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Truthful spectrum auction design for secondary networks

Yuefei Zhu, Baochun Li, Zongpeng Li
2012 2012 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM  
A severe limitation of existing spectrum auction designs lies in the oversimplifying assumption that every non-licensed user is a singlenode or single-link secondary user.  ...  We aim to design truthful auctions for allocating channels to SNs in a coordinated fashion that maximizes social welfare of the system.  ...  For spectrum auctions that take interference among secondary users into consideration, Wu et al.  ... 
doi:10.1109/infcom.2012.6195836 dblp:conf/infocom/ZhuLL12 fatcat:igwbnitw5fge3cfy5v7inkzrsy

Designing Truthful Spectrum Auctions for Multi-hop Secondary Networks

Zongpeng Li, Baochun Li, Yuefei Zhu
2015 IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing  
A limitation of existing spectrum auction designs lies in the over-simplifying assumption that every nonlicensed secondary user is a single node or single-hop network.  ...  The framework relieves a spectrum auction designer from worrying about truthfulness of the auction, so that he or she can focus on social welfare maximization while assuming truthful bids for free.  ...  Designing Truthful Spectrum Auctions for Multi-hop Secondary Networks Zongpeng Li, Senior Member, IEEE; Baochun Li, Senior Member, IEEE; Yuefei Zhu .  ... 
doi:10.1109/tmc.2013.64 fatcat:shozwvadvzbhhhdi2ib24xvzge

Truthful group buying-based spectrum auction design for cognitive radio networks

Dejun Yang, Guoliang Xue, Xiang Zhang
2014 2014 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC)  
Inspired by the group buying service on the Internet, group buying strategy has been introduced into the design for spectrum auctions to increase the buying power of small network providers as a whole.  ...  We carefully design the budget extraction for each secondary access point within the secondary network to maximize the budget collected from the secondary users.  ...  In this paper, we design a Truthful Group Buyingbased Auction (TRUBA) for spectrum leasing in cognitive radio networks.  ... 
doi:10.1109/icc.2014.6883665 dblp:conf/icc/YangXZ14 fatcat:kr7stqktljerjbjrvukwocwtmm

DOTA: A Double Truthful Auction for spectrum allocation in dynamic spectrum access

Qinhui Wang, Baoliu Ye, Tianyin Xu, Sanglu Lu, Song Guo
2012 2012 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference (WCNC)  
In this paper, we address this problem by proposing DOTA, a DOuble Truthful Auction for dynamic spectrum access.  ...  The most significant challenge of the auction design to provide economic robustness, particularly truthfulness, under the local-dependent interference constraints.  ...  DOTA AUCTION DESIGN In this section, we present the model for double spectrum auction problem and describe the detailed design of DOTA. A.  ... 
doi:10.1109/wcnc.2012.6214017 dblp:conf/wcnc/WangYXLG12 fatcat:gu5pbbfwdbezvc4njhs5u62wmq

TODA: Truthful Online Double Auction for Spectrum Allocation in Wireless Networks

ShiGuang Wang, Ping Xu, XiaoHua Xu, ShaoJie Tang, XiangYang Li, Xin Liu
2010 2010 IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum (DySPAN)  
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to design truthful online double auction mechanisms for spectrum allocation.  ...  In this case, we design strategyproof (truthful) mechanisms for both the primary users and secondary users.  ...  Unfortunately, previous truthful double auction designs [2] , [15] , [7] , [26] only consider the single-round case, which is not fit for the continuous spectrum auction where secondary users come  ... 
doi:10.1109/dyspan.2010.5457905 fatcat:242grlixobe7tgfbpxeyz7p3ge

PROMISE: A framework for truthful and profit maximizing spectrum double auctions

Dejun Yang, Xiang Zhang, Guoliang Xue
2014 IEEE INFOCOM 2014 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications  
of secondary users who can share a common channel. • We propose PROMISE, a general framework for truthful and profit maximizing spectrum double auction.  ...  To fill this void, we design PROMISE, a framework for spectrum double auctions, which jointly considers spectrum reusability, truthfulness, and profit maximization without the distribution knowledge.  ...  Considering the fact that secondary users may join the network in an online fashion, Wang et al. [21] designed TODA, a general framework for truthful online double auction for spectrum allocation.  ... 
doi:10.1109/infocom.2014.6847930 dblp:conf/infocom/YangZX14 fatcat:ioii76cdcfgoza3ky5aroohkzq

A Truthful Bilateral Multiunit Auction for Heterogeneous Cognitive Radio Networks

Jinzhao Su, Jianfei Wang, Wei Wu
2011 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks  
For attracting primary users to participate in secondary spectrum market, an auction was proposed as an alternative for spectrum trade.  ...  Existing auction schemes are either to be unilateral trade which only supports heterogeneous cognitive radio networks without guarantee of bid truthfulness, or to be truthful single-unit auction which  ...  Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank Education Ministry of China for their support of this paper under the National Foundation for the Doctoral Program (200800060018), and also support by Aviation  ... 
doi:10.1155/2011/350476 fatcat:y3qgxwvl4naelc6gm4shxy3tyq

A Hybrid Spectrum Combinational Auction Mechanism Based on a Weighted Bipartite Graph for Energy Internet in Smart Cities

