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Page 9769 of Mathematical Reviews Vol. , Issue 2003m [page]

2003 Mathematical Reviews  
the Nash equilibrium action at every revision opportunity.  ...  Our example indicates that intermediate cases cannot be seen as convex combinations of the two polar non-stochastic cases of two or infinitely many indi- viduals.” 2003m:91017 91A10 91A28 Hellwig, Christian  ... 

Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games

Riccardo Calcagno, Yuichiro Kamada, Stefano Lovo, Takuo Sugaya
2014 Theoretical Economics  
In the preparation phase, each player stochastically receives opportunities to revise her actions, and the finally revised action is taken at the deadline.  ...  Which equilibrium prevails depends on the payoff structure and on the relative frequency of the arrivals of revision opportunities for each of the players. for useful comments and suggestions on either  ...  Which equilibrium prevails in the revision game depends on the payoff structure and the relative arrival frequency of revision opportunities for each player.  ... 
doi:10.3982/te1202 fatcat:dacdoluvenhvtjagu226dtiolq

Orders of limits for stationary distributions, stochastic dominance, and stochastic stability

2010 Theoretical Economics  
When an agent receives a revision opportunity, he chooses a new strategy using a noisy best response rule that satisfies mild regularity conditions; best response with mutations, logit choice, and probit  ...  In general, different noisy best response rules can generate different stochastically stable states.  ...  Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Thus, x is not stochastically stable. This competes the proof of the corollary.  ... 
doi:10.3982/te554 fatcat:55lzcf6rgrfkvhchtmqs5sgv5q

Tempered best response dynamics

Dai Zusai
2017 International Journal of Game Theory  
In a game with heterogeneous payoff types, the payoff dependency of revision rates in the tBRD endogenously produces heterogeneity in revision rates among different payoff types.  ...  Consider the players who get a revision opportunity under the standard BRD and then draw a stochastic status- quo bias.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00182-017-0575-9 fatcat:uwprsat3yradhmdmtzambv4wsy

Social coordination with locally observable types

Ennio Bilancini, Leonardo Boncinelli
2017 Economic Theory  
We show that when the cost of interacting with a different type is small with respect to the payoff of coordination, then the payoff-dominant convention is the only stochastically stable convention; instead  ...  In particular, we consider a model where a population of agents play a coordination game over time, choosing both the action and the network of agents with whom to interact.  ...  worst case of all mismatches a payoff of k(π(B, B) − c − d), while the highest payoff with any other strategy is k(π(A, A) − c), which is lower by the assumption d < π(B, B) − π(A, A).  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00199-017-1047-y fatcat:4fjerbpgpzbizcjntvfoiiascm

Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic: Macroprudential Edition

Jan Libich
2017 Social Science Research Network  
Our game-theoretic analysis focuses on the increasingly adopted separation setup, in which M&Ms are conducted by two different institutions (e.  ...  The 2008 crisis highlighted the linkages between the financial sector and the real economy, as well as between the corresponding stabilization policies: macroprudential and monetary (M&Ms).  ...  The opposite is true for C N 2 , which will result in a Policy Deadlock in the absence of P 's revision opportunity, and coordination otherwise (assuming C's best case scenario with P 's yielding, P S  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2985247 fatcat:ioqhjxu2k5fkfhwo5kbyh7kdoa

Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice

György Szabó, Csaba Tőke
1998 Physical review. E, Statistical physics, plasmas, fluids, and related interdisciplinary topics  
The players updated in a random sequence have a chance to adopt one of the neighboring strategies with a probability depending on the payoff difference.  ...  A simplified prisoner's game is studied on a square lattice when the players interacting with their neighbors can follow only two strategies: to cooperate (C) or to defect (D) unconditionally.  ...  Each player plays a PD game with itself and with its neighbors. The total payoff of a certain player is the sum over all interactions.  ... 
doi:10.1103/physreve.58.69 fatcat:za3mx5modjdd3epftyapib5hj4

Monetary Policy Facing Fiscal Indiscipline under Generalized Timing of Actions

Jan Libich, Petr Stehlík
2012 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics  
As the policy interactions are strategic, we use game-theoretic methods. Specifically, we develop a framework that allows for an arbitrary, possibly stochastic timing of moves.  ...  We then calibrate the model with European Monetary Union data.  ...  The Revision will have a particular role in that it provides the revisers with the first opportunity to react to the committed player's move -observing it.  ... 
doi:10.1628/093245612802920962 fatcat:bpgn7dwshresbouxb3wj6zm7ly

