Filters








409 Hits in 5.0 sec

Tight inefficiency bounds for perception-parameterized affine congestion games

Pieter Kleer, Guido Schäfer
<span title="">2018</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/elaf5sq7lfdxfdejhkqbtz6qoq" style="color: black;">Theoretical Computer Science</a> </i> &nbsp;
We introduce a new model of congestion games that captures several extensions of the classical congestion game introduced by Rosenthal in 1973.  ...  We derive tight bounds on the price of anarchy and the price of stability for a large range of parameters. Our bounds provide a complete picture of the inefficiency of equilibria for these games.  ...  We thank the anonymous referees for their very useful comments.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2018.04.025">doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2018.04.025</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/7zogde56hngdxm633m5apy4nya">fatcat:7zogde56hngdxm633m5apy4nya</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180720221442/https://ir.cwi.nl/pub/25765/ALCO7241.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/f6/9d/f69ddb28b70fe4ab86e6de0c319b7bc0f9acde32.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2018.04.025"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> elsevier.com </button> </a>

A geometric approach to the price of anarchy in nonatomic congestion games

José R. Correa, Andreas S. Schulz, Nicolás E. Stier-Moses
<span title="">2008</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/gjdubbzq4zd3bgbmuwnb2p7neq" style="color: black;">Games and Economic Behavior</a> </i> &nbsp;
We present a short, geometric proof for the price-of-anarchy results that have recently been established in a series of papers on selfish routing in multicommodity flow networks and on nonatomic congestion  ...  Our analysis holds in the more general context of nonatomic congestion games, which provide the framework in which we describe this work.  ...  A preliminary version of this article appeared in the Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization (Correa et al., 2005) .  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.01.001">doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.01.001</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/mx77yugcofd6fko5s4kbk2apyu">fatcat:mx77yugcofd6fko5s4kbk2apyu</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170706104535/http://web.mit.edu/schulz/www/epapers/css-geb.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/3c/9a/3c9a3c800ec471a3e967dfea0e754977bebacf35.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.01.001"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> elsevier.com </button> </a>

Tight Inefficiency Bounds for Perception-Parameterized Affine Congestion Games [chapter]

Pieter Kleer, Guido Schäfer
<span title="">2017</span> <i title="Springer International Publishing"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/2w3awgokqne6te4nvlofavy5a4" style="color: black;">Lecture Notes in Computer Science</a> </i> &nbsp;
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t We introduce a new model of congestion games that captures several extensions of the classical congestion game introduced by Rosenthal in 1973.  ...  We derive tight bounds on the price of anarchy and the price of stability for a large range of parameters. Our bounds provide a complete picture of the inefficiency of equilibria for these games.  ...  Acknowledgements We thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on the paper.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_32">doi:10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_32</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/habihmi7arbifhnmumvar4yusq">fatcat:habihmi7arbifhnmumvar4yusq</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180720221048/https://ir.cwi.nl/pub/27659/27659.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/d6/93/d69332e371a10c7f9dd2d99cd5e27fd898f08fba.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_32"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> springer.com </button> </a>

Tight Inefficiency Bounds for Perception-Parameterized Affine Congestion Games [article]

Pieter Kleer, Guido Schäfer
<span title="2017-01-26">2017</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
Despite the fact that we deal with a more general class of congestion games, we manage to derive tight bounds on the price of anarchy and the price of stability for a large range of pa- rameters.  ...  As in most related works, we concentrate on congestion games with affine latency functions here.  ...  We thank the anonymous referees for useful comments and one referee in particular for very detailed suggestions and pointing out important typos.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1701.07614v1">arXiv:1701.07614v1</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/6xuhelmcdrdx7euk2dnbll4mtq">fatcat:6xuhelmcdrdx7euk2dnbll4mtq</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20200829182942/https://arxiv.org/pdf/1701.07614v1.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/25/42/254209297a4da1ef91f23a56f00971c10fbe4dc1.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1701.07614v1" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

Exact Price of Anarchy for Weighted Congestion Games with Two Players [article]

