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Utilitarians Without Utilities: Maximizing Social Welfare for Graph Problems using only Ordinal Preferences - Full Version [article]

Ben Abramowitz, Elliot Anshelevich
<span title="2017-11-28">2017</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
We consider ordinal approximation algorithms for a broad class of utility maximization problems for multi-agent systems.  ...  We study these problems in the ordinal setting: latent numerical utilities exist, but we only have access to ordinal preference information, i.e., every agent specifies an ordering over the other agents  ...  Our paper provides good approximations for a broad class of ordinal analogues to graph optimization problems representing utility maximization for multi-agent systems.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1711.10588v1">arXiv:1711.10588v1</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/zxebiqptwrap7m4y7cxmyonozy">fatcat:zxebiqptwrap7m4y7cxmyonozy</a> </span>
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Distributed Algorithm for Matching between Individuals and Activities [article]

Maxime Morge, Antoine Nongaillard
<span title="2018-03-21">2018</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
The first aims at maximizing the global satisfaction of the individuals. The second ensures that all individuals are assigned as much as possible to a preferred activity.  ...  In this paper, we introduce an agent-based model for coalition formation which is suitable for our usecase. We propose here two clearing-houses mechanisms that return sound matchings.  ...  How to reach a matching which maximizes the social welfare?  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.07211v4">arXiv:1706.07211v4</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/ktse5vyyrrg33nedjr34bun5ra">fatcat:ktse5vyyrrg33nedjr34bun5ra</a> </span>
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Optimal Income Taxation Theory and Principles of Fairness

Marc Fleurbaey, François Maniquet
<span title="">2018</span> <i title="American Economic Association"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/lwzy55pb3becljvrbfyavuxvle" style="color: black;">Journal of Economic Literature</a> </i> &nbsp;
Even though utilitarianism still dominates public economics, recent interest has arisen for broadening the normative approach and making room for fairness principles such as desert or responsibility.  ...  The achievements and limitations of the classical theory of optimal labor-income taxation based on social welfare functions are now well known.  ...  or rely only on ordinal preferences?  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20171238">doi:10.1257/jel.20171238</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/ytswgot2qrbjpfbygj5hdbpmyq">fatcat:ytswgot2qrbjpfbygj5hdbpmyq</a> </span>
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Compactly representing utility functions using weighted goals and the max aggregator

Joel Uckelman, Ulle Endriss
<span title="">2010</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/weoplee4x5anpi62cco5v4higa" style="color: black;">Artificial Intelligence</a> </i> &nbsp;
, for a range of different notions of collective optimality proposed in social choice theory and welfare economics.  ...  We also study the computational complexity of the problem of finding the best and the worst alternative for a given set of weighted goals, and of finding an alternative that is optimal for a group of agents  ...  We analyze the complexity of the problem for several of the standard notions of collective utility, familiar from the social choice and welfare economics literature, such as utilitarian social welfare,  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2010.07.003">doi:10.1016/j.artint.2010.07.003</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/wsgi5ozkxnc6zhoesoyu6jjzxq">fatcat:wsgi5ozkxnc6zhoesoyu6jjzxq</a> </span>
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On Interim Envy-Free Allocation Lotteries

Ioannis Caragiannis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou
<span title="2021-07-18">2021</span> <i title="ACM"> Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation </i> &nbsp;
Our algorithms use the ellipsoid method for linear programming and e cient solutions to a novel variant of the bipartite matching problem as a separation oracle.  ...  We present a series of results on two optimization problems, including a generalization of the classical rent division problem to random allocations using interim envy-freeness as the solution concept.  ...  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This work was partially supported by the European Commission under COST Action 16228 -European Network for Game Theory (GAMENET).  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3465456.3467648">doi:10.1145/3465456.3467648</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/3pwcswprprcrhbs6hez4aa5g5y">fatcat:3pwcswprprcrhbs6hez4aa5g5y</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20210730120119/http://repository.essex.ac.uk/30538/23/On_Interim_Envy_Free_Allocation_Lotteries.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/21/c1/21c1a25bed854f50e1f715a53e548f6f7b863200.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3465456.3467648"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> acm.org </button> </a>

On Interim Envy-Free Allocation Lotteries [article]

Ioannis Caragiannis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou
<span title="2021-02-26">2021</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
Our algorithms use the ellipsoid method for linear programming and efficient solutions to a novel variant of the bipartite matching problem as a separation oracle.  ...  We present a series of results on two optimization problems, including a generalization of the classical rent division problem to random allocations using interim envy-freeness as the solution concept.  ...  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work was partially supported by the European Commission under COST Action 16228 "European Network for Game Theory".  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.07839v2">arXiv:2102.07839v2</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/p2nqk5fcv5g7hpms5amefvtfqy">fatcat:p2nqk5fcv5g7hpms5amefvtfqy</a> </span>
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Positional scoring-based allocation of indivisible goods

