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Sound Modular Verification of C Code Executing in an Unverified Context

Pieter Agten, Bart Jacobs, Frank Piessens
2015 SIGPLAN notices  
Acknowledgments We thank Greta Yorsh and our anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions that have improved the quality of this paper.  ...  This is also a bug, but it will not violate any property of the verified module assumed by the verifier, hence our runtime checks will allow this.  ...  This includes both memory safety failures (e.g. dereferencing invalid memory addresses) as well as failures of assertions that were statically verified to hold. • Security properties verified to hold in  ... 
doi:10.1145/2775051.2676972 fatcat:ir7tfm4kd5getljnmge6p7punq

Sound Modular Verification of C Code Executing in an Unverified Context

Pieter Agten, Bart Jacobs, Frank Piessens
2015 Proceedings of the 42nd Annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages - POPL '15  
Acknowledgments We thank Greta Yorsh and our anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions that have improved the quality of this paper.  ...  This is also a bug, but it will not violate any property of the verified module assumed by the verifier, hence our runtime checks will allow this.  ...  This includes both memory safety failures (e.g. dereferencing invalid memory addresses) as well as failures of assertions that were statically verified to hold. • Security properties verified to hold in  ... 
doi:10.1145/2676726.2676972 dblp:conf/popl/Agten0P15 fatcat:jhccknvchbamhcleoi3xtgdotm

The e-ACSL perspective on runtime assertion checking

Julien Signoles
2021 Proceedings of the 5th ACM International Workshop on Verification and mOnitoring at Runtime EXecution  
Runtime Assertion Checking (RAC) is the discipline of verifying program assertions at runtime, i.e. when executing the code.  ...  Here, we revisit these three RAC's research areas by emphasizing the works done in E-ACSL, which is both a BISL and a RAC tool for C code. We also compare it to others languages and tools.  ...  Indeed, pure methods are easy to execute for runtime assertion checkers, but lead to several issues for consistently verify them for deductive verifiers [35] .  ... 
doi:10.1145/3464974.3468451 fatcat:qcnslj6awvep3lm6b4y5o5ayum

SmacC: A Retargetable Symbolic Execution Engine [chapter]

Armin Biere, Jens Knoop, Laura Kovács, Jakob Zwirchmayr
2013 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
SmacC is a symbolic execution engine for C programs. It can be used for program verification, bounded model checking and generating SMT benchmarks.  ...  SmacC uses the logic for bit-vectors with arrays to construct a bit-precise memorymodel of a program for path-wise exploration.  ...  We analyzed a memcopy and a stringcopy implementation for bounded runtime-and memory-safety (with bounded array-size 50, respectively 40), verified the functional correctness of a palindrome check and  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-02444-8_40 fatcat:qsnedy6xnja2jetlowlxvnsj24

A design and verification methodology for secure isolated regions

Rohit Sinha, Manuel Costa, Akash Lal, Nuno P. Lopes, Sriram Rajamani, Sanjit A. Seshia, Kapil Vaswani
2016 SIGPLAN notices  
The runtime library includes core services such as secure communication channels and memory management.  ...  We present /CONFIDENTIAL: a verifier for IRC that is modular, automatic, and keeps our compiler out of the trusted computing base.  ...  We gratefully acknowledge our shepherd Michael Hicks and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful feedback.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2980983.2908113 fatcat:mal7vs5nvvhhnkkawe7ct3v6pi

A design and verification methodology for secure isolated regions

Rohit Sinha, Manuel Costa, Akash Lal, Nuno P. Lopes, Sriram Rajamani, Sanjit A. Seshia, Kapil Vaswani
2016 Proceedings of the 37th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation - PLDI 2016  
The runtime library includes core services such as secure communication channels and memory management.  ...  We present /CONFIDENTIAL: a verifier for IRC that is modular, automatic, and keeps our compiler out of the trusted computing base.  ...  We gratefully acknowledge our shepherd Michael Hicks and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful feedback.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2908080.2908113 dblp:conf/pldi/0001CLLRSV16 fatcat:6dqxszlsonb7nltu5hmmypea6e

Design, Implementation and Verification of an eXtensible and Modular Hypervisor Framework

A. Vasudevan, S. Chaki, Limin Jia, J. McCune, J. Newsome, A. Datta
2013 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy  
preserving the fundamental hypervisor security property of memory integrity (i.e., ensuring that the hypervisor's memory is not modified by software running at a lower privilege level).  ...  We verify the memory integrity of the XMHF core -6018 lines of code -using a combination of automated and manual techniques.  ...  We thank our shepherd, William Enck, for his help with the final version of this paper, as well as the anonymous reviewers for their detailed comments.  ... 
doi:10.1109/sp.2013.36 dblp:conf/sp/VasudevanCJMND13 fatcat:dugdofrzlfeczkkp5bobzqj2ji

