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Twofold optimality of the relative utilitarian bargaining solution

Marcus Pivato
2008 Social Choice and Welfare  
Given a bargaining problem, the relative utilitarian (RU) solution maximizes the sum total of the bargainer's utilities, after having first renormalized each utility function to range from zero to one.  ...  We show that RU is 'optimal' in two very different senses. First, RU is the maximal element (over  ...  The main result of this section is this: Theorem 1 Let Υ : B−→R I − be the relative utilitarian bargaining solution.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00355-008-0313-0 fatcat:qaolawwfuvfgfj3rzg5fu2bw5i

Optimal Monetary Policy with Overlapping Generations of Policymakers

Maral Shamloo
2010 IMF Working Papers  
Older and younger generations of Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) members decide on policy by engaging in a bargaining process.  ...  The model suggests that the lower the churning rate or the longer the tenure time, the closer social welfare will be to that under optimal commitment policy. JEL Classification Numbers: E52; E58; E61  ...  The Utilitarian Solution and the Stationary Equilibrium In this paper I will consider a particular bargaining mechanism, namely the utilitarian solution.  ... 
doi:10.5089/9781451962642.001 fatcat:fdlefzf4izfvrbfud5bntovbyu

Focal points and bargaining

Ken Binmore, Joe Swierzbinski, Steven Hsu, Chris Proulx
1993 International Journal of Game Theory  
In the long run, the median subject behaves as though optimizing often down to a fraction of a penny.  ...  A simple bargaining game introduced by Nash is used for this purpose. Subjects are conditioned in different treatments to use four different bargaining solutions.  ...  We also gratefully acknowledge funding from the University of Michigan to set up the Michigan Economics Laboratory, where the experiments were conducted.  ... 
doi:10.1007/bf01240133 fatcat:un22ff53kzfgvh22xueidxin4m

On the consistency of data with bargaining theories

Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique
2014 Theoretical Economics  
We show that if the disagreement point is fixed and symmetric, the Nash, utilitarian, and egalitarian max-min bargaining solutions are all observationally equivalent.  ...  Our results are readily applicable, outside of the bargaining framework, to testing the tax code for compliance with the principle of equal loss.  ...  Note that this is indeed a generalization, as the problems of optimizing n i=1 u i (x i ) and of optimizing n i=1 [u i (x i ) − u i (d i )] have the same solutions over B(m d).  ... 
doi:10.3982/te1095 fatcat:mgw6hnqazfedfgsl4tskkfr3vm

A Rawlsian View of CSR and the Game Theory of its Implementation (Part II): Fairness and Equilibrium

Lorenzo Sacconi
2010 Social Science Research Network  
of the Nash bargaining solution) can be interpreted as an equivalent solution to the distribution proportional to relative needs, that is, proportional to the relative intensity of marginal utility variations  ...  the, 1979; Sacconi 1991 Sacconi , 2000 Sacconi , 2006b .The twofold distributive justice characterisation of the bargaining solutions matches the different nature of the problems of collective choice  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1777989 fatcat:xnf73bo745dkxgvaf5tkf4juce

Does bargaining matter in the small firms matching model?

Olivier l'Haridon, Franck Malherbet, Sébastien Pérez-Duarte
2013 Labour Economics  
We apply the Nash, the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions in the small firm's matching model of unemployment.  ...  To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to implement and systematically compare these solutions in search-matching economies. Our results are twofold.  ...  We can also compare the relative behavior of Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions as well as the relative behavior of Nash and Egalitarian solutions.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2012.12.002 fatcat:yrlfavcsnzduhpxffrpadqnzdq

On the Efficiency-Fairness Trade-off

Dimitris Bertsimas, Vivek F. Farias, Nikolaos Trichakis
2012 Management science  
We approach the problem of designing objectives that account for the natural tension between efficiency and fairness in the context of a framework that captures a number of resource allocation problems  ...  We deal with the problem of selecting the appropriate objective from this family.  ...  The authors thank Bill Moser and Mark Weber of Lincoln Labs and Shubham Gupta for providing the data for their case study.  ... 
doi:10.1287/mnsc.1120.1549 fatcat:siorh4x4nbfzdcg5ug6cu5fidq

A positive theory of the earnings relationship of unemployment benefits

Laszlo Goerke, Markus Pannenberg, Heinrich W. Ursprung
2009 Public Choice  
We show for a wage bargaining model that a stronger earnings relationship of unemployment benefits may reduce wages and increase employment.  ...  A Positive Theory of the Earnings Relationship of Unemployment Benefits Evidently, the benefit-structure of the unemployment insurance has a significant influence on profits and trade union utility.  ...  the number of utilitarian unions relative to insiderdominated unions is not greater than 4 to 1.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9558-0 fatcat:ggdgamubu5eynfe774xq3e2c3e