A bargaining approach to coordination in networks

Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez
2008 International Journal of Game Theory  
The latter is defined as the difference in the payoff of the best response to an opponent's strategy and the worst response.  ...  Differently, JW study a dynamics in which the opportunities to revise actions and links are drawn independently, i.e., players may revise actions and not links or vice versa.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00182-008-0127-4 fatcat:lxdfiig36fc67aqwhyiwss73l4

The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information

ROBERT POWELL
2004 American Political Science Review  
The present analysis then formalizes this mechanism as an "inefficiency condition" which ensures that all of the equilibria of a stochastic game are inefficient.  ...  The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Compete Information Civil wars, revolutions, litigation, strikes, economic sanctions, international conflict, and the use of power in general pose an  ...  The actors play the same game over and over. In a stochastic game, the strategic environment changes.  ... 
doi:10.1017/s000305540400111x fatcat:vpbeiefhhze3tg7cm6hk5y7axm

Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria

Carlos Alós-Ferrer
2003 International Game Theory Review  
In the 2 × 2 case, both imitation and myopic best reply yield strong stability results for the same type of mixed Nash equilibria. * I thank Josef Hofbauer for helpful comments and for providing me with  ...  This paper examines the stability of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of symmetric games, viewed as population profiles in dynamical systems with learning within a single, finite population.  ...  Hence, for n > n A , A-players which are given the opportunity to revise switch to B with probability one.  ... 
doi:10.1142/s0219198903001057 fatcat:5ciuk3nujndj5fcqz53anykwty

Imitation and Learning [chapter]

Carlos Alós‐Ferrer, Karl H. Schlag
2009 The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice  
Chapter 11 prepared for the Handbook of Rational and Social Choice.  ...  Each period, players receive revision opportunities with a given, exogenous probability 0 < 1 − δ ≤ 1, i.e. δ measures the amount of inertia in individual behavior.  ...  In their model there are two actions, payoffs are idiosyncratic, in each period a fraction of the population is selected and receives the opportunity to change their action, an agent revising observes  ... 
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290420.003.0012 fatcat:jl6exbj6yfbwljb7ioxjkpgyxa

Introducing Disappointment Dynamics and Comparing Behaviors in Evolutionary Games: Some Simulation Results

Tassos Patokos
2014 Games  
The paper presents an evolutionary model, based on the assumption that agents may revise their current strategies if they previously failed to attain the maximum level of potential payoffs.  ...  The paper is structured in five sections. Section 2 provides a concise review of the use of adaptive procedures in evolutionary game theory, along with the notion of disappointment in economics.  ...  Conflicts of Interest The author declares no conflict of interest.  ... 
doi:10.3390/g5010001 fatcat:gzlaspza5ber3k4prgmu4dfzm4

Evolutionary game theory and population dynamics [article]

Jacek Miekisz
2007 arXiv   pre-print
We discuss stability of equilibria in deterministic dynamics with migration, time-delay, and in stochastic dynamics of well-mixed populations and spatial games with local interactions.  ...  In these lecture notes, we introduce fundamental concepts of evolutionary game theory and review basic properties of deterministic replicator dynamics and stochastic dynamics of finite populations.  ...  The player who has a revision opportunity chooses in t + 1 with the probability 1 − ǫ the strategy with a higher average payoff in t and the other one with the probability ǫ.  ... 
arXiv:q-bio/0703062v1 fatcat:b4vz257ikne3fcwkxpyv7p6m4i

The price of anarchy and stability in general noisy best-response dynamics [article]

Paolo Penna
2015 arXiv   pre-print
In this work we revise the price of anarchy and the price of stability by considering the quality of long-run equilibria in these dynamics.  ...  In particular, a small noise by itself is not enough to improve the quality of equilibria as soon as other very natural schedules are used.  ...  This will not be possible given the remaining jobs: If we have a machine with a ∆-job and ∆ − δ-job, then the jobs that are  ... 
arXiv:1512.04017v1 fatcat:got73nlqjjatpnzqhd25qpgxxi
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