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Utility Dependence in Correct and Fair Rational Secret Sharing

Gilad Asharov, Yehuda Lindell
2010 Journal of Cryptology  
We ask whether this dependence on the actual utility values is really necessary and prove that in the basic setting, rational secret sharing cannot be achieved without it.  ...  One problem that has been studied considerably is that of rational secret sharing.  ...  of rounds in any fair reconstruction mechanism depends on {β 1 , β 2 } and so depends on the actual utilities.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00145-010-9064-z fatcat:ogqetbmaazhvza2r4lofyds6im

Utility Dependence in Correct and Fair Rational Secret Sharing [chapter]

Gilad Asharov, Yehuda Lindell
2009 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We ask whether this dependence on the actual utility values is really necessary and prove that in the basic setting, rational secret sharing cannot be achieved without it.  ...  One problem that has been studied considerably is that of rational secret sharing.  ...  We ask whether this dependence on the actual utility values is really necessary and prove that in the basic setting, rational secret sharing cannot be achieved without it.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-03356-8_33 fatcat:zvq5qiq4efc57kdtfinekrxcaa

Proposal for Quantum Rational Secret Sharing [article]

Arpita Maitra, Sourya Joyee De, Goutam Paul, Asim K. Pal
2015 arXiv   pre-print
The proposed scheme is fair (everyone gets the secret), correct and achieves strict Nash equilibrium.  ...  A rational secret sharing scheme is a game in which each party responsible for reconstructing a secret tries to maximize his utility by obtaining the secret alone.  ...  PRELIMINARIES In this section, we briefly describe classical rational secret sharing and discuss the concepts of rationality, fairness, correctness and equilibrium used in this work.  ... 
arXiv:1501.04212v4 fatcat:gljmoghe3jcz3awzvthnzlxc7m

Fair Computation with Rational Players [chapter]

Adam Groce, Jonathan Katz
2012 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
(Eurocrypt 2011) recently considered this problem and showed impossibility of rational fair computation for a particular function and a particular set of utilities.  ...  Revisiting the problem, we show that rational fair computation is possible, for arbitrary functions and utilities, as long as at least one of the parties has a strict incentive to compute the function  ...  Depending on the utilities and input distributions, our results would give rational secret-sharing protocols where following the protocol is a (computational) Nash equilibrium.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_7 fatcat:o2qnwzjn4ffnrhpwyngcu7fg7i

Secure two-party quantum computation for non-rational and rational settings [article]

Arpita Maitra, Goutam Paul, Asim K. Pal
2016 arXiv   pre-print
We adapt our quantum protocols for both the above types of functions in rational setting to achieve fairness and strict Nash equilibrium.  ...  Further, in the context of secure multi-party quantum computation, for the first time we introduce rational parties, each of whom tries to maximize its utility by obtaining the function output alone.  ...  In quantum domain, the concept of rational players in secret sharing has been first introduced in [20] .  ... 
arXiv:1504.01974v5 fatcat:drxq4nlv7nf2njgmzka6zcvhca

A secure rational quantum state sharing protocol

Zhao Dou, Gang Xu, Xiu-Bo Chen, Xin Liu, Yi-Xian Yang
2017 Science China Information Sciences  
Second, the utility, security, correctness, fairness, Nash equilibrium, and Pareto optimality of our scheme are discussed in detail, where the utility, correctness, and fairness of rational quantum state  ...  In addition, the deterministic QSTS in cavity quantum electrodynamics was investigated. Halpern and Teague [14] considered a rational classical SS protocol in 2004.  ...  Introduction In the secret sharing (SS) problem, there exists a dealer Alice and some agents Bob i . Alice owns a secret or some bits, which are split by her and shared by all the agents.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s11432-016-9151-x fatcat:atcwtusl4zbszkgfuy5wopiaxi

A new socio-rational secret sharing scheme

Jianghao Jin, Xie Zhou, Chuangui Ma, N.A. Xu', an Wang
2017 International Journal of Innovative Computing and Applications  
In the proposed schemes, both the traditional and rational players are considered in an unconditionally secure setting. (2017) 'A new socio-rational secret sharing scheme', Int. .  ...  We introduce the concept of a socio-rational secret sharing scheme, in which shares are delivered based on players' reputation and the way they contact with other participants.  ...  Acknowledgements The authors thank all the reviewers and editors for their valuable comments and works.  ... 
doi:10.1504/ijica.2017.082494 fatcat:74y376rer5he5ctfdg457mqkea

Fair Secure Computation with Reputation Assumptions in the Mobile Social Networks

Yilei Wang, Chuan Zhao, Qiuliang Xu, Zhihua Zheng, Zhenhua Chen, Zhe Liu
2015 Mobile Information Systems  
Rational parties value their utilities when they participate in secure computation protocol in mobile social networks.  ...  Here we regard the applications in mobile social networks as specific functions and stress on the achievement of fairness on these functions within mobile social networks in the presence of two rational  ...  Disclosure An abstract of this paper has been presented in the INCOS2013 conference, pages 309-314, 2013 [35] .  ... 
doi:10.1155/2015/637458 fatcat:s7ptrf42j5fnljoy4ki3kogjhm

