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Auctions With A Minimum Requirement Of Bids

Ferdinando Colombo
2003 Australian Economic Papers  
We show that in a second-price sealed-bid procurement auction with independent and private costs of production, participation costs and the requirement of a minimum number of bids for the good to be bought  ...  , the unique Bayesian equilibrium and rationalizable solution calls for all ...rms not to bid.  ...  This would call for him to abandon the canonical auction model with independent and private values or to question the validity of the game-theoretic concepts of solution.  ... 
doi:10.1111/1467-8454.00204 fatcat:qixwrlmz3fakzgdpharkvjfo6i

Innovation Contests with Entry Auction

Thomas Giebe
2010 Social Science Research Network  
In these equilibria, signaling in the entry auction does not occur since contestants play a simple strategy that does not depend on rivals' private information.  ...  We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for admission to an innovation contest.  ...  In particular, we combine each of the two mechanisms mentioned above with an entry auction where the highest-bidding participants pay an entry fee (according to the auction rules) and then enter the contest  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1558495 fatcat:atnijtp2z5azljs75x4bgqqfbi

Innovation contests with entry auction

Thomas Giebe
2014 Journal of Mathematical Economics  
In these equilibria, signaling in the entry auction does not occur since contestants play a simple strategy that does not depend on rivals' private information.  ...  We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for admission to an innovation contest.  ...  In particular, we combine each of the two mechanisms mentioned above with an entry auction where the highest-bidding participants pay an entry fee (according to the auction rules) and then enter the contest  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.02.004 fatcat:m5ibrhq4k5fnbjm43iqdqktkjm

Predictive value and the usefulness of game theoretic models

Ido Erev, Alvin E Roth, Robert L Slonim, Greg Barron
2002 International Journal of Forecasting  
First, there are many important settings in which game theoretic models have high forecasting power.  ...  Forecasting (2002)] argues that this does not imply that game theoretic analysis cannot be useful. The current paper discusses two types of observations that support this assertion.  ...  is concerned with the the market who were not matched to each other development of game theoretic models with but would both prefer to be.  ... 
doi:10.1016/s0169-2070(02)00023-7 fatcat:f53mfrmi5ffkrgn7ul5nmmeshe

Chapter 32 An Empirical Perspective on Auctions [chapter]

Ken Hendricks, Robert H. Porter
2007 Handbook of Industrial Organization  
We describe the economics literature on auction markets, with an emphasis on the connection between theory, empirical practice, and public policy, and a discussion of outstanding issues.  ...  We discuss identi...cation and estimation issues, with an emphasis on the connection between theory and empirical practice. We also discuss both structural and reduced form empirical approaches.  ...  Similarly, the Dutch auction is akin to a FPSB auction. Variations on these mechanisms include secret or publicly announced reserve prices or minimum bids, and entry fees or subsidies.  ... 
doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03032-9 fatcat:2qwtpkhbezdsbhtbz4deofuyue

Constrained automated mechanism design for infinite games of incomplete information

Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Daniel M. Reeves, Michael P. Wellman
2011 Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems  
By comparing our results with known optimal mechanisms, and in some cases improving on the best known mechanisms, we provide evidence that ours is a promising approach to parametric mechanism design for  ...  We apply the approach to several classes of two-player infinite games of incomplete information, producing optimal or nearly optimal mechanisms using various objective functions.  ...  This auction is Ex-Interim-IR, and will remain so if the designer charges a fixed entry fee of 0.0027, giving itself a total revenue of approximately 0.4932.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s10458-011-9177-2 fatcat:gkigwo7kpje2rbrbuaqs6nen7m

Optimal Design of Crowdsourcing Contests

Nikolay Archak, Arun Sundararajan
2009 International Conference on Information Systems  
This paper provides a game theoretic model of a crowdsourcing contest. Special attention is given to the asymptotic behavior of the contest outcome.  ...  We show that all significant outcomes of crowdsourcing contests will be determined by contestants in a small neighborhood (core) of the most efficient contestant type; in particular, the asymptotic structure  ...  He finds that free entry in the contest is not optimal and the organizer should restrict participation by imposing an entry fee, one that extracts all participant surplus.  ... 
dblp:conf/icis/ArchakS09 fatcat:6saart76dbaijhdbqhuqhhjq5e

Auctions of Real Options: Security Bids, Moral Hazard, and Strategic Timing

Lin William Cong
2012 Social Science Research Network  
The paper thus offers the theoretical insight that auctions are not one-shot games, and cautions the use of security bids despite their oft-discussed benefits.  ...  By endogenizing the timing of auctions and characterizing the timing game, the paper also highlights the integral role of strategic timing in auction design.  ...  To fully endogenize the auction timing in an informal auction, one has to consider the Bayesian equilibrium in the optimal stopping game among the seller and bidders.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2143929 fatcat:wy3dpb7kb5d2fiin3zff2umhmu

