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Two-Sided Reputation in Certification Markets

Matthieu Bouvard, Raphaël Levy
2017 Management science  
In a market where sellers solicit certification to overcome asymmetric information, we show that the profit of a monopolistic certifier can be hump-shaped in its reputation for accuracy: a higher accuracy  ...  Conversely, this region may expand when sellers hold multiple certifications.  ...  In this paper, we argue that reputation in certification markets is two-sided, in that certifiers use their reputation to attract different types of sellers with conflicting preferences for precision.  ... 
doi:10.1287/mnsc.2017.2742 fatcat:e3dkagrjd5cjvbwcqjxm3bkcnm

Two-Sided Reputation in Certification Markets

Matthieu Bouvard, Raphaël Levy
2012 Social Science Research Network  
In a market where sellers solicit certification to overcome asymmetric information, we show that the profit of a monopolistic certifier can be hump-shaped in its reputation for accuracy: a higher accuracy  ...  Conversely, this region may expand when sellers hold multiple certifications.  ...  In this paper, we argue that reputation in certification markets is two-sided, in that certifiers use their reputation to attract different types of sellers with conflicting preferences for precision.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2178119 fatcat:d62ydsv5nzegpifepnsadljyqa

Two­sided reputation in certification markets Two-sided reputation in certification markets

Matthieu Bouvard, Matthieu Bouvard, Raphaël Levy
2013 unpublished
In a market where sellers solicit certification to overcome adverse selection, we show that the profit of a monopolistic certifier is hump-shaped in his reputation for accuracy: a higher accuracy attracts  ...  Conversely, this region expands when sellers can hold multiple certifications.  ...  This captures the idea that reputation is essentially two-sided in certification markets.  ... 
fatcat:frl24jkct5fn3oiy4ez7rkp26i

Endogenous Matching, Underwriter Reputation, and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings

Oktay Akkus, J. Anthony Cookson, Ali Hortacsu
2014 Social Science Research Network  
We document two opposing effects of underwriter reputation: (i) an issuer-side certification effect where greater reputation reduces the amount of underpricing, which has been stable and negative from  ...  Our estimates imply that high underwriter reputation is associated with 10 to 15 percent greater long run market value for the issuing firm.  ...  In two-sided matching market, the characteristics of counterfactual firms should have predictive power for the underwriter's reputation.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2419277 fatcat:zsnxsercujbptbzg4wvzplw3va

The Appeal of Third-Party Certifications: Information Unraveling in Natural Experiments

Mingfeng Lin, Paulo Goes
2012 Social Science Research Network  
market.  ...  The first natural experiment was the introduction of certifications into the market, with a fee; and the second occurred when certification exams were made free.  ...  In this paper we refer to those on the supply side of the market as sellers or workers, and both terms are used interchangeably. Buyers or customers refer to the demand side of the market.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2163760 fatcat:exjxbq6svfdbdci6zmu6aquu6q

Building Trust in Online Auction Markets Through an Economic Incentive Mechanism

Sulin Ba, Han Zhang
2003 Social Science Research Network  
Millions of dollars change hands daily through online auction markets. However, fraud has been on the rise in these markets.  ...  Thus, each participant's identity as well as his or her reputation can be established by other market participants.  ...  This gives both sides an incentive to cheat, even though honest behavior maximizes the total payoff of the two players: (1 + g)p t À lp t < p t + p t according to the assumption g À l < 1.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2853905 fatcat:2dvhbii5pre3ne7yoiorxwx6d4

Environmental Labeling and Incomplete Consumer Information in Laboratory Markets

Timothy N. Cason, Lata Gangadharan
2002 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management  
We induce buyer preferences over quality in a laboratory posted offer market to study sellers' incentives to offer products of differing quality.  ...  We first document the market failure that arises from incomplete information when no signaling or reputations are possible. We then study various treatments that could remedy this failure.  ...  During each market period sellers can sell a maximum of two units of grade Regular or two units of grade Super.  ... 
doi:10.1006/jeem.2000.1170 fatcat:6wcz3cx3x5hvxgc5ucacw5emka

Building trust in online auction markets through an economic incentive mechanism

Sulin Ba, Andrew B. Whinston, Han Zhang
2003 Decision Support Systems  
Millions of dollars change hands daily through online auction markets. However, fraud has been on the rise in these markets.  ...  Thus, each participant's identity as well as his or her reputation can be established by other market participants.  ...  This gives both sides an incentive to cheat, even though honest behavior maximizes the total payoff of the two players: (1 + g)p t À lp t < p t + p t according to the assumption g À l < 1.  ... 
doi:10.1016/s0167-9236(02)00074-x fatcat:jjaxslcw2zdwvgfjffkk4doxiu