Fast as a shadow, expressive as a tree

Arvid Jakobsson, Nikolai Kosmatov, Julien Signoles
2015 Proceedings of the 30th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing - SAC '15  
This combined monitoring technique has been implemented in the runtime assertion checking tool for E-ACSL.  ...  In this work, we address memory monitoring in the context of runtime assertion checking of C programs annotated in E-ACSL, an expressive specification language offered by the FRAMA-C framework for analysis  ...  The authors thank the FRAMA-C team members for support and useful discussions. Special thanks to Matthieu Lemerre for his advice on implementation of the shadow memory technique.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2695664.2695815 dblp:conf/sac/JakobssonKS15 fatcat:b22ogv6f2ragdomnayo7s6cwza

Security Checkers: Detecting processor malicious inclusions at runtime

Michael Bilzor, Ted Huffmire, Cynthia Irvine, Tim Levin
2011 2011 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust  
for verifying a PSL assertion, we propose a new method called Security Checkers, which uses security-focused PSL assertions to create hardware design units for detecting malicious inclusions at runtime  ...  Based on the adoption of the Property Specification Language (PSL) for behavioral verification, and the advent of tools for automatically generating synthesizable hardware design language (HDL) constructs  ...  Not all interesting properties of a system are statically decidable, however, and complex proofs can be tedious. Model Checking employs several methods for verifying the correctness of a design.  ... 
doi:10.1109/hst.2011.5954992 dblp:conf/host/BilzorHIL11 fatcat:425o4bjmjfdwzedkf4ttx3n3sy

Hardware property checker for run-time Hardware Trojan detection

Xuan Thuy Ngo, Jean-Luc Danger, Sylvain Guilley, Zakaria Najm, Olivier Emery
2015 2015 European Conference on Circuit Theory and Design (ECCTD)  
Then, a Hardware Property Checker (HPC) is created and integrated in the IC in order to verify these properties in runtime. We discuss how to define the critical properties for HPC.  ...  The assertion and Property Specification Language (PSL) is used to describe the properties to be checked.  ...  Another advantage is the ability to verify properties sequentially and also new properties can be checked even after HPC deployment.  ... 
doi:10.1109/ecctd.2015.7300085 dblp:conf/ecctd/NgoDGNE15 fatcat:zohddlcac5dejn626erwf2cize

JBMC: Bounded Model Checking for Java Bytecode [chapter]

Lucas Cordeiro, Daniel Kroening, Peter Schrammel
2019 Msphere  
It checks a set of desired properties, such as assertions and absence of uncaught exceptions, under given bounds on loops, recursion and data structures.  ...  JBMC is a bounded model checking tool for verifying Java bytecode. It is built on top of the CPROVER framework. JBMC processes Java bytecode together with a model of the standard Java libraries.  ...  JBMC is able to check for array bounds, division by zero, unintended arithmetic overflows, runtime errors in Java (e.g. illegal memory access) and user-specified assertions.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-030-17502-3_17 fatcat:hpshkhaz3vg2zoki2pzigavcgy

Hardware/Software Co-monitoring [article]

Li Lei, Kai Cong, Zhenkun Yang, Bo Chen, Fei Xie
2019 arXiv   pre-print
checking detects invalid driver commands issued to the device by verifying system properties against driver/device interactions.  ...  Based on the co-execution of the device and FDM, HW/SW co-monitoring carries out two-tier runtime checking: (1) device checking checks if the device behaviors conform to the FDM behaviors; (2) property  ...  Property checking verifies if the device/driver interactions follow certain system properties.  ... 
arXiv:1905.03915v1 fatcat:auadrvububhmzdp5ttqykcdgau

ARCHERR: Runtime Environment Driven Program Safety [chapter]

Ramkumar Chinchani, Anusha Iyer, Bharat Jayaraman, Shambhu Upadhyaya
2004 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
For example, the machine word size is an important factor in an integer overflow attack and likewise the memory layout of a process in a buffer or heap overflow attack.  ...  Based on this analysis, we have developed Archerr, an automated one-pass source-to-source transformer that derives appropriate architecture dependent runtime safety error checks and inserts them in C source  ...  For every operation over numerical types, it is important to assert that the properties (5) and (6) hold.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-540-30108-0_24 fatcat:zzwmomqpijfyxjme3apsptk23q

Implementing a Formally Verifiable Security Protocol in Java Card [chapter]

Engelbert Hubbers, Martijn Oostdijk, Erik Poll
2004 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
decisions that have to be made in the development of such an implementation in a systematic way, and to investigate the possibilities of formal specification and verification in the design process and for  ...  Runtime checking with the JML tool The JML runtime assertion checker [?] takes as input Java source files annotated with JML specifications.  ...  We have checked that the implementation meets these specifications, using runtime assertion checking with the JML tool, and doing static checking using ESC/Java.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-540-39881-3_19 fatcat:c2ffksc3tfblpdozfovn7m2pci

Asserting Performance Expectations

J.S. Vetter, P.H. Worley
2002 ACM/IEEE SC 2002 Conference (SC'02)  
As the application executes, each performance assertion in the application collects data implicitly to verify the assertion.  ...  at runtime.  ...  Government retains a nonexclusive, royalty-free license to publish or reproduce the published form of this contribution, or allow others to do so, for U.S. Government purposes.  ... 
doi:10.1109/sc.2002.10046 dblp:conf/sc/VetterW02 fatcat:gqorop4tc5gc5boxpmyl6v5xya
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