An Introduction to Auctions

Sofia B Villas-Boas
2006 Journal of Industrial Organization Education  
The material can be covered in the last part of a first year graduate industrial organization course as well as an introduction to auctions course, in two or three lectures, using the lecture notes attached  ...  . __________________________- † These sets of lectures are based on lecture notes for the course ARE 202, which is a first year graduate course in the PhD program in the Agricultural and Resource Economics  ...  This drawback is overcome in the third non-parametric approach to estimation described below.  ... 
doi:10.2202/1935-5041.1004 fatcat:nutu5ydz2zgp3ee42zsqmw6uhe

Competition Between Auctions

Ernan Haruvy, Peter T. L. Popkowski Leszczyc, Octavian Carare, James C. Cox, Eric Greenleaf, Wolfgang Jank, Sandy D. Jap, Young-Hoon Park, Michael H. Rothkopf
2009 Social Science Research Network  
Even though auctions are capturing an increasing share of commerce, they are typically treated in the theoretical economics literature as isolated.  ...  That is, an auction is typically treated as a single seller facing multiple buyers or as a single buyer facing multiple sellers.  ...  Mike was a great scholar and one of the big experts in the areas of auctions. It has been a privilege to have Mike participate in this choice symposium and to co-author with him on this paper.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1377542 fatcat:kr4g4ixcu5ekxkt42nwijfis2y

Auctions of Identical Objects With Singleunit Demands: a Survey

Flavio Menezes
1998 Brazilian Review of Econometrics  
In this context, I will present a survey of the main results regarding the ranking of auctions based on revenue, bidding behaviour, effects of entry fees and reserve prices, and other strategic issues.  ...  The theory of auctions of a single object generalizes to a situation where identical objects are sold either sequentially or simultaneously but individuais can only buy one object.  ...  lO Moreover, it is not difficult to see that a selIer could achieve the maximised value of the expected revenue by instead resorting to entry fees or a combination of reserve price and entry fees.  ... 
doi:10.12660/bre.v18n21998.2839 fatcat:hucob7jdj5htbgms6izwk2pc4e

Competition between auctions

Ernan Haruvy, Peter T. L. Popkowski Leszczyc, Octavian Carare, James C. Cox, Eric A. Greenleaf, Wolfgang Jank, Sandy Jap, Young-Hoon Park, Michael H. Rothkopf
2008 Marketing letters  
These cross-disciplinary approaches to auction research offer fresh angles on issues not addressed previously, such as customer retention, relationship development, platform design, and novel statistical  ...  This treatment greatly simplifies the theory, but it limits auction theory to monopoly sellers or monopsony buyers and fails to consider the interface between these auctions and their market contexts or  ...  They considered the case of sellers and buyers who choose to participate in two uniform auctions. In their two-stage game, buyers and sellers decide first on the auction market they attend.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s11002-008-9037-2 fatcat:4nd3scsrb5e7bk5qamzgvlhsiu

The Origin of the Winner's Curse: A Laboratory Study

Gary Charness, Dan Levin
2009 American Economic Journal: Microeconomics  
payoffs, and/or a misunderstanding of the game.  ...  Our transformation reduced the game to an individual-choice problem, but one that still retains the key adverse-selection issue that results in the WC.  ...  discussions, as well as seminar participants at the SEA meetings in 2003, the New and Alternative Directions Workshop at Carnegie-Mellon in 2004, ESA-Tucson in 2004, and Tel Aviv University.  ... 
doi:10.1257/mic.1.1.207 fatcat:7qfgt6ck5vc6tjsirhs6kzzjmi

The Origin of the Winner's Curse: A Laboratory Study

Gary Charness, Dan Levin
2007 Social Science Research Network  
payoffs, and/or a misunderstanding of the game.  ...  Our transformation reduced the game to an individual-choice problem, but one that still retains the key adverse-selection issue that results in the WC.  ...  discussions, as well as seminar participants at the SEA meetings in 2003, the New and Alternative Directions Workshop at Carnegie-Mellon in 2004, ESA-Tucson in 2004, and Tel Aviv University.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.932250 fatcat:7enmgsq5o5evhdwv5ic4lfqxja

A Survey on Blockchain: A Game Theoretical Perspective

Ziyao Liu, Nguyen Cong Luong, Wenbo Wang, Dusit Niyato, Ping Wang, Ying-Chang Liang, Dong In Kim
2019 IEEE Access  
Finally, we highlight important challenges and future research directions of applying game theoretical approaches to incentive mechanism design and the combination of blockchain with other technologies  ...  In this survey, we review the game models proposed to address common issues in the blockchain network.  ...  Given a certain blockchain-based cryptocurrency, the user can choose whether or not to participate in the blockchain platform with a cost and to hold a certain amount of the crypto-currency, given the  ... 
doi:10.1109/access.2019.2909924 fatcat:a5gl7yexnffp5fjsnsw26gnjmi
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