Honest certification and the threat of capture

Roland Strausz
2005 International Journal of Industrial Organization  
These conditions alone have strong implications for the industrial organization of certification markets: 1) Honest certification requires high prices that may even exceed the static monopoly price. 2)  ...  This principle implies benefits from specialization and explains specialized certifiers as efficient market institutions that sell reputation as a service to other firms.  ...  In order to derive an equilibrium in which certification is honest, we proceed in two steps.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2004.09.002 fatcat:zw5kbj6vizdg7mpfik75iju5tq

Dynamic Certification, Reputation for Quality and Industry Standard

Ivan Marinovic, Felipe Varas
2016 Social Science Research Network  
We consider two types of equilibria: one in which certification decisions are made based on firm's reputation and the second in which they are made based on the time since last certification.  ...  We also show that the firm in this case suffers from an over-certification trap in which the benefits of reputation are dissipated by excessive certification.  ...  As we discussed above, if τ a ∈ (0, τ ), the equilibrium beliefs/reputation are non-monotone between two certifications (see Figure 2 below).  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2839587 fatcat:nnf4thkuzbh27ckzxcgrkd4mxe

Corporate Social Responsibility in Buyer-Supplier Relationships: Is it Beneficial for Top-Tier Suppliers to Market their Capability to Ensure a Responsible Supply Chain?

Thomas Leppelt, Kai Foerstl, Evi Hartmann
2013 Business Research  
CSR)related supply management practices affects the reputation of top-tier suppliers in business-to-business (B2B) markets.  ...  reputation, which is expressed in four sets of testable research propositions.  ...  sending of positive signals through marketing and the avoidance of negative signals through respective SCM practices are in fact two sides of the same coin.  ... 
doi:10.1007/bf03342746 fatcat:2k7tmxunkrbljgeujdyejtpb24

Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of Transnational Private Regulation of Labor and Environmental Conditions

Tim Bartley
2007 American Journal of Sociology  
I analyze the emergence of certification associations in the 1990s in two fields-forest products and apparel.  ...  Two particular scandals in the mid-1990s dramatically increased the visibility of sweatshops and raised the reputational stakes for companies.  ...  The table is based on the main affiliation(s) (past or present) of each individual, as revealed in the interview.  ... 
doi:10.1086/518871 fatcat:aorf73ehcvfc3cklc2lunyiacm

Certifying the public image? Reputational gains of certification in Norwegian salmon aquaculture

Marit Schei Olsen, Trine Thorvaldsen, Tonje C. Osmundsen
2021 Aquaculture  
We would like to thank the companies that participated in this study. We are also grateful to the two anonymous reviewers providing valuable feedback.  ...  Acknowledgements This work has been conducted as part of the STARR (Sustainable Aquaculture -Regulation and Reputation) project (grant no. 234139), the Sustainfish Project (grant no. 254841), and the SoLic  ...  Further, by obtaining ASC certification, producers are seeking to improve their reputation and standing in global markets, with public authorities, and with local and global community.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.aquaculture.2021.736900 fatcat:yuczsebv5rh2bnw2dqqocntngq

Dynamic Certification and Reputation for Quality

Ivan Marinovic, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Felipe Varas
2015 Social Science Research Network  
We consider two types of equilibria: one in which certification decisions are made based on firm's reputation and the second in which they are made based on the time since last certification.  ...  We also show that the firm in this case suffers from an over-certification trap in which the benefits of reputation are dissipated by excessive certification.  ...  We study two types of equilibria: where the market expects the firms to recertify when its reputation drops sufficiently or when enough time passes since last certification.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2697762 fatcat:5csjy6h36nb4ldm26ekyhgyi6m

Dynamic Certification and Reputation for Quality

Iván Marinovic, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Felipe Varas
2018 American Economic Journal: Microeconomics  
We consider two types of equilibria: one in which certification decisions are made based on firm's reputation and the second in which they are made based on the time since last certification.  ...  We also show that the firm in this case suffers from an over-certification trap in which the benefits of reputation are dissipated by excessive certification.  ...  We study two types of equilibria: where the market expects the firms to recertify when its reputation drops sufficiently or when enough time passes since last certification.  ... 
doi:10.1257/mic.20160282 fatcat:pcocngcdjfh33fxlurwqkg5gz4
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