Joran van den Bosse and Marc Uetz and Matthias Walter
<span title="2022-03-03">2022</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
This paper gives a complete analysis of worst-case equilibria for various versions of weighted congestion games with two players and affine cost functions.  ...  The results are exact price of anarchy bounds which are parametric in the weights of the two players, and establish exactly how the primitives of the game enter into the quality of equilibria.  ...  For weighted affine congestion games, the price of anarchy with an arbitrary number of players is slightly larger than 5/2; it equals 1 + φ with φ = (1 + √ 5)/2 ≈ 1.618 being the golden ratio [1] .  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.01740v1">arXiv:2203.01740v1</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/s4w6cwbjgnci5bzjpr57la2wue">fatcat:s4w6cwbjgnci5bzjpr57la2wue</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220307183847/https://arxiv.org/pdf/2203.01740v1.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/d7/bc/d7bc119390137b85ae25097713caf56f7be296c3.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.01740v1" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

The Curse of Sequentiality in Routing Games [chapter]

José Correa, Jasper de Jong, Bart de Keijzer, Marc Uetz
<span title="">2015</span> <i title="Springer Berlin Heidelberg"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/2w3awgokqne6te4nvlofavy5a4" style="color: black;">Lecture Notes in Computer Science</a> </i> &nbsp;
the price of anarchy equals 5/2.  ...  This is called the sequential price of anarchy.  ...  We thank Marco Scarsini and Victor Verdugo for discussions on the price of anarchy of the symmetric atomic network game. We thank the reviewers for some helpful comments.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_19">doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_19</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/fri6g6gvbbaphfq3k2eetdbyga">fatcat:fri6g6gvbbaphfq3k2eetdbyga</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190225184038/http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/729f/497fd39411307691b20aa4c4ba97c627bf73.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/72/9f/729f497fd39411307691b20aa4c4ba97c627bf73.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_19"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> springer.com </button> </a>

On the Robustness of the Approximate Price of Anarchy in Generalized Congestion Games [chapter]

Vittorio Bilò
<span title="">2016</span> <i title="Springer Berlin Heidelberg"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/2w3awgokqne6te4nvlofavy5a4" style="color: black;">Lecture Notes in Computer Science</a> </i> &nbsp;
One of the main results shown through Roughgarden's notions of smooth games and robust price of anarchy is that, for any sum-bounded utilitarian social function, the worst-case price of anarchy of coarse  ...  games with non-negative (and possibly decreasing) latency functions, the worst-case price of anarchy of ǫ-approximate coarse correlated equilibria still coincides with that of ǫ-approximate pure Nash  ...  bounds on the price of anarchy of lookahead equilibria in congestion games with affine latency functions.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_8">doi:10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_8</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/ppwbegsb7bf5lk2rgvx52kgqoq">fatcat:ppwbegsb7bf5lk2rgvx52kgqoq</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190304080741/http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ba5a/abb82f776c2a2ad1fd24b07b1583aa5718a7.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/ba/5a/ba5aabb82f776c2a2ad1fd24b07b1583aa5718a7.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_8"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> springer.com </button> </a>

On the Robustness of the Approximate Price of Anarchy in Generalized Congestion Games [article]

Vittorio Bilò
<span title="2014-12-02">2014</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
One of the main results shown through Roughgarden's notions of smooth games and robust price of anarchy is that, for any sum-bounded utilitarian social function, the worst-case price of anarchy of coarse  ...  games with non-negative (and possibly decreasing) latency functions, the worst-case price of anarchy of ϵ-approximate coarse correlated equilibria still coincides with that of ϵ-approximate pure Nash  ...  bounds on the price of anarchy of lookahead equilibria in congestion games with affine latency functions.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.0845v1">arXiv:1412.0845v1</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/tbi5eurgojchfm7wbb7dexsnzy">fatcat:tbi5eurgojchfm7wbb7dexsnzy</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20200913212544/https://arxiv.org/pdf/1412.0845v1.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/eb/86/eb86e98b14dfa5fa0e4cec4e94678ee8a1737668.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.0845v1" title="arxiv.org access"> <button class="ui compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="file alternate outline icon"></i> arxiv.org </button> </a>

