120,618 Hits in 6.9 sec

How many kinds of reasons?

Maria Alvarez
2009 Philosophical Explorations  
And her believing that is a mental state. And this, the objection concludes, shows that motivating and explanatory reasons are mental states. But this argument fails.  ...  , which in turn they conceive of as mental states.  ... 
doi:10.1080/13869790902838514 fatcat:75rzdmu7t5frpoqq5fokckdppu

Page 679 of The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute Vol. 4, Issue 4 [page]

1998 The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute  
role of its referent: a to-be-discovered internal state of the individual that causally mediates between the environment, behaviour and other mental states.  ...  The distinctive move that the functionalists made in their theorizing about the mental was to locate the explanatory role of the mental concept deployed in propositional attitude ascriptions in the causal  ... 

Inference to the hypothesis of extended cognition

Mark Sprevak
2010 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A  
In the conversation, both Peter and I were drawn to the thought that this strategy would not work. Peter asked: 'What di erence would it make if the environmental features are mental?'  ...  I hope that Peter would have been sympathetic with the general line of this paper, even if not with the details. It would have been much better for his input.  ...  As far as the other forms of externalism are concerned, although the environment can a ect the content or factive status of a mental state, the mental state's action-guiding role typically remains untouched  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.10.010 fatcat:zpiwlxgud5c5tnwhv7cildftfu

The realizers and vehicles of mental representation

Zoe Drayson
2018 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A  
The neural vehicles of mental representation play an explanatory role in cognitive psychology that their realizers do not.  ...  But it is a well-known fact that two mental states with the same referential content don't always play the same explanatory role in intentional explanation.  ...  thus allowing co-referring mental states to play distinct causal roles in psychological explanation.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.01.005 pmid:29609778 fatcat:eu5uhd7ttzeyfbzxh633ehezgu

William M. Ramsey * Representation Reconsidered

M. Sprevak
2011 British Journal for the Philosophy of Science  
Acknowledgements I would like to thank Jim Bogen, Lisa Damm, Natalie Gold, Edouard Machery, and all the participants in the Pittsburgh reading group on cognitive science, as well as William Ramsey and  ...  For a state to be a mental representation it must: (i) be capable of having original intentional content, and (ii) interact causally with other cognitive states.  ...  Talk of representation in these cases is overblown: it does not add explanatory value to saying merely that the state is a reliable causal relay.  ... 
doi:10.1093/bjps/axr022 fatcat:ru5vsg5lobdenamf4fw5mycobi

Extended Cognition and Functionalism

Mark Sprevak
2009 Journal of Philosophy  
In Section , I criticise the other main argument for HEC: that HEC should be accepted based on its explanatory value to cognitive science.  ...  position. e price of HEC is rampant expansion of the mind into the world, and the implausibility of such expansion is indicative of deep-seated problems with functionalism. e argument of this paper consequently  ...  Part of this paper was presented at the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Geneva, . I would like to thank Microso Research for funding this work.  ... 
doi:10.5840/jphil2009106937 fatcat:t6yuzwa44rhppdfxhh6xswg3eq


Bence Nanay
2018 Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy  
Anthropomorphism is the methodology of attributing human-like mental states to animals. Zoomorphism is the converse of this: it is the attribution of animal-like mental states to humans.  ...  human mind, we should only posit new, different kinds of mental states if the zoomorphic attribution of animal mental states fails to explain our behavior.  ...  I gave a talk on this topic at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 2014 and I am grateful for the feedback received.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s10670-018-0099-0 fatcat:7xt3dywrqjaurht3puj3dljknq

The Explanatory Gap Argument and Phenomenal States: A Defense of Physicalism

Fasiku Gbenga
2011 Kritike: An Online Journal of Philosophy  
Hence, even if the explanatory gap is sustained, it proves no point against physicalism and the physicalists' account of the nature of consciousness in the world.  ...  The second section argues that the explanatory gap argument fails to support the reality of a property of consciousness that is not amenable to scientific investigation and theories.  ...  states and mental states is epistemological, and does not exist in the fabric of the world.  ... 
doi:10.25138/5.2.a.8 fatcat:iaey3ojjkzc37axajdyohokz7q

Networks, intentionality and multiple realizability: Not enough to block reductionism