Dorothea Baumeister, Sylvain Bouveret, Jérôme Lang, Nhan-Tam Nguyen, Trung Thanh Nguyen, Jörg Rothe, Abdallah Saffidine
<span title="2016-08-02">2016</span> <i title="Springer Nature"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/7rdrzlhoxjb5ho2u76erh6zpni" style="color: black;">Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems</a> </i> &nbsp;
The rule associated with s and maps a profile to (one of) the allocation(s) maximizing social welfare.  ...  We assume that agents' preferences over sets of goods are additive, but that the input is ordinal: each agent reports her preferences simply by ranking single goods.  ...  , Communication Protocols and Computational Resistance to Strategic Behavior," by COST Action IC1205 on Computational Social Choice, by a grant for gender-sensitive universities funded by the NRW Ministry  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-016-9340-x">doi:10.1007/s10458-016-9340-x</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/7kmpkceja5f5tfkwreymayw7gy">fatcat:7kmpkceja5f5tfkwreymayw7gy</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20200306211256/http://hal.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/hal-01399842/file/BBLNNRS17.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/b5/eb/b5eb18c7a174a70196ccd6135bc55ae0400dbc17.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-016-9340-x"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> springer.com </button> </a>

Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets

Yeon-Koo Che, Olivier Tercieux
<span title="">2015</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/tol7woxlqjeg5bmzadeg6qrg3e" style="color: black;">Social Science Research Network</a> </i> &nbsp;
We study Pareto efficient mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individual preferences are randomly drawn from a class of distributions, allowing for both common and idiosyncratic  ...  that in the limit coincides with the utilitarian upper bound.  ...  For each preference draw, we obtain the maximum or minimum normalized utilitarian welfares among 100 draws of serial orders. We then average the welfare over 50 preference draws.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2620566">doi:10.2139/ssrn.2620566</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/tlizri2pobdrdgycqkocaap2yu">fatcat:tlizri2pobdrdgycqkocaap2yu</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190430134714/https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20180239/19840/600" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/a2/38/a23814af06849898426c24b5a75ab0522d007be1.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2620566"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> ssrn.com </button> </a>

Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets

Yeon-Koo Che, Olivier Tercieux
<span title="">2018</span> <i title="The Econometric Society"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/w44m5ko6q5evpg4ydd3s5eespe" style="color: black;">Theoretical Economics</a> </i> &nbsp;
We study Pareto efficient mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individual preferences are randomly drawn from a class of distributions, allowing for both common and idiosyncratic  ...  that in the limit coincides with the utilitarian upper bound.  ...  For each preference draw, we obtain the maximum or minimum normalized utilitarian welfares among 100 draws of serial orders. We then average the welfare over 50 preference draws.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.3982/te2793">doi:10.3982/te2793</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/uzfwlskvhnd6vpmvijj2xxmr2a">fatcat:uzfwlskvhnd6vpmvijj2xxmr2a</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20200307021452/https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/197146/1/1024165353.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/f7/37/f7372aa1336c31ac5b7b0d0aee864ad67471fe89.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.3982/te2793"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="unlock alternate icon" style="background-color: #fb971f;"></i> Publisher / doi.org </button> </a>

Chapter 10 Social welfare functionals and interpersonal comparability [chapter]

Claude d'Aspremont, Louis Gevers
<span title="">2002</span> <i title="Elsevier"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/oa6otezr55fftnin5yxykl525a" style="color: black;">Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare</a> </i> &nbsp;
Social welfare functionals are defined formally together with closely related concepts.  ...  This chapter reviews the SWFL approach to social choice.  ...  ; moreover, an extended version of welfarism is adopted, so that bargaining problems are entirely described by the respective images of X and x 0 in individual utility space.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/s1574-0110(02)80014-5">doi:10.1016/s1574-0110(02)80014-5</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/liaw6llgyrcrpeuxwoi2fbv7nu">fatcat:liaw6llgyrcrpeuxwoi2fbv7nu</a> </span>
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Compensation and Responsibilityprotect11The last substantial revision of this survey was made in 2005. Some new works on compensation and responsibility have been done since then. We refer the reader to Fleurbaey (2008) for updates [chapter]

