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Voting by sequential elimination with few voters

Sylvain Bouveret, Yann Chevaleyre, François Durand, Jérôme Lang
2017 Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence  
We define a new class of low-communication voting rules, tailored for contexts with few voters and possibly many candidates.  ...  These rules are defined by a predefined sequence of voters: at each stage, the designated voter eliminates a candidate, and the last remaining candidate wins.  ...  Acknowledgements This research has been supported by the project ANR-14-CE24-0007-01 CoCoRICo-CoDec. Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence  ... 
doi:10.24963/ijcai.2017/19 dblp:conf/ijcai/BouveretCDL17 fatcat:v6uiv3vp25h7lngwdlq3oi56e4

A Problem with Referendums

Dean Lacy, Emerson M.S. Niou
2000 Journal of Theoretical Politics  
loser or Pareto-dominated by every other set of outcomes.  ...  KEY WORDS • Condorcet winner • nonseparable preferences • referendums • sequential voting • strategic votingvote-trading 1.  ...  Voting by sets is too costly for voters when more than a few (two or three) issues are under consideration.  ... 
doi:10.1177/0951692800012001001 fatcat:jnb3jezpmvdfvdtrcghlvbl3we

Solving Seven Open Problems of Offline and Online Control in Borda Elections

Marc Neveling, Jörg Rothe
2017 PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE TWENTY-EIGHTH INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE  
However, for one of the most important natural voting systems, the Borda Count, only a few such complexity results are known.  ...  voting systems—only recently they succeeded in classifying four problems of online candidate control for one natural voting system: sequential plurality (Hemaspaandra et al. 2016).  ...  We thank the reviewers and the SPC member and acknowledge support by DFG RO 1202/15-1.  ... 
doi:10.1609/aaai.v31i1.10703 fatcat:yyjvtqcxh5fzbo7iyfbgxztyhi

Breaking the Brexit Impasse: Achieving a Fair, Legitimate and Democratic Outcome

Toke Aidt, Jagjit S. Chadha, Hamid Sabourian
2019 National Institute Economic Review  
The procedure requires (1) that all options with some minimum support are on the agenda, (2) that voting takes place in multiple rounds and (3) that in each round the alternative with the least support  ...  vote.  ...  This deficiency undermines the legitimacy of any standard one-round voting procedures and underscores the importance of multi-stage voting with sequential elimination of options.  ... 
doi:10.1177/002795011924700103 fatcat:z6ohw5etevcgfew7uwwwdqjtcy

If you like the alternative vote (a.k.a. the instant runoff), then you ought to know about the Coombs rule

Bernard Grofman, Scott L. Feld
2004 Electoral Studies  
Using the instant runoff, the candidate with the fewest first place votes is eliminated; while under the Coombs rule, the candidate with the most last place votes is eliminated.  ...  In both rules, voters are required to rank order candidates.  ...  Acknowledgements This research was partially supported by National Science Foundation grant #SBR 97-30578 (to Grofman and Anthony Marley), Program in Methodology, Measurement and Statistics.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2003.08.001 fatcat:xoi6p56ug5gijfclefgm54koli

When Voters Make Laws

Elizabeth Garrett, Mathew D. McCubbins
2008 Public Works Management & Policy  
attention. 2 In this paper we discuss three challenges facing the use the initiative and referendum process to fund local infrastructure projects; these problems suggest that we cannot be confident that voters  ...  the sequential elimination agenda problems.  ...  voters armed with effective voting cues.  ... 
doi:10.1177/1087724x08321016 fatcat:fny5t6v57zbcjfbcqqx2sixw3q

Super Tuesday: campaign finance and the dynamics of sequential elections

Rainer Schwabe
2014 Social Choice and Welfare  
I provide a rationale for Super Tuesday electoral calendars in which a block of voters vote simultaneously early in the election followed by other voters voting sequentially.  ...  I develop a model of campaign ...nance in primary elections in which campaigns, which supply hard information about candidates' electability, must be ...nanced by strategic donors.  ...  Indeed, with only …ve voters, there are few opportunities and the SIG.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00355-014-0856-1 fatcat:n6f7qkrxojadfju4jufriiaupa

Learning and Coordination in the Presidential Primary System

George Deltas, Helios Herrera, Mattias K. Polborn
2015 The Review of Economic Studies  
This setup generates two problems that are affected by the temporal organization of primaries: First, voters in late-voting states can use the results in early elections to update on candidates' valences  ...  The advantage of sequential voting is to minimize vote-splitting in late districts; however, coordination may occur on the wrong candidate.  ...  In other words, all voters with preferred position θ i = 0 vote for candidate 1, while those voters with θ i = 1 either vote for candidate 2 or 3. 10 This creates a coordination 8 In elections with more  ... 
doi:10.1093/restud/rdv055 fatcat:le3j2wfcgzgsbfqfxh3kklogzi

