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Sub-committee Approval Voting and Generalised Justified Representation Axioms [article]

Haris Aziz, Barton E. Lee
2017 arXiv   pre-print
We then focus on sub-committee voting with approvals and propose extensions of the justified representation axioms that have been considered for proportional representation in approval-based committee  ...  We study a general model of social choice called Sub-Committee Voting (SCV) that simultaneously generalizes these settings.  ...  Table 1 : 1 Properties of justified representation concepts for sub-committee voting.  ... 
arXiv:1711.06030v1 fatcat:6o2agotulncvpmyex5gqak4mvi

Electing the Executive Branch [article]

Ehud Shapiro, Nimrod Talmon
2021 arXiv   pre-print
Voting (GreedyPAV) to our setting, and demonstrate – through computer-based simulations – how voting for all offices together using this rule overcomes this weakness.  ...  We propose a formal model consisting of k offices, each with its own disjoint set of candidates, and a set of voters who provide approval ballots for all offices.  ...  Global Axioms Definition 1 ((Global Justified Representation)).  ... 
arXiv:2009.09734v4 fatcat:ud2nssl75rayhhyh4bycstbqma

Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting: Axioms and Algorithms [article]

Haris Aziz and Barton Lee and Nimrod Talmon
2017 arXiv   pre-print
We concentrate on approval elections and propose proportional representation axioms in participatory budgeting, by generalizing relevant axioms for approval-based multi-winner elections.  ...  We observe a rich landscape with respect to the computational complexity of identifying proportional budgets and computing such, and present budgeting methods that satisfy these axioms by identifying budgets  ...  We present a series of proportional representation axioms which generalize the JR (justified representation) and PJR (proportional justified representation) axioms considered in approval-based multi-winner  ... 
arXiv:1711.08226v1 fatcat:aphhyec7fvd4xp777amhpgqowq

Justified Representation for Perpetual Voting

Laurent Bultaeu, Noam Hazon, Rutvik Page, Ariel Rosenfeld, Nimrod Talmon
2021 IEEE Access  
We adapt the well-established Justified Representation and Proportional Justified Representation axioms, commonly used in the social choice literature, to perpetual voting, resulting in two axiomatic variants  ...  INDEX TERMS Computational social choice, justified representation, perpetual voting. 96598 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.  ...  multiwinner voting rule, but shall get adequate representation in the winning committees.  ... 
doi:10.1109/access.2021.3095087 fatcat:wn57llgm4bec7nldxi7garf5ja

Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferences [article]

Martin Lackner, Piotr Skowron
2022 arXiv   pre-print
The corresponding multi-winner voting rules are called approval-based committee (ABC) rules. Due to the simplicity of approval preferences, ABC rules are widely suitable for practical use.  ...  This book provides a thorough and in-depth look at multi-winner voting based on approval preferences.  ...  Acknowledgments First and foremost, we would like to thank Piotr Faliszewski for extensive feedback and discussions that significantly improved this book.  ... 
arXiv:2007.01795v4 fatcat:pef6zcg3fnalln55b3ixlbasl4

Individual Representation in Approval-Based Committee Voting [article]

Markus Brill, Jonas Israel, Evi Micha, Jannik Peters
2021 arXiv   pre-print
We show that checking whether an IR outcome exists is computationally intractable, and we verify that all common approval-based voting rules may fail to provide IR even in cases where this is possible.  ...  When selecting multiple candidates based on approval preferences of agents, the proportional representation of agents' opinions is an important and well-studied desideratum.  ...  .; and Skowron, P. 2021. Approval-Based Committee Voting: Axioms, Algorithms, and Applications.  ... 
arXiv:2112.05193v1 fatcat:xmq67hsrzvftli3n4fdrupfgke

Voting with evaluations: Characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting

Antonin Macé
2018 Journal of Mathematical Economics  
Characterization results are provided for each of the two prominent additive rules: Evaluative Voting when the evaluation set is finite and Range Voting when the evaluation set is [0, 1].  ...  I conduct an axiomatic analysis of voting rules in a context where voters evaluate each candidate by assigning her an evaluation from a pre-established set.  ...  A representation theorem I introduce two axioms which are satisfied when a voting rule is represented by a ranking rule.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.09.002 fatcat:kbwwiyixuna6norcmwk346lefu

A verifiably secure and proportional committee election rule [article]