Markus I. Eronen, Laura F. Bringmann
2019 Behavioral and Brain Sciences  
role of networks in these arguments is unclear.  ...  We argue that the two main arguments, intentionality and multiple realizability of mental disorders, are not sufficient to establish that mental disorders are not brain disorders, and that the specific  ...  That is, even though the intentional contents of symptoms may have an important pragmatic or predictive role in studying mental disorders, they need not figure in the causal mechanisms of mental disorders  ... 
doi:10.1017/s0140525x18001012 fatcat:vrueqxulljawzgbdtouwkol5uq

Higher-Order Thought and the Problem of Radical Confabulation

Timothy Lane, Caleb Liang
2008 The Southern Journal of Philosophy  
According to David Rosenthal's influential higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, what makes a mental state conscious is that it is accompanied by a suitable higher-order  ...  We further argue that the two-component view is more consistent with his effort to promote HOT as an explanatory theory suitable for application to the empirical sciences.  ...  9 They seem to be mental states, not mere physiological ones, because their functional roles parallel the functional roles of conscious sensory states.  ... 
doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.2008.tb00070.x fatcat:yyjw2petjnedbmosrkbmtwdg3q

Personality disorder

C. Bennett
2002 British Journal of Psychiatry  
Behav-on the level of explanatory power.  ...  The confidence in what consti-disorders). The confidence in what constitutes a mental disorder is partly dependent tutes a mental disorder is partly dependent on the level of explanatory power.  ... 
doi:10.1192/bjp.181.1.76 pmid:12091269 fatcat:wocqyqd2zvhjnnkpoaecel2pbi

Minding One's Cognitive Systems: When Does a Group of Minds Constitute a Single Cognitive Unit?

Robert Rupert
2005 Episteme: A journal of individual and social epistemology  
The possibility of group minds or group mental states has been considered by a number of authors addressing issues in social epistemology and related areas (Goldman 2004, Pettit 2003, Gilbert 2004, Hutchins  ...  The concerns raised herein constitute challenges to the advocates of group minds (or group mental states), challenges that might be overcome as theoretical and empirical work proceeds.  ...  against the hypotheses of group minds and group mental states. 4 Return now to our concern with causal-explanatory work.  ... 
doi:10.3366/epi.2004.1.3.177 fatcat:ufhld3467na2bc4ov3pyvtwnpu

Preface [chapter]

1998 Wittgenstein on Language and Thought  
Instead, the construal of mental states as free-standing internal states has to be abandoned.  ...  It presupposes the very conception of mental states as free-standing internal states which Wittgenstein refutes.  ... 
doi:10.1515/9781474473248-001 fatcat:kkizzmijvbavnlp7z7mzne3xu4

Ethnic differences in prisoners: Describing trauma and stress

G. Mezey
2003 British Journal of Psychiatry  
Although the authors correctly state that Although the authors correctly state that there is no legislative framework for pro-there is no legislative framework for providing treatment for mental disorders  ...  More worryingly, Dein assigns a patriarchal role worryingly, Dein assigns a patriarchal role to the psychiatrist, a role that cannot lead to the psychiatrist, a role that cannot lead to a collaborative  ...  do not tackle the practical issues relating to the management of prisoners with ing to the management of prisoners with mental disorder in any great detail, they mental disorder in any great detail, they  ... 
doi:10.1192/bjp.183.2.170-a pmid:12893673 fatcat:4l7nnjqhxfa2zc623neatvcmkq

Latina Daughters and Their Caregiving Roles

2020 Journal of Mental Health and Social Behaviour  
Furthermore, first-born or oldest Latinas are sometimes expected to take on the role of caregiver with younger siblings and/or aging parents [4] . found that this caregiving role was often cultivated at  ...  For purposes of this article, the terms Mexican-American, Hispanic and Latino/a were used interchangeably.  ...  The researchers used ethnographic content analysis [17, 18] to analyze the transcripts of the practitioners' perceptions of the role of the daughter regarding Mexican Americans families use of both mental  ... 
doi:10.33790/jmhsb1100120 fatcat:imzrzzmuofcirlkf5ucl7vp7cm
« Previous Showing results 1 — 15 out of 120,618 results