Coordination mechanisms

George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Akash Nanavati
<span title="">2009</span> <i title="Elsevier BV"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/elaf5sq7lfdxfdejhkqbtz6qoq" style="color: black;">Theoretical Computer Science</a> </i> &nbsp;
We give upper and lower bounds for the price of anarchy for selfish task allocation and congestion games.  ...  The quality of a coordination mechanism is measured by its price of anarchy-the worst-case performance of a Nash equilibrium over the (centrally controlled) social optimum.  ...  To define the price of anarchy of a congestion game, we need first to agree on the social cost (i.e., the system cost) of a set of strategies.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2009.01.005">doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2009.01.005</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/trpp2kb3jzex3pikstvhna7qr4">fatcat:trpp2kb3jzex3pikstvhna7qr4</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170829052627/http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~fiat/gtnetwork/paper-ckn04.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/48/b3/48b34b1ec461159bfd5504ea8ae362b1348f2295.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2009.01.005"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> elsevier.com </button> </a>

Coordination Mechanisms [chapter]

George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Akash Nanavati
<span title="">2004</span> <i title="Springer Berlin Heidelberg"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/2w3awgokqne6te4nvlofavy5a4" style="color: black;">Lecture Notes in Computer Science</a> </i> &nbsp;
We give upper and lower bounds for the price of anarchy for selfish task allocation and congestion games.  ...  The quality of a coordination mechanism is measured by its price of anarchy-the worst-case performance of a Nash equilibrium over the (centrally controlled) social optimum.  ...  To define the price of anarchy of a congestion game, we need first to agree on the social cost (i.e., the system cost) of a set of strategies.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27836-8_31">doi:10.1007/978-3-540-27836-8_31</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/h4ovmqoo5nf5bj5fielifq72ai">fatcat:h4ovmqoo5nf5bj5fielifq72ai</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170829052627/http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~fiat/gtnetwork/paper-ckn04.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/48/b3/48b34b1ec461159bfd5504ea8ae362b1348f2295.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27836-8_31"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> springer.com </button> </a>

Atomic congestion games with random players: network equilibrium and the price of anarchy

Chenlan Wang, Xuan Vinh Doan, Bo Chen
<span title="2020-05-24">2020</span> <i title="Springer Science and Business Media LLC"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/tsm6lnbvf5ahzjp7czojbjig5i" style="color: black;">Journal of combinatorial optimization</a> </i> &nbsp;
We also upper bound the price of anarchy with affine cost functions to characterize the quality of the equilibria.  ...  In this paper, we present a new model of congestion games with finite and random number of players, and an analytical method to compute the random path and link flows.  ...  Acknowledgements We thank University of Warwick for funding the paper open access.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-020-00583-3">doi:10.1007/s10878-020-00583-3</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/cgtnpfdwefgvbapynywsz3edy4">fatcat:cgtnpfdwefgvbapynywsz3edy4</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20200710104237/https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10878-020-00583-3.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/d1/55/d155cb2bf8a7d7cc4560564eae29f04c58d350c0.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-020-00583-3"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="unlock alternate icon" style="background-color: #fb971f;"></i> springer.com </button> </a>

On Multidimensional Congestion Games

Vittorio Bilò, Michele Flammini, Vasco Gallotti, Cosimo Vinci
<span title="2020-10-15">2020</span> <i title="MDPI AG"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/63zsvf7vxzfznojpqgfvpyk2lu" style="color: black;">Algorithms</a> </i> &nbsp;
We focus on the case in which the cost function associated with each resource is affine and bound the price of anarchy and stability as a function of d with respect to two meaningful social cost functions  ...  We introduce multidimensional congestion games, that is, congestion games whose set of players is partitioned into d+1 clusters C0,C1,...,Cd.  ...  for the price of anarchy of multidimensional weighted affine congestion games as a function of d.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.3390/a13100261">doi:10.3390/a13100261</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/7oukotvocvfnbaen5atmsv7com">fatcat:7oukotvocvfnbaen5atmsv7com</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20201019193613/https://res.mdpi.com/d_attachment/algorithms/algorithms-13-00261/article_deploy/algorithms-13-00261.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/d9/d5/d9d54282f4b40ee2970cb5d83706357ad44682d5.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.3390/a13100261"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="unlock alternate icon" style="background-color: #fb971f;"></i> mdpi.com </button> </a>