Rational Secret Sharing Over an Asynchronous Broadcast Channel With Information Theoretic Security

William K Moses Jr, C Pandu Rangan
2011 International journal of network security and its applications  
We consider the problem of rational secret sharing introduced by Halpern and Teague [1], where the players involved in secret sharing play only if it is to their advantage.  ...  In our paper, we propose an m-out-of-n rational secret sharing scheme which can function over an asynchronous broadcast channel without the use of cryptographic primitives and with a non-interactive dealer  ...  ߝ-rational m-out-of-n secret sharing scheme with probability immune to backward induction,• and handles ܷ -dependence of any player i in a time efficient manner.Depending upon the number of honest players  ... 
doi:10.5121/ijnsa.2011.3601 fatcat:xdzze7wa2fgwhf3665awykeqa4

Outsourcing secret sharing scheme based on homomorphism encryption

En Zhang, Jie Peng, Ming Li
2018 IET Information Security  
The malicious behaviour of clients and CSP can be detected in time. Moreover, the CSP cannot get any useful information about the secret, and it is fair for every client to obtain the secret.  ...  However, the existing secret sharing schemes cannot apply to computationally weak devices and cannot efficiently guarantee fairness.  ...  Acknowledgments This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (U1604156, 61602158), and Science and Technology Research Project of Henan Province (172102210045).  ... 
doi:10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0026 fatcat:pzfk3zz6wnfbnckseb4ngrs4ri

Achieving State Machine Replication without Honest Players [article]

Conor McMenamin and Vanesa Daza and Matteo Pontecorvi
2021 arXiv   pre-print
In the ByRa model, we identify the properties of strong incentive compatibility in expectation and fairness that all protocols must satisfy in order to achieve state machine replication.  ...  Existing standards for player characterisation in tokenised state machine replication protocols depend on honest players who will always follow the protocol, regardless of possible token increases for  ...  This fatal dependence on an underlying correct-by-default SMR protocol/ trusted third-party is also demonstrated in [15, 23, 24] , where claims of incentive compatibility and fairness do not hold in the  ... 
arXiv:2012.10146v2 fatcat:w4rf4fc7kbb43n7fazxhvh3ybq

Purely Rational Secret Sharing (Extended Abstract) [chapter]

Silvio Micali, abhi shelat
2009 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Rational secret sharing is a fundamental primitive at the intersection of cryptography and game theory.  ...  Rational Secret Sharing as a Special Form of Mechanism Design The Intuitive Notion.  ...  Acknowledgements Many thanks to Sergei Izmalkov for his characteristically generous and insightful help.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-00457-5_4 fatcat:745qwlwy65bs5g3awfghl3enri

Efficient Rational Secret Sharing in Standard Communication Networks [chapter]

Georg Fuchsbauer, Jonathan Katz, David Naccache
2010 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We propose a new methodology for rational secret sharing leading to various instantiations (in both the two-party and multi-party settings) that are simple and efficient in terms of computation, share  ...  size, and round complexity.  ...  Rational Secret Sharing: The 2-Out-of-2 Case Let S = {0, 1} be the domain of the secret.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_25 fatcat:cm7rzq6omnb4fmuu2zez25bbfi

Games for exchanging information

Gillat Kol, Moni Naor
2008 Proceedings of the fourtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC 08  
In contrast, we provide a rational secret sharing scheme with simultaneous broadcast channel in which shares are taken from an unbounded domain, but have nite (and polynomial sized) expectation.  ...  We consider the rational versions of two of the classical problems in foundations of cryptography: secret sharing and multiparty computation, suggested by Halpern and Teague (STOC 2004).  ...  Our Settings We review the models for rational MPC and rational secret sharing used in the paper.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1374376.1374437 dblp:conf/stoc/KolN08 fatcat:f7sers4jr5d7jfmlcwarcqf76u

How Fair is Your Protocol?

Juan Garay, Jonathan Katz, Björn Tackmann, Vassilis Zikas
2015 Proceedings of the 2015 ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing - PODC '15  
Security of distributed cryptographic protocols usually requires privacy (inputs of the honest parties remain hidden), correctness (the adversary cannot improperly affect the outcome), and fairness (if  ...  The basic idea is to use an appropriate utility function to express the preferences of an adversary who wants to violate fairness.  ...  Indeed, for the payoff vector γ = (0, 0, 1, 0) a security statement in our model implies 1/p-security, and protocolΠ described above shows that our notion is strictly stronger.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2767386.2767431 dblp:conf/podc/GarayKTZ15 fatcat:okwufn66evasblgy7md2yitat4
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