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Two-Sided Reputation in Certification Markets
2017
Management science
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In a market where sellers solicit certification to overcome asymmetric information, we show that the profit of a monopolistic certifier can be hump-shaped in its reputation for accuracy: a higher accuracy ...
Conversely, this region may expand when sellers hold multiple certifications. ...
In this paper, we argue that reputation in certification markets is two-sided, in that certifiers use their reputation to attract different types of sellers with conflicting preferences for precision. ...
doi:10.1287/mnsc.2017.2742
fatcat:e3dkagrjd5cjvbwcqjxm3bkcnm
Two-Sided Reputation in Certification Markets
2012
Social Science Research Network
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In a market where sellers solicit certification to overcome asymmetric information, we show that the profit of a monopolistic certifier can be hump-shaped in its reputation for accuracy: a higher accuracy ...
Conversely, this region may expand when sellers hold multiple certifications. ...
In this paper, we argue that reputation in certification markets is two-sided, in that certifiers use their reputation to attract different types of sellers with conflicting preferences for precision. ...
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2178119
fatcat:d62ydsv5nzegpifepnsadljyqa
Twosided reputation in certification markets Two-sided reputation in certification markets
2013
unpublished
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In a market where sellers solicit certification to overcome adverse selection, we show that the profit of a monopolistic certifier is hump-shaped in his reputation for accuracy: a higher accuracy attracts ...
Conversely, this region expands when sellers can hold multiple certifications. ...
This captures the idea that reputation is essentially two-sided in certification markets. ...
fatcat:frl24jkct5fn3oiy4ez7rkp26i
Endogenous Matching, Underwriter Reputation, and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings
2014
Social Science Research Network
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We document two opposing effects of underwriter reputation: (i) an issuer-side certification effect where greater reputation reduces the amount of underpricing, which has been stable and negative from ...
Our estimates imply that high underwriter reputation is associated with 10 to 15 percent greater long run market value for the issuing firm. ...
In two-sided matching market, the characteristics of counterfactual firms should have predictive power for the underwriter's reputation. ...
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2419277
fatcat:zsnxsercujbptbzg4wvzplw3va
The Appeal of Third-Party Certifications: Information Unraveling in Natural Experiments
2012
Social Science Research Network
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market. ...
The first natural experiment was the introduction of certifications into the market, with a fee; and the second occurred when certification exams were made free. ...
In this paper we refer to those on the supply side of the market as sellers or workers, and both terms are used interchangeably. Buyers or customers refer to the demand side of the market. ...
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2163760
fatcat:exjxbq6svfdbdci6zmu6aquu6q
Building Trust in Online Auction Markets Through an Economic Incentive Mechanism
2003
Social Science Research Network
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Millions of dollars change hands daily through online auction markets. However, fraud has been on the rise in these markets. ...
Thus, each participant's identity as well as his or her reputation can be established by other market participants. ...
This gives both sides an incentive to cheat, even though honest behavior maximizes the total payoff of the two players: (1 + g)p t À lp t < p t + p t according to the assumption g À l < 1. ...
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2853905
fatcat:2dvhbii5pre3ne7yoiorxwx6d4
Environmental Labeling and Incomplete Consumer Information in Laboratory Markets
2002
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
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We induce buyer preferences over quality in a laboratory posted offer market to study sellers' incentives to offer products of differing quality. ...
We first document the market failure that arises from incomplete information when no signaling or reputations are possible. We then study various treatments that could remedy this failure. ...
During each market period sellers can sell a maximum of two units of grade Regular or two units of grade Super. ...
doi:10.1006/jeem.2000.1170
fatcat:6wcz3cx3x5hvxgc5ucacw5emka
Building trust in online auction markets through an economic incentive mechanism
2003
Decision Support Systems
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Millions of dollars change hands daily through online auction markets. However, fraud has been on the rise in these markets. ...
Thus, each participant's identity as well as his or her reputation can be established by other market participants. ...
