Filters








230 Hits in 9.1 sec

Tradeoffs Between Information and Ordinal Approximation for Bipartite Matching [article]

Elliot Anshelevich, Wennan Zhu
2017 arXiv   pre-print
We study ordinal approximation algorithms for maximum-weight bipartite matchings.  ...  To address this question for forming high-utility matchings between agents in X and Y, we consider three ordinal information types: when we know the preference order of only nodes in X for nodes in Y,  ...  We establish tradeoffs between the percentage of available preferences and the possible approximation ratio for all three models of information above, and thus quantify when a specific amount of ordinal  ... 
arXiv:1707.01608v1 fatcat:2np25wwyg5bzlgrc7o3ahb7ei4

Guest Editorial: Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory

Vittorio Bilo, Michele Flammini
2019 Theory of Computing Systems  
divisible and indivisible goods to a set of strategic budgeted bidders with additive valuations arriving over time; • Tradeoffs Between Information and Ordinal Approximation for Bipartite Matching by  ...  Elliot Anshelevich and Wennan Zhu, which designs constant approximation algorithms for the problem of computing the maximum-weight matching in a complete bipartite graph when only the ordered preferences  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00224-019-09932-0 fatcat:tm3cyijapfaltbhyhgyl3p3gse

A Few Queries Go a Long Way: Information-Distortion Tradeoffs in Matching [article]

Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros A. Voudouris
2020 arXiv   pre-print
We study the interplay between elicited cardinal information (measured by the number of queries per agent) and distortion for one-sided matching, as well as a wide range of well-studied related problems  ...  We consider the one-sided matching problem, where n agents have preferences over n items, and these preferences are induced by underlying cardinal valuation functions.  ...  possible information-distortion tradeoffs in one-sided matching?  ... 
arXiv:2009.06543v1 fatcat:srtkatashzceplvpcjxnkwfp6q

A Few Queries Go a Long Way: Information-Distortion Tradeoffs in Matching

Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros A. Voudouris
2022 The Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research  
We study the interplay between elicited cardinal information (measured by the number of queries per agent) and distortion for One-Sided Matching, as well as a wide range of well-studied related problems  ...  We consider the One-Sided Matching problem, where n agents have preferences over n items, and these preferences are induced by underlying cardinal valuation functions.  ...  Birmpas has been supported by the ERC Advanced Grant 788893 AMDROMA "Algorithmic and Mechanism Design Research in Online Markets", and the MIUR PRIN project ALGADIMAR "Algorithms, Games, and Digital Markets  ... 
doi:10.1613/jair.1.12690 fatcat:ik7y5p6gq5ayzousl2tt57w53m

Don't Roll the Dice, Ask Twice: The Two-Query Distortion of Matching Problems and Beyond [article]

Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros A. Voudouris
2022 arXiv   pre-print
A recent array of works put forward the agenda of designing mechanisms that can learn the values of the agents for a small number of alternatives via queries, and use this extra information to make a better-informed  ...  Matching, General Graph Matching, and k-Constrained Resource Allocation.  ...  et al. [2021b] recently put forward the agenda of studying the tradeoffs between information and efficiency, when the employed mechanisms are equipped with the capability of learning the values of the  ... 
arXiv:2203.01872v2 fatcat:h7ydvuyryjfu5buwjchrfghgum

Maximizing Efficiency in Dynamic Matching Markets [article]

Itai Ashlagi, Maximilien Burq, Patrick Jaillet, Amin Saberi
2018 arXiv   pre-print
We study matching algorithms that perform well over any sequence of arrivals when there is no a priori information about the match values or arrival times.  ...  The primal-dual analysis of the algorithm hinges on a careful comparison between the initial dual value associated with an agent when it first arrives, and the final value after d time steps.  ...  For the case, in which agents have ordinal preferences, Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed the Deferred Acceptance algorithm which finds a stable matching.  ... 
arXiv:1803.01285v1 fatcat:6wqd2fr675ethfimpk34fcjtpy

Plurality Veto: A Simple Voting Rule Achieving Optimal Metric Distortion [article]

Fatih Erdem Kizilkaya, David Kempe
2022 arXiv   pre-print
This general rule interpolates between Random Dictatorship (for k=0) and Plurality Veto (for k=n-1), and k controls the variance of the output.  ...  We show that for all k, this rule has distortion at most 3.  ...  Several other recent works have studied the tradeoff between communication and distortion. Mandal et al.  ... 
arXiv:2206.07098v1 fatcat:k3yqfu6y4fekjgwzlpiqckzuh4

An Asymmetric Popularity-Similarity Optimization Method for Embedding Directed Networks into Hyperbolic Space

