A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2004; you can also visit the original URL.
The file type is application/pdf
.
Filters
The development and proof of a formal specification for a multilevel secure system
1987
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems
Not only does the formality promote precision, but it enables the proof of any formal specifications, and perhaps of any implementation, for the system. ...
This paper describes current work on the design and specification of a multilevel secure distributed system called SNet. ...
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors are extremely indebted to the three anonymous referees who provided complete and insightful comments on the first version of this paper. ...
doi:10.1145/13677.22724
fatcat:cq7n4yzdcbebrmqboidvyfofxm
Proving multilevel security of a system design
1977
Proceedings of the sixth symposium on Operating systems principles - SOSP '77
The less general model relates well to design specifications and permits straightforward proof of the security of a system design. The correspondence between the two models is easily demonstrated. ...
The two models when applied appropriately are more useful for defining and proving the multilevel security of systems than existing models. ...
AC KNOWLEDGMENTS Peter Neumann, the leader at SRI of the project under which the SOM was developed, provided the authors with many critical comments. ...
doi:10.1145/800214.806547
dblp:conf/sosp/FeiertagLR77
fatcat:oi4qwkdmtrcq3o22j2fbqt3w5y
Reflections on the verification of the security of an operating system kernel
1983
Proceedings of the ninth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles - SOSP '83
First, it is for a complete implementation of a commercially available secure computer system. ...
This paper discusses the formal verification of the design of an operating system kernel's conformance to the multilevel security property. ...
This paper discusses an experience in the use of formal methods for the development of an operating system security kernel. ...
doi:10.1145/800217.806623
dblp:conf/sosp/Silverman83
fatcat:vdjp2feqdfanrfy4syvuprbl7i
Reflections on the verification of the security of an operating system kernel
1983
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
First, it is for a complete implementation of a commercially available secure computer system. ...
This paper discusses the formal verification of the design of an operating system kernel's conformance to the multilevel security property. ...
This paper discusses an experience in the use of formal methods for the development of an operating system security kernel. ...
doi:10.1145/773379.806623
fatcat:ztlv4o26rvdenfp7fkhmuwyxxu
Guest Editors' Note
1987
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Our work was simplified by the following people who, as members of the Program Committee of the 1986 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, reviewed most of the papers included here. ...
In the security models area, the paper by Denning et al. presents a model of multilevel security for relational database systems. ...
of operating systems and hardware protection mechanisms as bases for the development of secure computer systems. ...
doi:10.1109/tse.1987.232888
fatcat:yabfbkhcurd6ngbh2fqxtwjfh4
Comparison Paper between the Bell and LaPadula Model
1984
1984 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
This paper provides a brief explanation of the two most cited models in the field of computer security and points out the basic differences between them. ...
There ia a common misconception in the field that the MLS tool for HDM ia designed to be an implementation of the Bell and LaPadula model. ...
Establishing multilevel security for a specific specification in SPECIAL involves writing a set of specifications that completely specify the external interface of the system. ...
doi:10.1109/sp.1984.10021
dblp:conf/sp/Taylor84
fatcat:urnktgxa4jbvtg27iyjy5mxogi
Lessons Learned from Building a High-Assurance Crypto Gateway
2011
IEEE Security and Privacy
Most modern large-scale systems employ a complex organization of distributed components, described Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of ...
information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing ...
Acknowledgments Steven Greenwald and Cynthia Irvine helped considerably in reviewing a preliminary version of this document. Brant Hashii built much of eSS. ...
doi:10.1109/msp.2010.201
fatcat:k5zvshjmbndstgqtjt43ohdxzy
Mathematics, technology, and trust: formal verification, computer security, and the U.S. military
1997
IEEE Annals of the History of Computing
A distinctive concern in the U.S. military for computer security dates from the emergence of time-sharing systems in the 1960s. ...
The paper examines the connections between computer security and formal, deductive verification of the properties of computer systems. ...