This gives both sides an incentive to cheat, even though honest behavior maximizes the total payoff of the two players: (1 + g)p t À lp t < p t + p t according to the assumption g À l < 1. ...
doi:10.1016/s0167-9236(02)00074-x
fatcat:jjaxslcw2zdwvgfjffkk4doxiu
Honest certification and the threat of capture
2005
International Journal of Industrial Organization
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These conditions alone have strong implications for the industrial organization of certification markets: 1) Honest certification requires high prices that may even exceed the static monopoly price. 2) ...
This principle implies benefits from specialization and explains specialized certifiers as efficient market institutions that sell reputation as a service to other firms. ...
In order to derive an equilibrium in which certification is honest, we proceed in two steps. ...
doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2004.09.002
fatcat:zw5kbj6vizdg7mpfik75iju5tq
Dynamic Certification, Reputation for Quality and Industry Standard
2016
Social Science Research Network
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We consider two types of equilibria: one in which certification decisions are made based on firm's reputation and the second in which they are made based on the time since last certification. ...
We also show that the firm in this case suffers from an over-certification trap in which the benefits of reputation are dissipated by excessive certification. ...
As we discussed above, if τ a ∈ (0, τ ), the equilibrium beliefs/reputation are non-monotone between two certifications (see Figure 2 below). ...
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2839587
fatcat:nnf4thkuzbh27ckzxcgrkd4mxe
Corporate Social Responsibility in Buyer-Supplier Relationships: Is it Beneficial for Top-Tier Suppliers to Market their Capability to Ensure a Responsible Supply Chain?
2013
Business Research
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CSR)related supply management practices affects the reputation of top-tier suppliers in business-to-business (B2B) markets. ...
reputation, which is expressed in four sets of testable research propositions. ...
sending of positive signals through marketing and the avoidance of negative signals through respective SCM practices are in fact two sides of the same coin. ...
doi:10.1007/bf03342746
fatcat:2k7tmxunkrbljgeujdyejtpb24
Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of Transnational Private Regulation of Labor and Environmental Conditions
2007
American Journal of Sociology
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I analyze the emergence of certification associations in the 1990s in two fields-forest products and apparel. ...
Two particular scandals in the mid-1990s dramatically increased the visibility of sweatshops and raised the reputational stakes for companies. ...
The table is based on the main affiliation(s) (past or present) of each individual, as revealed in the interview. ...
doi:10.1086/518871
fatcat:aorf73ehcvfc3cklc2lunyiacm
Certifying the public image? Reputational gains of certification in Norwegian salmon aquaculture
2021
Aquaculture
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We would like to thank the companies that participated in this study. We are also grateful to the two anonymous reviewers providing valuable feedback. ...
Acknowledgements This work has been conducted as part of the STARR (Sustainable Aquaculture -Regulation and Reputation) project (grant no. 234139), the Sustainfish Project (grant no. 254841), and the SoLic ...
Further, by obtaining ASC certification, producers are seeking to improve their reputation and standing in global markets, with public authorities, and with local and global community. ...
doi:10.1016/j.aquaculture.2021.736900
fatcat:yuczsebv5rh2bnw2dqqocntngq
Dynamic Certification and Reputation for Quality
2015
Social Science Research Network
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We consider two types of equilibria: one in which certification decisions are made based on firm's reputation and the second in which they are made based on the time since last certification. ...
We also show that the firm in this case suffers from an over-certification trap in which the benefits of reputation are dissipated by excessive certification. ...
We study two types of equilibria: where the market expects the firms to recertify when its reputation drops sufficiently or when enough time passes since last certification. ...
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2697762
fatcat:5csjy6h36nb4ldm26ekyhgyi6m
Dynamic Certification and Reputation for Quality
2018
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
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We consider two types of equilibria: one in which certification decisions are made based on firm's reputation and the second in which they are made based on the time since last certification. ...
We also show that the firm in this case suffers from an over-certification trap in which the benefits of reputation are dissipated by excessive certification. ...
We study two types of equilibria: where the market expects the firms to recertify when its reputation drops sufficiently or when enough time passes since last certification. ...
doi:10.1257/mic.20160282
fatcat:pcocngcdjfh33fxlurwqkg5gz4
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