Simple Elections I [chapter]

W. D. Wallis
2014 The Mathematics of Elections and Voting  
There is a well-defined set of voters-the electorate-and each voter casts one vote. The votes are then counted. We shall refer to such an election as a simple election.  ...  Sequential Voting Another technique used to avoid the problems of the plurality method is sequential voting.  ...  While the electors are not required by federal law to honor their pledge, there have been very few occasions when an elector voted otherwise.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-09810-4_2 fatcat:5g4kivzat5ggpii7ug4gxhwldq

Blockchain based voting system for Jordan parliament elections

Mohammad Malkawi, Muneer Bani Yassein, Asmaa Bataineh
2021 International Journal of Power Electronics and Drive Systems (IJPEDS)  
casting votes by voters.  ...  Covid-19 pandemic has stressed more than any-time before the necessity for conducting election processes in an electronic manner, where voters can cast their votes remotely with complete security, privacy  ...  Also, the sequential voting prevents voters from entering the voting process together by design and forcing the voters for waiting outside the voting structure.  ... 
doi:10.11591/ijece.v11i5.pp4325-4335 fatcat:ukdm34zr7fdjna4neumkjg6aa4

Heuristic Voting Under the Alternative Vote: The Efficiency of "Sour Grapes" Behavior

Jean-François Laslier
2016 Homo Oeconomicus  
This theoretical paper contrasts two voting heuristics: overstating and replacing. Under the Alternative Vote, overstatement is inefficient but replacement is efficient.  ...  The paper argues that the "replacing" manipulation corresponds to a psychologically and politically plausible voter behavior. JEL code: D72  ...  The few observations of AV in the laboratory by Van der Straeten et al. (2010) systematically conform to it.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s41412-016-0001-8 fatcat:5vtbm25nzjbotod2skuikfvxcq

Phragmén's and Thiele's election methods [article]

Svante Janson
2018 arXiv   pre-print
The relation with STV is also discussed. The paper also contains historical information on the methods.  ...  The election methods introduced in 1894--1895 by Phragm\'en and Thiele, and their somewhat later versions for ordered (ranked) ballots, are discussed in detail.  ...  Hence, the voters favouring B have thus in reality eliminated their candidate by voting BC instead of ABC!  ... 
arXiv:1611.08826v2 fatcat:nmcb5zviizby7fcez3lbkliylu

Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections

Eddie Dekel, Michele Piccione
2000 Journal of Political Economy  
We explore sequential voting in symmetric two-option environments.  ...  We illustrate several instances in which sequential voting does no better at aggregating information than simultaneous voting.  ...  revealed by the first few decision makers.  ... 
doi:10.1086/262110 fatcat:6y5l4vqn3zf5hbsoxrj6nqkcx4

The Excess Method: A Multiwinner Approval Voting Procedure to Allocate Wasted Votes

Steven Brams, Markus Brill
2018 Social Science Research Network  
More specifically, the excess method largely eliminates the need for voters to anticipate the voting behavior of other voters and vote strategically (in particular, so as not to waste votes on shoo-ins  ...  The excess method does this by sequentially allocating excess votes to a voter's as-yet-unelected approved candidates, based on the Jefferson method of apportionment.  ...  Acknowledgments Markus Brill's work was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft under Grant BR 4744/2-1. We thank Karen Long Jusko and D. Marc Kilgour for helpful comments.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.3274796 fatcat:o7fbmytug5dd5k7t6od3hv72pa

The Communication Burden of Single Transferable Vote, in Practice [chapter]

Manel Ayadi, Nahla Ben Amor, Jérôme Lang
2018 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
In the first part of the paper, we assume that voters give, in a single shot, their top k alternatives; we define a version of STV that works for such k-truncated votes, and we evaluate empirically (on  ...  Single Transferable Vote (STV) is of particular interest for voting, for cognitive reasons (it is easy to understand) and normative reasons (it is clone-proof).  ...  We now define a stronger notion of a necessary loser, which only applies to rules that proceed by sequential elimination: x ∈ A is an immediate loser if we know that x will be the next candidate eliminated  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_23 fatcat:rrfyruwuxzb3jmrz7drq67oepe
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