Stackelberg Strategies and Collusion in Network Games with Splittable Flow

Tobias Harks
<span title="2010-05-22">2010</span> <i title="Springer Nature"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/qj6jzeossfhihfshwf7nb7lbcq" style="color: black;">Theory of Computing Systems</a> </i> &nbsp;
We study the impact of collusion in network games with splittable flow and focus on the well established price of anarchy as a measure of this impact.  ...  We first investigate symmetric load balancing games and show that the price of anarchy is at most m, where m denotes the number of coalitions.  ...  [1] derived tight bounds on the price of anarchy for weighted and unweighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-010-9269-4">doi:10.1007/s00224-010-9269-4</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/wy3auplmsvhpplnwzd5sunv6wm">fatcat:wy3auplmsvhpplnwzd5sunv6wm</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170830032839/http://researchers-sbe.unimaas.nl/tobiasharks/wp-content/uploads/sites/29/2014/02/TOCS-H-2011.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/bb/3a/bb3adac7680b29e3fec8058d69b5234885a3d82a.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-010-9269-4"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> springer.com </button> </a>

Selfish routing with incomplete information

Martin Gairing, Burkhard Monien, Karsten Tiemann
<span title="">2005</span> <i title="ACM Press"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/tewj77cuufbzbgbk265bb462ga" style="color: black;">Proceedings of the 17th annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures - SPAA&#39;05</a> </i> &nbsp;
In this setting, we focus on the price of anarchy, the existence and the computational complexity of equilibria.  ...  We also prove bounds on the so-called price of anarchy that measures the worst-possible inefficiency of equilibria with respect to a social welfare measure. iii We use an incomplete information model different  ...  This finishes the proof. Price of Anarchy In this section we study the price of anarchy for weighted congestion games with player-specific affine latency functions.  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/1073970.1074000">doi:10.1145/1073970.1074000</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://dblp.org/rec/conf/spaa/GairingMT05.html">dblp:conf/spaa/GairingMT05</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/e5wpzxzwgbh7hdopis4564umsi">fatcat:e5wpzxzwgbh7hdopis4564umsi</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20200307000439/http://digital.ub.uni-paderborn.de/hsmig/download/pdf/4688?originalFilename=true" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/fb/7d/fb7d4d5c24034845bea9ea23082b6bd711c8229b.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1145/1073970.1074000"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> acm.org </button> </a>

Malicious Bayesian Congestion Games [chapter]

Martin Gairing
<span title="">2009</span> <i title="Springer Berlin Heidelberg"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/2w3awgokqne6te4nvlofavy5a4" style="color: black;">Lecture Notes in Computer Science</a> </i> &nbsp;
We provide (tight) bounds on the Price of Malice for an interesting class of malicious Bayesian congestion games.  ...  This result even holds when resource latency functions are linear, each player is malicious with the same probability, and all strategy sets consist of singleton sets of resources.  ...  The Theorem follows for p → 0, which implies n → ∞. Recall that the Price of Anarchy of (non-malicious) congestion games with affine latency functions is 5 2 [5] .  ... 
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-93980-1_10">doi:10.1007/978-3-540-93980-1_10</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/c6tjygigcrfpxpj2p5pckpyt5a">fatcat:c6tjygigcrfpxpj2p5pckpyt5a</a> </span>
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20161023002828/http://cgi.csc.liv.ac.uk:80/~gairing/publications/2008-waoa.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext"> <button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="icon ia-icon"></i> Web Archive [PDF] <div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail"> <img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/4b/50/4b503bf9f86c377aff29d03208c1b75939e87887.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy"> </div> </button> </a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-93980-1_10"> <button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button"> <i class="external alternate icon"></i> springer.com </button> </a>
&laquo; Previous Showing results 1 &mdash; 15 out of 409 results