Alfonso Cevallos, Alistair Stewart
2020 arXiv   pre-print
of Proportional Justified Representation (PJR).  ...  The property of proportional representation in approval-based committee elections has appeared in the social choice literature for over a century, and is typically understood as avoiding the underrepresentation  ...  We establish such objective formally as an optimization problem, related to the axiom of proportional justified representation (PJR), and propose efficient approximation algorithms for it.  ... 
arXiv:2004.12990v2 fatcat:7uazms4crjajrexwfdsmsmensi

Perpetual Voting: The Axiomatic Lens [article]

Martin Lackner, Jan Maly
2021 arXiv   pre-print
In this framework, we consider a sequence of subsequent approval-based elections and try to achieve a fair overall outcome.  ...  We study proportionality on simple profiles that are equivalent to the apportionment setting and show that lower and upper quota axioms can be used to distinguish (and sometimes characterize) perpetual  ...  Let us briefly discuss two stronger axioms from the approval-based multi-winner literature: Proportional Justified Representation [24] and Extended Justified Representation (EJR) [1] .  ... 
arXiv:2104.15058v1 fatcat:fsr6rygnofezvd3ksbhmzha2pa

Analysis and Design of Electoral Systems

Michel Balinski, Steven Brams, Friedrich Pukelsheim
2004 Oberwolfach Reports  
The pertinent theory is available in the seminal monograph [4] by Balinski and Young. Among all possible apportionment methods, the authors single out two  ...  BAZI is a freely available JAVA-Program, permitting the user to experiment with various apportionment methods, and to assess their relative merits on the basis of real data rather than abstract theory.  ...  similar to Approval Voting (with different limitations).  ... 
doi:10.4171/owr/2004/14 fatcat:cxpmrxihfvdx7j2mryxnbbyxbe

The median rule in judgement aggregation

Klaus Nehring, Marcus Pivato
2021 Economic Theory  
We show that, under appropriate regularity conditions, the median rule is the unique judgement aggregation rule which satisfies three axioms: Ensemble Supermajority Efficiency, Reinforcement, and Continuity  ...  We also allow for issues to be weighted, and provide numerous examples in which issue weights arise naturally.  ...  Multi-winner approval voting evaluates committees by separately assessing the merit of each member.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00199-021-01348-7 fatcat:lbji5megmvduvdbyaphzoeoifi

Yolo4Apnea: Real-time Detection of Obstructive Sleep Apnea

Sondre Hamnvik, Pierre Bernabé, Sagar Sen
2020 Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence  
It causes breathing to repeatedly stop and start during sleep which over years increases the risk of hypertension, heart disease, stroke, Alzheimer's, and cancer.  ...  demo, we present Yolo4Apnea a deep learning system extending You Only Look Once (Yolo) system to detect sleep apnea events from abdominal breathing patterns in real-time enabling immediate awareness and  ...  Dickerson, Judy Goldsmith, Omer Lev, and Elizabeth Mattei for comments on drafts.  ... 
doi:10.24963/ijcai.2020/729 dblp:conf/ijcai/Mattei20 fatcat:74ctygyyxreshppgvc4fs723cu

Popular Sovereign Versus Government Institution Generated Constitutional Norms: When Does A Constitutional Amendment Not Amend the Constitution?

Carlos E. Gonzalez
2003 Social Science Research Network  
Lawyers and judges have used a democracy reinforcing narrative to justify the nullification of statutory norms and other sub-constitutional norms by truly conflicting constitutional norms since Marbury  ...  Next, Part II elaborates on the framework by explaining the two additional axiomatic meta-norms-the source and hierarchic axioms-which account for the ordering of legal categories and sub-categories.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.359201 fatcat:vy6oqyy3kraaniib3nkneprgt4

Page 74 of The Woman's Journal Vol. 2, Issue 10 [page]

1871 The Woman's Journal  
, declared that no law of England allowed or approved of slavery, and discharged the ne- gro.  ...  We think we are justified in saying that the weight of authority sustains us in the view we take of thisquestion.  ... 

Strategy-proofness and single-peackedness in bounded distributive lattices [article]

Ernesto Savaglio, Stefano Vannucci
2014 arXiv   pre-print
The equivalence of individual and coalitional strategy-proofness that is known to hold for single peaked domains in bounded linear orders fails in such a general setting.  ...  Then, it is shown that, under both of those specifications, a voting rule as defined on a bounded distributive lattice is strategy-proof on the set of all profiles of single peaked total preorders if and  ...  A generalized weak committee voting rule is a function f : Π i∈N Y i → X such that, for some fixed generalized committee C ⊆ P(N ) and some fixed family {z S : z S ∈ X} S∈C , and for all y N ∈ Π i∈N Y  ... 
arXiv:1406.5120v1 fatcat:xle5pmuw5fhxpo5vxzpwmfnhlm
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