A Rawlsian View of CSR and the Game Theory of its Implementation (Part II): Fairness and Equilibrium [chapter]

Lorenzo Sacconi
2011 Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance  
The twofold distributive justice characterisation of the bargaining solutions matches the different nature of the problems of collective choice modelled by the post-constitutional games, on the one hand  ...  of the Nash bargaining solution)can be interpreted as an equivalent solution to the distribution proportional to relative needs, that is, proportional to the relative intensity of marginal utility variations  ... 
doi:10.1057/9780230302112_8 fatcat:ouqp722burdszkkpssjdzx3aty

Structural Change and the Labor-market Effects of Globalization [chapter]

Noel Gaston, Douglas Nelson
2014 World Scientific Studies in International Economics  
The paper develops a simple political-economy model of unemployment benefit determination in a small open economy characterized by bargaining between firms and unions.  ...  The authors derive a number of comparative static results and present empirical results for a panel of OECD countries that are broadly consistent with the theory.  ...  The existence of an exit option, even if not exercised, changes the relative bargaining power of the firm and the union.  ... 
doi:10.1142/9789814452519_0008 fatcat:rgu3kggggjgypa3yegonogsxri

Structural Change and the Labor-market Effects of Globalization

Noel Gaston, Douglas Nelson
2004 Review of International Economics  
The paper develops a simple political-economy model of unemployment benefit determination in a small open economy characterized by bargaining between firms and unions.  ...  The authors derive a number of comparative static results and present empirical results for a panel of OECD countries that are broadly consistent with the theory.  ...  The existence of an exit option, even if not exercised, changes the relative bargaining power of the firm and the union.  ... 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9396.2004.00481.x fatcat:v3pz4uopjve27opijtydhq6fcm

Cooperative Interdomain Traffic Engineering Using Nash Bargaining and Decomposition

Gireesh Shrimali, Aditya Akella, Almir Mutapcic
2010 IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking  
We present a new inter-domain traffic engineering protocol based on the concepts of Nash bargaining and dual decomposition.  ...  We show that the global optimization problem can be separated into sub-problems by introducing appropriate shadow prices on the inter-domain flows.  ...  In fact, the Nash solution is the only solution that satisfies the following problem that is simultaneously utilitarian (Pareto efficient) and egalitarian (fair) [11] .  ... 
doi:10.1109/tnet.2009.2026748 fatcat:bkxk2r3nz5dj5iefs3nauzzviy

Cooperative Inter-Domain Traffic Engineering Using Nash Bargaining and Decomposition

G. Shrimali, A. Akella, A. Mutapcic
2007 IEEE INFOCOM 2007 - 26th IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications  
We present a new inter-domain traffic engineering protocol based on the concepts of Nash bargaining and dual decomposition.  ...  We show that the global optimization problem can be separated into sub-problems by introducing appropriate shadow prices on the inter-domain flows.  ...  In fact, the Nash solution is the only solution that satisfies the following problem that is simultaneously utilitarian (Pareto efficient) and egalitarian (fair) [11] .  ... 
doi:10.1109/infcom.2007.46 dblp:conf/infocom/ShrimaliAM07 fatcat:akwg5ap53vdnfkqxbef234xaq4

Optimal Non-Linear Income Taxation in Search Equilibrium

Per Engstrom
2002 Social Science Research Network  
The paper extends the basic Stiglitz (1982) model of optimal income taxation into general search equilibrium.  ...  With wages determined by bargaining between Þrm and worker the results are changed. Both marginal tax rates are of ambiguous sign.  ...  The government seeks to Þnd the set of Pareto optimal solutions to the tax problem.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.360281 fatcat:35qnuwhw4jebtblls6wdblgfhu

The role of information in different bargaining protocols

Rafael Hortala-Vallve, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Rosemarie Nagel
2012 Experimental Economics  
We find that unconstrained negotiation does best under a situation of complete information where the valuations of both bargaining parties are common knowledge.  ...  The sources of inefficiencies in each of the two cases arise from the different strategic use of the available information.  ...  We specially want to thank two anonymous referees for encouraging us analyzing the role of information in the previously circulated paper "Experimental Comparison between Free Negotiation and a Multi-issue  ... 
doi:10.1007/s10683-012-9328-6 fatcat:aqbben4vlrhetcpbxwfqp26p5e
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