Zongning Wu, Zengru Di, Ying Fan
2020 Complexity  
In accordance with the bipartite structure of directed networks and multiplex node information, the method replays the generation law of asymmetric networks in hyperbolic space, estimating the hyperbolic  ...  Here, we propose a model for embedding directed networks into hyperbolic space.  ...  (a, b) e relationships among the hyperbolic distance, the angular distance, and the spatial distance. e abscissa indicates the distance between the nodes, and the ordinate is the statistic for the number  ... 
doi:10.1155/2020/8372928 fatcat:ic7wcmg5ojgdjgb62qnn35a6lm

Fair-by-design matching [article]

David García-Soriano, Francesco Bonchi
2020 arXiv   pre-print
Our main contribution is a polynomial-time algorithm for fair matching building on techniques from minimum cuts, and edge-coloring algorithms for regular bipartite graphs, and transversal theory.  ...  In the special case of matchings in bipartite graphs, our framework is equivalent to the egalitarian mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Mouline.  ...  (For example, instance I could represent a bipartite graph between jobs and a set U of applicants, and S the set of all matchings.)  ... 
arXiv:1802.02562v2 fatcat:2jvgofivzbcena2jgkimsuxayq

Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets

Yeon-Koo Che, Olivier Tercieux
2015 Social Science Research Network  
Thanks to the recent progress in matching theory, there are by now well-established mechanisms for attaining each of these two goals and for balancing the tradeoffs between them when they are in conflict  ...  We study efficient and stable mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individuals' preferences are drawn randomly from a class of distributions allowing for both common and  ...  Second, while the tradeoff between efficiency and stability is well understood, it remains unclear how best to resolve the tradeoff when both goals are important.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2638009 fatcat:jjamskqlavcitlrwpjn7wg2c2m

High Welfare Matching Markets via Descending Price [article]

Robin Bowers, Bo Waggoner
2022 arXiv   pre-print
This result extends to models with costs for acquiring information about one's values, and also to matching on hypergraphs.  ...  We introduce notions of approximate stability and show that they have beneficial welfare implications.  ...  Participants are able to manage the risk-reward tradeoff for investing in information acquisition, because once prices have descended to a low point, they know that they can lock in available matches for  ... 
arXiv:2203.02023v2 fatcat:lha7lfpcd5bxbhkvhxi7srzafy

Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal World [article]

Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
2016 arXiv   pre-print
We study truthful mechanisms for matching and related problems in a partial information setting, where the agents' true utilities are hidden, and the algorithm only has access to ordinal preference information  ...  Our techniques yield universally truthful algorithms for a number of graph problems: a 1.76-approximation algorithm for Max-Weight Matching, 2-approximation algorithm for Max k-matching, a 6-approximation  ...  Acknowledgements This work was supported in part by NSF awards CCF-1527497 and CNS-1218374.  ... 
arXiv:1610.04069v2 fatcat:fs4z3cutxnacnbrgx6bw7vg2dq

Resolving the Optimal Metric Distortion Conjecture [article]

Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Halpern, Nisarg Shah
2020 arXiv   pre-print
A prominent motivation for this problem comes from voting theory, where V represents a set of voters, C represents a set of candidates, and the rankings correspond to ordinal preferences of the voters.  ...  We propose algorithms that choose a point in C using only these rankings as input and we provide bounds on their distortion (worst-case approximation ratio).  ...  novel algorithms for problems such as matching, clustering, and facility location using only ordinal information.  ... 
arXiv:2004.07447v2 fatcat:gxlktxx7jrc3fn3uysp7z5dveu

Betting on permutations

Yiling Chen, Lance Fortnow, Evdokia Nikolova, David M. Pennock
2007 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '07  
We also show that a natural greedy algorithm gives a poor approximation for indivisible orders.  ...  We prove that the auctioneer problem becomes NP-hard for pair betting. We identify a sufficient condition for the existence of a pair betting match that can be verified in polynomial time.  ...  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We thank Ravi Kumar, Yishay Mansour, Amin Saberi, Andrew Tomkins, John Tomlin, and members of Yahoo! Research for valuable insights and discussions.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1250910.1250957 dblp:conf/sigecom/ChenFNP07 fatcat:bcrw5bldj5fbxhrxq4wtaaynby

The Mathematical Parallels Between Packet Switching and Information Transmission [article]

Tony T. Lee
2006 arXiv   pre-print
of analogies between switching and transmission are identified.  ...  The theme of this paper is to show that transmission noise and packet contention actually have similar characteristics and can be tamed by comparable means to achieve reliable communication, and a number  ...  Theorem 3: (Hall) Let G = (V L , V R , E) be a bipartite graph, there exists a complete matching for G if and only if |N A | ≥ |A| (15) for any subset A ⊆ V L .  ... 
arXiv:cs/0610050v2 fatcat:zvmg2zbupvgabkonwe6lapczie
« Previous Showing results 1 — 15 out of 230 results