Huibin Feng, Zhaocai Yu, Jian Guan, Geng Lin, Wei Yu
2020 Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing  
In this paper, the spectrum allocation problem of the cognitive radio network for EI in a smart city is investigated.  ...  The network spectrum allocation with both heterogeneous primary operators and secondary users is formulated as the combinatorial auction problem and then is converted to a subset selection problem on a  ...  Assuming without the valuation distribution knowledge, a framework for spectrum double auction which jointly considers spectrum reusability, truthfulness, and profit maximization is designed in [26] .  ... 
doi:10.1155/2020/8829602 fatcat:h6futx25lnhihmgvugx434ad5y

Socially-optimal online spectrum auctions for secondary wireless communication

Hongxing Li, Chuan Wu, Zongpeng Li
2015 2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM)  
Spectrum auctions are efficient mechanisms for licensed users to relinquish their under-utilized spectrum to secondary links for monetary remuneration.  ...  Truthfulness and social welfare maximization are two natural goals in such auctions, but cannot be achieved simultaneously with polynomial-time complexity by existing methods, even in a static network  ...  ALGORITHM DESIGN In this section, we present our spectrum auction framework and the algorithms designed for both the secondary links and the primary user.  ... 
doi:10.1109/infocom.2015.7218589 dblp:conf/infocom/LiWL15 fatcat:4ainkhaxandpxosc2ht626qecy

A Secondary Market for Spectrum

Hong Xu, Jin Jin, Baochun Li
2010 2010 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM  
We design a market mechanism based on dynamic double auctions, creating a marketplace in the air to match bandwidth demand with supply.  ...  We advocate that a spectrum secondary market, analogous to the stock market, is to be established for users to dynamically trade among themselves their channel holdings obtained in the primary market from  ...  A truthful auction design is proposed in [4] based on the classical VCG auction. The revenue maximization of truthful spectrum auction is studied in [13] . Zhou et al.  ... 
doi:10.1109/infcom.2010.5462277 dblp:conf/infocom/XuJL10 fatcat:sy22srrs6raobgvxgiivlzz3va

Auctioning based Coordinated TV White Space Spectrum Sharing for Home Networks [article]

Saravana Manickam, Mahesh K. Marina, Sofia Pediaditaki, Maziar Nekovee
2013 arXiv   pre-print
Considering the home networking use case, we leverage the geolocation database for interference-aware coordinated TVWS sharing among secondary users (home networks) using short-term auctions, thereby realize  ...  For the short-term auctions, we propose an online multi-unit, iterative truthful mechanism called VERUM that takes into consideration spatially heterogeneous spectrum availability, an inherent characteristic  ...  Hoefer and Kesselhiem [16] study truthful spectrum auctions for secondary markets.  ... 
arXiv:1307.0962v2 fatcat:ehb4zhwv7bfexdhjpqohilagwa

Spectrum Auctions Under Physical Interference Model

Yuhui Zhang, Dejun Yang, Jian Lin, Ming Li, Guoliang Xue, Jian Tang, Lei Xie
2017 IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking  
Spectrum auctions provide a platform for licensed spectrum users to share their underutilized spectrum with unlicensed users.  ...  To fill this void, we design SPA, a spectrum single-sided auction under the physical interference model, which considers the interference to be accumulative.  ...  Auction Model With primary and secondary users in the cognitive radio network, we aim to design a single-sided spectrum auction that is individually rational, computationally efficient, and truthful.  ... 
doi:10.1109/tccn.2017.2752180 fatcat:hg27ktr3svepvg3ksci6o7nprm

Dynamic Spectrum Allocation for Heterogeneous Cognitive Radio Networks from Auction Perspective

Jinzhao Su, Jianfei Wang, Wei Wu
2011 Proceedings of the 6th International ICST Conference on Cognitive Radio Oriented Wireless Networks and Communications  
For attracting primary users to participate in secondary spectrum market, auction was proposed as an alternative for spectrum trade.  ...  Existing auction schemes are either to be single-sided trade which only supports heterogeneous cognitive radio networks without guarantee of bid truthfulness, or to be truthful single-unit auction which  ...  ACKNOWLEDGMENT The authors would like to thank Education Ministry of China for their supports of this work under the National Foundation for the Doctoral Program (200800060018), and also supports of Aviation  ... 
doi:10.4108/icst.crowncom.2011.245836 dblp:conf/crowncom/SuWW11 fatcat:v4m4rotpjfaf5d2xewyh5ps3g4

A New Technique of Auction Based Spectrum Allocation for CR Network

2016 International Journal of Science and Research (IJSR)  
We develop a truthful and efficient combinatorial auction scheme under a novel spectrum allocation model.  ...  With the diversification of wireless communication services and the proliferation of different wireless network technologies, the demand for radio spectrum is increasing dramatically.  ...  In [5] the Spectrum Auction Framework for Access Allocation in Cognitive Radio Networks is explained.  ... 
doi:10.21275/v5i1.nov152951 fatcat:uljrdurxvvcbjegzcqlhotpgvq

On designing truthful spectrum auctions for variable bandwidths

Tingting Chen, Sheng Zhong
2013 2013 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC)  
In this paper, we design truthful spectrum auction frameworks in which secondary users can bid for, and then be actually allocated spectra with variable bandwidths.  ...  They push the need for designing more flexible spectrum auction frameworks that allow to allocate spectrum with variable bandwidth to the secondary user.  ...  Challenges in Design Our goal is to design a truthful spectrum auction framework that allocates spectra with variable bandwidths to the devices of secondary users without interference.  ... 
doi:10.1109/icc.2013.6654712 dblp:conf/icc/ChenZ13 fatcat:cetg7z3kmnd27nv6lo2umw2pxi
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