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Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms

Noam Nisan, Amir Ronen
2000 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '00  
A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG (Vickrey, Clarke, Groves).  ...  When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty arises: VCG mechanisms are required to compute optimal outcomes and are, therefore, computationally infeasible  ...  The reader may verify that the Vickrey auction is a VCG mechanism. It is well known that VCG mechanisms are truthful (Groves, 1973) .  ... 
doi:10.1145/352871.352898 dblp:conf/sigecom/NisanR00 fatcat:bvq5eogtw5fbxh5wffabaxwtie

Computationally Feasible VCG Mechanisms

N. Nisan, A. Ronen
2007 The Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research  
A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG (Vickrey, Clarke, Groves).  ...  When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty arises: VCG mechanisms are required to compute optimal outcomes and are, therefore, computationally infeasible  ...  The reader may verify that the Vickrey auction is a VCG mechanism. It is well known that VCG mechanisms are truthful (Groves, 1973) .  ... 
doi:10.1613/jair.2046 fatcat:juaybhptabfd3k2ryqh6iuddrq

VCG Redistribution with Gross Substitutes

Mingyu Guo
2011 PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE TWENTY-EIGHTH INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE  
For the problem of allocating resources among multiple strategic agents, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, strategy-proof, and it never incurs a deficit.  ...  In this paper, we study VCG redistribution mechanisms in the more general setting of combinatorial auctions.  ...  Introduction For the problem of allocating resources among multiple strategic agents, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (also known as the Clarke mechanism) satisfies the following properties  ... 
doi:10.1609/aaai.v25i1.7883 fatcat:flfcqo6itvcuhclt55wp46pfq4

Modified VCG Mechanisms in Combinatorial Auctions with Budget Constraints

Phuong Le
2015 Social Science Research Network  
I present two modifications of the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism to accommodate bidders' budget constraints in the combinatorial auction setting and show that they are Pareto-Optimal and (partially) incentive  ...  This paper studies the Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism in combinatorial auction setting.  ...  auction called the Vickrey with Budgets yields good revenue, incentive and efficiency properties.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2653970 fatcat:3bcngj4uwnhjzh6cpletmvytfu

Revenue Failures and Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges with VCG Payments [chapter]

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
2006 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We study four settings: combinatorial forward auctions with free disposal, combinatorial reverse auctions with free disposal, combinatorial forward (or reverse) auctions without free disposal, and combinatorial  ...  In a combinatorial auction, there are multiple items for sale, and bidders are allowed to place a bid on a bundle of these items rather than just on the individual items.  ...  The best-known such payment rule is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) scheme [7] [8] [9] .  ... 
doi:10.1007/11575726_1 fatcat:ewp6xs7e2farrll7hkdmpjb2ey

Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
2006 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - AAMAS '06  
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully.  ...  We study four settings: combinatorial forward auctions with free disposal, combinatorial reverse auctions with free disposal, combinatorial forward (or reverse) auctions without free disposal, and combinatorial  ...  The best-known such payment rule is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [20, 5, 9] .  ... 
doi:10.1145/1160633.1160729 dblp:conf/atal/ConitzerS06 fatcat:ffr742cavve2pno3ob3uhcg4nm

VC v. VCG: Inapproximability of Combinatorial Auctions via Generalizations of the VC Dimension [article]

Elchanan Mossel, Christos Papadimitriou, Michael Schapira, Yaron Singer
2009 arXiv   pre-print
We apply this machinery to prove the first computational-complexity inapproximability results for incentive-compatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions.  ...  It is believed that in many cases good approximations for combinatorial auctions may be unattainable due to an inherent clash between truthfulness and computational efficiency.  ...  Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms [39, 9, 20] , named after their three inventors, are the fundamental technique in mechanism design for inducing truthful behaviour of strategic agents.  ... 
arXiv:0905.1995v1 fatcat:56e5sk64yjf4jcu35zyucnuuna

Inapproximability for VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions [chapter]

Dave Buchfuhrer, Shaddin Dughmi, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Elchanan Mossel, Christos Papadimitriou, Michael Schapira, Yaron Singer, Chris Umans
2010 Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms  
In this paper, we prove the first computational-complexity inapproximability results for incentive-compatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions.  ...  It is believed that, in many cases, good approximations for combinatorial auctions may be unattainable due to an inherent clash between truthfulness and computational efficiency.  ...  The celebrated class of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms [40, 11, 23] is the only known universal technique for the design of deterministic incentive-compatible mechanisms.  ... 
doi:10.1137/1.9781611973075.45 dblp:conf/soda/BuchfuhrerDFKMPSSU10 fatcat:si245d27rjcqhddhsupdytdrxy

Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions

Ron Holzman, Dov Monderer
2004 Games and Economic Behavior  
We prove that when the number of (potential) buyers is at least three, every ex post equilibrium in the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves combinatorial auction mechanisms is a bundling equilibrium and is symmetric  ...  A Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction mechanism is a direct mechanism parametrized by a VC mechanism d, and by an n-tuple h = (h 1 , . . . , h n ) of functions h i : V N \{i} → .  ...  A Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism for such an auction [16, 2, 5] requires the agents to reveal their valuation functions (which are their private information), and based on the announced valuations  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2003.04.001 fatcat:2wegtlxvgja6bipsn4ez5x6tbi

Job Allocation in a Temporary Employment Agency via Multi-dimensional Price VCG Auctions Using a Multi-agent System

Juergen Landes, Ricardo Buettner
2011 2011 10th Mexican International Conference on Artificial Intelligence  
To address this problem we extend the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction to a mechanism in which agents make bids in a multidimensional contract space.  ...  In the late 1980's the name of Vickrey Clarke and Groves (VCG) auctions was coined by [16] .  ...  For (reverse) multi-attribute Vickrey auctions see for instance [31] , [35] , [36] and for reverse multi-attribute combinatorial auctions [37] , [38] .  ... 
doi:10.1109/micai.2011.11 fatcat:3p7ayxpayba47o7oqqn54aw4jm

Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with vcg payments

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
2004 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '04  
We study four settings: combinatorial forward auctions with free disposal, combinatorial reverse auctions with free disposal, combinatorial forward (or reverse) auctions without free disposal, and combinatorial  ...  In a combinatorial auction, there are multiple items for sale, and bidders are allowed to place a bid on a bundle of these items rather than just on the individual items.  ...  The best-known such payment rule is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) scheme [7] [8] [9] .  ... 
doi:10.1145/988772.988826 dblp:conf/sigecom/ConitzerS04c fatcat:xm6bhhoxnrfdfihyqfpwxywkuy

Ex-Post Equilibrium and VCG Mechanisms [article]

Rakefet Rozen, Rann Smorodinsky
2012 arXiv   pre-print
This work follows work by Holzman, Kfir-Dahav, Monderer and Tennenholtz (2004) and Holzman and Monderer (2004) where similar analysis is done for combinatorial auctions.  ...  Albeit natural, implementing VCG mechanisms may not be feasible due to the prohibitive communication constraints.  ...  A set of agents N, a social welfare maximizing mechanism, M, and a set of functions h i : (IR A ) N −{i} → IR, ∀i ∈ N, and a set of valuations, V i ⊂ IR A , for each i, defines a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves  ... 
arXiv:1211.3293v1 fatcat:emxn6wddjnhntpm26vsjhibmu4

Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions [chapter]

Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger, Martin Starnberger
2013 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
In the context of combinatorial auctions the truthful direct-revelation mechanism that maximizes social welfare is the VCG mechanism.  ...  We thus study the performance of the VCG mechanism when bidders are forced to choose bids from a subspace of the valuation space for which the VCG outcome can be computed efficiently.  ...  In the context of combinatorial auctions the truthful direct-revelation mechanism that maximizes welfare is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [29, 4, 10] .  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_13 fatcat:d2txdnzokbe7das6oug32ggj5i

An Approach to VCG-like Approximate Allocation and Pricing for Large-scale Multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions

Naoki Fukuta
2013 Journal of Information Processing  
Furthermore, the algorithm can be seen as an approximation of VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism satisfying budget balance condition and bidders' individual rationality without having unrealistic assumptions  ...  A multi-unit combinatorial auction is a combinatorial auction that has some items that can be seen as indistinguishable.  ...  In VCG (Vickery-Clarke-Groves) mechanism, prices that winners will pay will be given as follows [5] .  ... 
doi:10.2197/ipsjjip.21.9 fatcat:qjokhrainvbnxnrno3zu7iokea

Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions

Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger, Martin Starnberger
2018 ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation  
In the context of combinatorial auctions the truthful direct-revelation mechanism that maximizes social welfare is the VCG mechanism.  ...  We thus study the performance of the VCG mechanism when bidders are forced to choose bids from a subspace of the valuation space for which the VCG outcome can be computed efficiently.  ...  In the context of combinatorial auctions the truthful direct-revelation mechanism that maximizes welfare is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [29, 4, 10] .  ... 
doi:10.1145/3232860 fatcat:pcvobx7ly5b35mf6ol5pgetlqm
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