Fleurbaey Marc, Maniquet François
<span title="">2011</span> <i title="Elsevier"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/oa6otezr55fftnin5yxykl525a" style="color: black;">Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare</a> </i> &nbsp;
Notice that Ordinalism is built in the model since we make use only of the quasilinear representation of the quasi-linear preferences.  ...  Therefore, this axiom of Equal Welfare for Equal Preferences is the correct translation of Equal Utility for Equal Function to a setting with ordinal non-comparable preferences. 41 In addition, as noticed  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/s0169-7218(10)00022-5">doi:10.1016/s0169-7218(10)00022-5</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/dw4qzzsuufatncwlrqf5ovgwie">fatcat:dw4qzzsuufatncwlrqf5ovgwie</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170808135557/http://darp.lse.ac.uk/papersdb/fleurbaey-maniquet_(handbooksocialchoice).pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/9a/f7/9af7a5f9659217add3d652b73ab0251391b8a00b.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/s0169-7218(10)00022-5"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> elsevier.com </button> </a>

A Few Queries Go a Long Way: Information-Distortion Tradeoffs in Matching [article]

Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros A. Voudouris
<span title="2020-09-14">2020</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
The goal is to match every agent to a single item so as to maximize the social welfare.  ...  Most of the related literature, however, assumes that the values of the agents are not a priori known, and only access to the ordinal preferences of the agents over the items is provided.  ...  Typically, as well as in this paper, this objective is the (utilitarian) social welfare, i.e., the total utility of the agents.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.06543v1">arXiv:2009.06543v1</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/srtkatashzceplvpcjxnkwfp6q">fatcat:srtkatashzceplvpcjxnkwfp6q</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20200921204420/https://arxiv.org/pdf/2009.06543v1.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.06543v1" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

Inequality and Uncertainty: Theory and Legal Applications

Matthew D. Adler, Chris William Sanchirico
<span title="">2006</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/tol7woxlqjeg5bmzadeg6qrg3e" style="color: black;">Social Science Research Network</a> </i> &nbsp;
Welfarism" is the principle that social policy should be based solely on individual well-being, with no reference to 'fairness" or "rights."  ...  The problem arises from the combination of uncertainty-an inevitable feature of real policy choice-and a social  ...  One might well read Kaplow's earlier article to argue that the only acceptable version of welfarism-the only version consistent with both the sure-thing principle and ex ante Paretianism-is utilitarianism  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.886571">doi:10.2139/ssrn.886571</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/2zl7nhscynedraat5vxebyhdz4">fatcat:2zl7nhscynedraat5vxebyhdz4</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20141219234929/http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5238&amp;context=faculty_scholarship" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/a3/c0/a3c0f8ee977a1f198d2a5a9ed9fb312ef5f3f8d7.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.886571"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> ssrn.com </button> </a>

Beyond dominant resource fairness

David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah
<span title="">2012</span> <i title="ACM Press"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/7ljisdx4yfhzbmhados4oxci6y" style="color: black;">Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce - EC &#39;12</a> </i> &nbsp;
Second, we study the relation between social welfare and properties such as truthfulness; DRF performs poorly in terms of social welfare, but we show that this is an unavoidable shortcoming that is shared  ...  Technological advances such as cloud computing and data centers provide a new impetus for investigating this problem under the assumption that agents demand the resources in fixed proportions, known in  ...  To study social welfare we must assume an interpersonal comparison of utilities, that is, we need to exactly specify the utilities of agents for allocations, rather than focusing on ordinal preferences  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/2229012.2229075">doi:10.1145/2229012.2229075</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://dblp.org/rec/conf/sigecom/ParkesPS12.html">dblp:conf/sigecom/ParkesPS12</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/sg3mwpd4zzbxnj4j5wza45uq7y">fatcat:sg3mwpd4zzbxnj4j5wza45uq7y</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160107152956/http://www.cs.cmu.edu:80/~nkshah/papers/beyondDRF.ec12.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/18/ea/18ea18ad0e7adb2fc1e123c0c13d95a99ebeb312.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/2229012.2229075"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> acm.org </button> </a>

A comparison of optimal tax policies when compensation or responsibility matter

Laurence Jacquet, Dirk Van de Gaer
<span title="">2011</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/nrmdhgqdejgszgl7b6jadevtxa" style="color: black;">Journal of Public Economics</a> </i> &nbsp;
They rely on a cardinal or alternatively an ordinal measure of welfare.  ...  We compare the extent to which optimal policies based on different normative criteria obey the principles of compensation (for differential skills) and responsibility (for preferences for labor) when labor  ...  For instance, Boadway et al. (2002) use a Utilitarian social welfare function where different weights can be assigned to individuals with different preferences for leisure.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.05.005">doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.05.005</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/gu5bx7smlrcrfjm4ff7fwfc5wm">fatcat:gu5bx7smlrcrfjm4ff7fwfc5wm</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170811022430/http://congres.afse.fr/docs/2010/854455lj_dvdg_march10.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/41/a5/41a5b6e8679b93dddaa826db4e3da750609366bf.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.05.005"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> elsevier.com </button> </a>
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