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Dynamic Traffic Models in Transportation Science (Dagstuhl Seminar 18102)

Roberto Cominetti, Tobias Harks, Carolina Osorio, Britta Peis, Michael Wagner
2018 Dagstuhl Reports  
In view of the above, this interdisciplinary seminar brought together leading scientists in the areas traffic simulations, algorithmic game theory and dynamic traffic assignment as well as people from  ...  industry with strong scientific background who identified possible ways to bridge the described gap.  ...  As a novel aspect, individual vehicles might to be interested in selfishly optimizing their routes, but cooperate with other vehicles using the same software in order to decrease the average journey time  ... 
doi:10.4230/dagrep.8.3.21 dblp:journals/dagstuhl-reports/CominettiHOP18 fatcat:rywgmshsizharnoomv4ymii5tq

When Should the Chicken Cross the Road? - Game Theory for Autonomous Vehicle - Human Interactions

C. W. Fox, F. Camara, G. Markkula, R. A. Romano, R. Madigan, N. Merat
2018 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Vehicle Technology and Intelligent Transport Systems  
Unlike most Game Theory applications in Economics, active vehicle control requires real-time selection from multiple equilibria with no history, and we present and argue for a novel solution concept, meta-strategy  ...  Autonomous vehicle localization, mapping and planning in un-reactive environments are well-understood, but the human factors of complex interactions with other road users are not yet developed.  ...  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation programme under grant agreement InterACT No 723395.  ... 
doi:10.5220/0006765404310439 dblp:conf/vehits/FoxCMRMM18 fatcat:f772fkkqgrhefgpnizexqt7lf4

Joint Strategy Fictitious Play With Inertia for Potential Games

Jason R. Marden, GÜrdal Arslan, Jeff S. Shamma
2009 IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control  
In particular, we illustrate the main results on a distributed traffic routing problem and derive tolling procedures that can lead to optimized total traffic congestion.  ...  ., a probabilistic reluctance to change strategies, and establish the convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium in all generalized ordinal potential games in both cases of averaged or exponentially discounted  ...  If the congestion game has at least one strict equilibrium, then all equilibria have the same aggregate vehicle distribution over the network. Furthermore, all equilibria are strict.  ... 
doi:10.1109/tac.2008.2010885 fatcat:kr3dg42xuvhzldd4ogujfvyic4

Micro-foundations of congestion and pricing: A game theory perspective

David Levinson
2005 Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice  
This paper develops congestion theory and congestion pricing theory from its microfoundations, the interaction of two or more vehicles.  ...  Using game theory, with a twoplayer game it is shown that the emergence of congestion depends on the players' relative valuations of early arrival, late arrival, and journey delay.  ...  This assumption of perfect knowledge, which runs through traditional route choice and congestion pricing models, is strong, and is realistic only in a simple, highly structured game.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.tra.2005.02.021 fatcat:pled6rcmybelbkqgf3rvrtwydu

Green Routing Game: Strategic Logistical Planning using Mixed Fleets of ICEVs and EVs [article]

Hampei Sasahara and György Dán and Saurabh Amin and Henrik Sandberg
2022 arXiv   pre-print
This paper introduces a "green" routing game between multiple logistic operators (players), each owning a mixed fleet of internal combustion engine vehicle (ICEV) and electric vehicle (EV) trucks.  ...  We characterize Nash equilibria of this game and derive a condition for its uniqueness. We also use the gradient projection method to compute this equilibrium in a distributed manner.  ...  We first show that the game can admit multiple equilibria in contrast to standard routing games, the existence of which complicates the analysis.  ... 
arXiv:2204.00209v1 fatcat:e2iwvntzanevlnvdyxl6dqxeza

Dynamic routing games: An evolutionary game theoretic approach

Hamidou Tembine, Amar Prakash Azad
2011 IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference  
Further, we characterize the dynamic equilibria of the long-term game using evolutionary variational inequalities.  ...  The dynamic equilibria so obtained, optimizes the long term cost, however it need not to be an equilibrium for intermediate epochs (games).  ...  The assumption that players can observe the past actions of the others players is too strong in the context of routing games which involves many players with bounded rationality and limited observation  ... 
doi:10.1109/cdc.2011.6161167 dblp:conf/cdc/TembineA11 fatcat:3ce6lrl7bzfvzbs636suehuhly

Study of a Dynamic Cooperative Trading Queue Routing Control Scheme for Freeways and Facilities with Parallel Queues [article]

Roger Lloret-Batlle, R. Jayakrishnan
2018 arXiv   pre-print
For the former, we first characterize the properties of the underlying cooperative game. Our simulation results suggest that the setting is always strong-core stable.  ...  For the latter, we propose a new relaxation program for the strong-core concept.  ...  The next tables show the percent of instances where the imputation was found in the strong-core: Table 1 : Percent of experiments whose imputations are in the strong-core.  ... 
arXiv:1803.01265v1 fatcat:aygysx5625ardhtc5cddvowcvm