Science and Engineering Research Council/Safety Critical Systems Research Programme (GR/J58619). Additional support was provided by the U.S. Navy through the Naval Research Laboratory and by the U.S. ...
doi:10.1109/85.601735
fatcat:zba5ya33yvg5rcqquxhovwfycm
Secure Database Development
[chapter]
2014
Encyclopedia of Database Systems
For the database community the words secure database design may refer to the schema design to produce a database for a specific application with some level of security properties. ...
There is a large amount of literature on this latter subject and a related section in this encyclopedia (Database security). ...
Applications including secure databases Since this approach is tailored to the application, one can add the required level of security using formal proofs when necessary. ...
doi:10.1007/978-1-4899-7993-3_329-2
fatcat:ybhrxoe46rebxakmfby4xdwwcq
Secure Interoperation of Secure Distributed Databases
[chapter]
1999
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Are the transformation verification techniques that we have developed sufficient for verifying a collection of transformations adequate for implementing complex secure architecture? ...
This paper describes the process of implementing an architecture for secure distributed transaction processing, the process of verifying that it has the desired security properties, and the implementation ...
Specifically, we added the constraint that the system must satisfy a multilevel secure access control policy. ...
doi:10.1007/3-540-48119-2_39
fatcat:3cjierxlwfhonorjgsmx652h6q
On the Verification of Intransitive Noninterference in Mulitlevel Security
2005
IEEE Transactions on Systems Man and Cybernetics Part B (Cybernetics)
In this paper, we generalize the results for systems with any finite number of security levels by developing a direct method for checking -observability, based on an insightful observation that the function ...
INI can be used to characterize and solve several important security problems in multilevel security systems. ...
Intransitive Noninterference in Multilevel Systems To formally define INI, let us consider a set of security domains, a set of events partitioned over these domains, de-scribed by the mapping , and an ...
doi:10.1109/tsmcb.2005.847749
pmid:16240770
fatcat:lo7nke3qzrg33blorte43bql6a
Twelfth National Computer Security Conference - Baltimore, MD - October 10-13, 1989
1990
Journal of Research of the National Institute of Standards and Technology
for the Honeywell LOCK project; the formal specification of security aspects of a messaging system architecture; a Secure Distributed Operating System (SDOS) proto-type; a high B level security architecture ...
Penelope is a prototype Ada verification editor whose user interactively and concurrently develops specifications of programs, their Ada text, and proofs of their verification conditions. ...
doi:10.6028/jres.095.023
pmid:28179774
pmcid:PMC4930047
fatcat:2nvckbuabrg2phfmx6s7lh6ezu
The SeaView security model
1990
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
This paper describes a formal security model for a such a system. ...
A multilevel database is intended to provide the security needed for database systems that contain data at a variety of classifications and serve a set of users having different clearances. ...
This paper presents a formal security policy model for a secure multilevel relational database system. ...
doi:10.1109/32.55088
fatcat:k26mscrplzetvofp7egqpubtse
An entropy conservation law for testing the completeness of covert channel analysis
1994
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Computer and communications security - CCS '94
Covert channel analysis typically involves stu& of individual covert channels in isolation, and determining the thoroughness of such case-by-case analysis can be d@cult. ...
To help address this problem, this paper$onnally dejnes the notion of a "complete" set of covert channels. ...
Designing Systems to Simplify Channel Analysis In as much as one might design a system to be reliable, maintainable, testable, or to support formal proof, one might also design a system with the specific ...
doi:10.1145/191177.191244
dblp:conf/ccs/Browne94
fatcat:3r62gqusljcddp7yaargutwblu
From a Proven Correct Microkernel to Trustworthy Large Systems
[chapter]
2011
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
The next big step in the challenge of building truly trustworthy systems is to provide a framework for developing secure systems on top of seL4. ...
The seL4 microkernel was the world's first general-purpose operating system kernel with a formal, machine-checked proof of correctness. ...
Acknowledgments The proof of the SAC mentioned above was conducted almost entirely by David Greenaway with minor contributions from Xin Gao, Gerwin ...
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-18070-5_1
fatcat:yeoqx3v4tnf5pakxffeucoslfe
« Previous
Showing results 1 — 15 out of 4,430 results