5qh37e
*equilibrium*in normal-form games,*which*extends*the*concept of*Nash**equilibrium*. ... A strategy profile*is*called a legitimate*equilibrium*if each player evaluates this profile by*the*upper integral, and each player evaluates all his possible deviations by*the*lower integral. ... This new*equilibrium*concept*is*a novel generalisation of*the*concept of*Nash**equilibrium*. ...##
###
Empirical Equilibrium
[article]

2020
*
arXiv
*
pre-print

We study

arXiv:1804.07986v3
fatcat:jycmtwma2nfijf7kj57mtnlaau
*the*foundations of empirical*equilibrium*, a refinement of*Nash**equilibrium*that*is*based on a non-parametric characterization of empirical distributions of behavior in games (Velez and Brown,2020b ...*The*refinement can be alternatively defined as those*Nash*equilibria that do not refute*the*regular QRE theory of Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey (2005). ... If some of these outcomes are implausible, then a*worst**case*scenario analysis can be unnecessarily pessimistic, and a best*case*scenario analysis can be unrealistically optimistic. ...##
###
Cursed Equilibrium

2005
*
Econometrica
*

sets better than

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00631.x
fatcat:icg67v54ejgwrmifpqr2disr6y
*the*parameter value corresponding to Bayesian*Nash**equilibrium*. ... We test a single-parameter variant of our model that embeds Bayesian*Nash**equilibrium*as a special*case*and find that parameter values corresponding to cursedness fit a broad range of experimental data ... Moreover,*the*existence of a Bayesian*Nash**equilibrium*(*which**is*to say, a χ = 0 cursed*equilibrium*)*is*neither necessary nor sufficient for*the*existence of a χ-cursed*equilibrium*for each χ ∈ (0, 1]. ...##
###
Stackelberg versus Cournot Equilibrium

1999
*
Games and Economic Behavior
*

While our findings essentially confirm

doi:10.1006/game.1998.0650
fatcat:ioie6d6rq5chvcfgknsxw5dqai
*the*predominance of*the*former, they also indicate that*the*latter*is*natural under some robust but restrictive conditions. ... For quantity duopoly we provide different sets of minimal conditions, directly on*the*demand and cost functions, yielding respectively*the*simultaneous and*the*two sequential modes of play. ... 2 y > y s P x s + y s − C 2 y s This says that*the*follower prefers*the**worst*Cournot-*Nash**equilibrium*(for himself) to any Stackelberg*equilibrium*. ...##
###
How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures

2010
*
Games and Economic Behavior
*

Specifically, we show lower bounds that are exponential in

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.002
fatcat:xeqrst7hazbyrg6islro2m5epm
*the*number of players in each one of*the*following*cases*: (1) reaching a pure*Nash**equilibrium*; (2) reaching a pure*Nash**equilibrium*in a Bayesian ... We then show that, in contrast,*the*communication complexity of reaching a correlated*equilibrium**is*polynomial in*the*number of players. ...*The*research was partially supported by grants of*the*Israel Science Foundation (Hart, Mansour) and by an IBM faculty award (Mansour). ...##
###
HOW LONG TO EQUILIBRIUM? THE COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY OF UNCOUPLED EQUILIBRIUM PROCEDURES
[chapter]

2013
*
World Scientific Series in Economic Theory
*

Specifically, we show lower bounds that are exponential in

doi:10.1142/9789814390705_0010
fatcat:pvappj4jpbgz7pfd3ukqfa5g5i
*the*number of players in each one of*the*following*cases*: (1) reaching a pure*Nash**equilibrium*; (2) reaching a pure*Nash**equilibrium*in a Bayesian ... We then show that, in contrast,*the*communication complexity of reaching a correlated*equilibrium**is*polynomial in*the*number of players. ...*The*research was partially supported by grants of*the*Israel Science Foundation (Hart, Mansour) and by an IBM faculty award (Mansour). ...##
###
Perfect Prediction Equilibrium
[article]

2015
*
arXiv
*
pre-print

Finally,

arXiv:1409.6172v2
fatcat:j7mq5xe5yzhphpwvk6ehaq5ave
*the*PPE*is*put in perspective with existing literature (Newcomb's Problem, Superrationality,*Nash**Equilibrium*, Subgame Perfect*Equilibrium*, Backward Induction Paradox, Forward Induction). ... In*the**Nash*paradigm, rational players consider that*the*opponent's strategy*is*fixed while maximizing their payoff. ... Introduction In non-cooperative game theory, one of*the*most common*equilibrium*concepts*is**the*Subgame Perfect*Equilibrium*(SPE) (Selten 1965) , a refinement of*the**Nash**Equilibrium*(*Nash*1951) . ...##
###
Learning and Equilibrium

2009
*
Annual Review of Economics
*

If agents' strategies are completely observed at

doi:10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.142930
fatcat:tpech5epxffvfhvm2cy5vk66u4
*the*end of each round, and agents are randomly matched with a series of anonymous opponents, fairly simple rules perform well in terms of*the*agent's*worst*-*case*...*The*theory of learning in games studies how,*which*and what kind of equilibria might arise as a consequence of a long-run non-*equilibrium*process of learning, adaptation and/or imitation. ... This universality property (called*worst*-*case*analysis in computer science) has proven important in*the*theory of learning, perhaps because it*is*fairly easy to achieve. ...##
###
Equilibrium in Combinatorial Public Projects
[chapter]

2013
*
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
*

For Pure

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_28
fatcat:5h6d6hnmkjbnxhyeo6ah4mbu2q
*Nash*Equilibria we show that*the**worst*-*case*loss in efficiency*is*proportional to*the*number of agents. ... For public projects in*which*only one item*is*selected we show constructively that there always exists a Pure*Nash**Equilibrium*that guarantees at least 1 2 (1 − 1 n ) of*the*optimum. ... For each*equilibrium*notion above, we can measure*worst*-*case*efficiency by way of*the*price of anarchy. ...##
###
Team-maxmin equilibrium: efficiency bounds and algorithms
[article]

2016
*
arXiv
*
pre-print

In this paper, we investigate bounds of (in)efficiency of

arXiv:1611.06134v1
fatcat:fjolrrvx2rhdzniyc5zlch4meq
*the*Team-maxmin*equilibrium*w.r.t.*the**Nash*equilibria and w.r.t.*the*Maxmin*equilibrium*when*the*team members can play correlated strategies. ... Nevertheless, to*the*best of our knowledge,*the*Team-maxmin*equilibrium**is*almost completely unexplored in*the*literature. ... Therefore, there are instances in*which**the**worst**Nash**equilibrium**is*arbitrarily worse than*the*Team-maxmin*equilibrium*and, in its turn,*the*Team-maxmin*equilibrium**is*arbitrarily worse (in this*case*...##
###
Collusion constrained equilibrium

2018
*
Theoretical Economics
*

In each

doi:10.3982/te2762
fatcat:7zkptp6fhjdx5drokbdtgs7the
*case*we show that equilibria in*which*groups choose*the*best alternative exist and that limits of these equilibria lead to collusion constrained equilibria. ... This allows groups to randomize between alternatives to*which*they are not indifferent in certain razor's edge*cases*where slight perturbations of group beliefs change*the*set of incentive compatible plans ... ADEMU*is*funded by*the*European Union's Horizon 2020 Program under grant agreement N° 649396 (ADEMU). _________________________*The*ADEMU Working Paper Series*is*being supported by*the*European Commission ...
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