Methodologies for analyzing equilibria in wireless games

Samson Lasaulce, Mérouane Debbah, Eitan Altman
2009 IEEE Signal Processing Magazine  
In this article, we provide non-exhaustive methodologies for characterizing equilibria in wireless games in terms of existence, uniqueness, selection, and efficiency.  ...  Under certain assumptions in terms of information and models, equilibria correspond to possible stable outcomes in conflicting or cooperative scenarios where rational entities interact.  ...  on all the routes actually used are equal, and less than those which would be experienced by a single vehicle on any unused route" (see p. 345 of [68] ).  ... 
doi:10.1109/msp.2009.933496 fatcat:gxd55ahcbzg6lelxhwcdfevv2y

Nash and Wardrop Equilibria in Aggregative Games with Coupling Constraints

Dario Paccagnan, Basilio Gentile, Francesca Parise, Maryam Kamgarpour, John Lygeros
2018 IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control  
Finally, we study the applications of charging of electric vehicles and of route choice on a road network.  ...  We consider the framework of aggregative games, in which the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy.  ...  In the following we apply the main results of Sections III, IV, V to the route choice game. Corollary 2. Consider the sequence of games (G RC M ) ∞ M =1 .  ... 
doi:10.1109/tac.2018.2849946 fatcat:6bqhr7fyzvh6pmru4zykosfehi

Regret based dynamics

Jason R. Marden, Gürdal Arslan, Jeff S. Shamma
2007 Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - AAMAS '07  
Furthermore, there are existing results proving that the collective behavior will asymptotically converge to a set of points of "no-regret" in any game.  ...  In this paper, we introduce a modification of the traditional no-regret algorithms by (i) exponentially discounting the memory and (ii) bringing in a notion of inertia in players' decision process.  ...  and inertia, in a strong sense, albeit in a restricted class of games.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1329125.1329175 dblp:conf/atal/MardenAS07 fatcat:clfa3cklmnebfkvy4ihlycefg4

Stochastic stability of dynamic user equilibrium in unidirectional networks: Weakly acyclic game approach

Koki Satsukawa, Kentaro Wada, Takamasa Iryo
2019 Transportation Research Procedia  
The convergence and stochastic stability of better response dynamics in the DUE games are then proved based on the theory of weakly acyclic games.  ...  With this property, we establish the relationship between DUE games in unidirectional networks and weakly acyclic games.  ...  Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank Toshihiko Miyagi for sharing his knowledge of weakly acyclic games.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.trpro.2019.05.022 fatcat:potcm63nuvakroumnhsj6hyipa

Stochastic stability of dynamic user equilibrium in unidirectional networks: Weakly acyclic game approach

Koki Satsukawa, Kentaro Wada, Takamasa Iryo
2019 Transportation Research Part B: Methodological  
The convergence and stochastic stability of better response dynamics in the DUE games are then proved based on the theory of weakly acyclic games.  ...  With this property, we establish the relationship between DUE games in unidirectional networks and weakly acyclic games.  ...  Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank Toshihiko Miyagi for sharing his knowledge of weakly acyclic games.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.trb.2019.05.015 fatcat:xmil5opno5batenwk667qumkfu

Selfish routing with incomplete information

Martin Gairing, Burkhard Monien, Karsten Tiemann
2005 Proceedings of the 17th annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures - SPAA'05  
To study selfish routing scenarios in networks we use and extend in this thesis two well-known classes of games modeling such routing scenarios: network congestion games and Wardrop games.  ...  In this setting, we focus on the price of anarchy, the existence and the computational complexity of equilibria.  ...  For example it is impossible to centrally control all vehicles in the German road traffic system or all data packets in a large communication network like the Internet.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1073970.1074000 dblp:conf/spaa/GairingMT05 fatcat:e5wpzxzwgbh7hdopis4564umsi

The Structure and Complexity of Nash Equilibria for a Selfish Routing Game [chapter]

Dimitris Fotakis, Spyros Kontogiannis, Elias Koutsoupias, Marios Mavronicolas, Paul Spirakis
2002 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
In this work, we study the combinatorial structure and the computational complexity of Nash equilibria for a certain game that models selfish routing over a network consisting of m parallel links.  ...  We embark on a systematic study of several algorithmic problems related to the computation of Nash equilibria for the selfish routing game we consider.  ...  We thank Peter Sanders Berthold Vöcking for a fruitful discussion right after a seminar talk on Nash equilibria for selfish routing given by Paul Spirakis at Max-Planck-Institut für Informatik.  ... 
doi:10.1007/3-540-45465-9_12 fatcat:vj4elhkitbfhhhm2qnsb3bu7d4

The structure and complexity of Nash equilibria for a selfish routing game

Dimitris Fotakis, Spyros Kontogiannis, Elias Koutsoupias, Marios Mavronicolas, Paul Spirakis
2009 Theoretical Computer Science  
In this work, we study the combinatorial structure and the computational complexity of Nash equilibria for a certain game that models selfish routing over a network consisting of m parallel links.  ...  We embark on a systematic study of several algorithmic problems related to the computation of Nash equilibria for the selfish routing game we consider.  ...  We thank Peter Sanders Berthold Vöcking for a fruitful discussion right after a seminar talk on Nash equilibria for selfish routing given by Paul Spirakis at Max-Planck-Institut für Informatik.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2008.01.004 fatcat:ryxkalifcbaxvdcicofapasuuq
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