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Strategyproof Exchange with Multiple Private Endowments

Taiki Todo, Haixin Sun, Makoto Yokoo
Our objective in this paper is to analyze the effect of such private ownership in exchange economies with multiple endowments.  ...  We study a mechanism design problem for exchange economies where each agent is initially endowed with a set of indivisible goods and side payments are not allowed.  ...  Our Results We investigate exchange problems with multiple private endowments.  ... 
doi:10.1609/aaai.v28i1.8817 fatcat:nd44iqcyvbdszer6nx342v4eaq

Strategyproof Multi-Item Exchange Under Single-Minded Dichotomous Preferences [article]

Haris Aziz
2020 arXiv   pre-print
We identify a general and sufficient condition called weak consistency for the exchange mechanisms to be strategyproof even if we impose any kind of distributional, diversity, or exchange cycle constraints  ...  We also derive impossibility results when constrained Pareto optimality is defined with respect to more permissive individual rationality requirements.  ...  There has also been work on strategyproof exchange with multiple endowments.  ... 
arXiv:1905.10778v2 fatcat:2ktwpof5wbcezbirhtbidnbsxm

Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange

Szilvia Papai
2000 Econometrica  
Although there are no property rights in the model, the rules satisfying the above criteria imitate a trading procedure with individual endowments, in which individuals exchange objects from their hierarchically  ...  object, without any medium of exchange.  ...  Given that multiple endowments are allowed, after the individuals in top trading cycles leave the market with their top-ranked object, unassigned objects in the initial endowment sets of individuals who  ... 
doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00166 fatcat:jztyjpzx2rfi7msh7dlnzha3cy

Quantifying the Strategyproofness of Mechanisms via Metrics on Payoff Distributions [article]

Benjamin Lubin, David C. Parkes
2012 arXiv   pre-print
Strategyproof mechanisms provide robust equilibrium with minimal assumptions about knowledge and rationality but can be unachievable in combination with other desirable properties such as budget-balance  ...  Focusing on combinatorial exchanges, we demonstrate that the metric is informative about the eventual equilibrium, where simple regretbased metrics are not, and can be used for online selection of an effective  ...  Combinatorial Exchanges A CE is a market with multiple units of dissimilar, indivisible items, G = {1, . . . , k}, and multiple agents, each of which may be interested in both buying and selling items.  ... 
arXiv:1205.2630v1 fatcat:3nkwxx2ur5gcnncyhrgbhmrefi

Strategyproof Quota Mechanisms for Multiple Assignment Problems [article]

Hadi Hosseini, Kate Larson
2016 arXiv   pre-print
We study the problem of allocating multiple objects to agents without transferable utilities, where each agent may receive more than one object according to a quota.  ...  Under lexicographic preferences, we characterize the set of strategyproof, non-bossy, and neutral quota mechanisms and show that under a mild Pareto efficiency condition, serial dictatorship quota mechanisms  ...  Pápai [27] extended the standard model of Svensson [36, 37] to settings where there are potentially more objects than agents (each agent receiving at most one object) with a hierarchy of endowments  ... 
arXiv:1507.07064v2 fatcat:62lgd5tbvzetdmu7jbp7gidtti

Mechanisms for Trading Durable Goods [article]

Sigal Oren, Oren Roth
2021 arXiv   pre-print
This is often the case with books that can be read and later exchanged for unread ones. Other examples of such easily transferable durable goods include puzzles, video games and baby clothes.  ...  We consider mechanisms that exchange items in cycles in which each participating agent receives an item that he demands and gives an item that he owns.  ...  [5] in which each agent is endowed with multiple copies of an item that is unique only to him.  ... 
arXiv:2110.14271v1 fatcat:vimcjrevmzfcfjtvbzuuuai6he

A note on the rationing of divisible and indivisible goods in a general network [article]

Shyam Chandramouli, Jay Sethuraman
2020 arXiv   pre-print
The agents generally have a unit supply/demand of a good that they want to exchange with other agents.  ...  Thus, we generalize the kidney exchange problem to that of a network with arbitrary capacity of available goods.  ...  The mechanism is also peak strategyproof if the preference profiles are private information of the agents.  ... 
arXiv:2002.02749v1 fatcat:tafu3qiokffr5ahkjg5uspwohu

Timeshare Exchange Mechanisms

Yu Wang, Aradhna Krishna
2006 Management science  
We test the three exchange mechanisms in laboratory experiments where we simulate exchange markets with networked "timeshare members."  ...  Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategyproof.  ...  Obviously, no exchange happens and the original endowment carries to the end.  ... 
doi:10.1287/mnsc.1060.0513 fatcat:jskhkliu35gnvbwax65vf2dqaq

Strategyproof Social Choice [chapter]

Salvador Barberà
2011 Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare  
As announced, we'll consider economies with l private goods and n consumers. The endowment of goods is denoted by e = (e 1 ; : : : ; e n ) 2 R nl + .  ...  Example 9 (See Figure 1 ) Agent 1 is endowed with ten units of each of the two goods and agent 2 is endowed with …ve units of each of the two goods.  ... 
doi:10.1016/s0169-7218(10)00025-0 fatcat:yliruv2jpjbzdayfxf5qxe7rvq

An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions

Salvador Barber�
2001 Social Choice and Welfare  
Strategy-proof exchange One of the most classical models in economics is that of an exchange economy. There are n consumers holding initial endowments of l private goods. No production takes place.  ...  As announced, we'll consider economies with l private goods and n consumers. The endowment of goods is denoted by e e 1 ; . . . ; e n A R nl .  ... 
doi:10.1007/s003550100151 fatcat:twdd5qfp5fdnrpqsqkftqpmh3i

Clearing supply and demand under bilateral constraints

Olivier Bochet, Herve Moulin, Rahmi Ilkilic
2010 Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory on Conference on Future Directions - BQGT '10  
Together with e ciency, and a version of equal treatment of equals, these properties are characteristic.  ...  Information about individual preferences is private, and so is information about feasible links: an agent may unilaterally close one of her links if it is in her interest to do so.  ...  In the absence of bilateral constraints, and with agents' endowments known, a parallel result, with a stronger version of the standard equal treatment of equals, was established in Klaus et al. (1998)  ... 
doi:10.1145/1807406.1807436 dblp:conf/bqgt/BochetMI10 fatcat:n7reizvtb5a3zmqpekvccvge54

Simple Strategy-Proof Approximately Walrasian Mechanisms

Alexander Kovalenkov
2002 Journal of Economic Theory  
It presents mechanisms under which truth-telling is a dominant strategy in ...nite exchange economies (in contrast to the Walrasian mechanism) and whose outcomes (generically) approximate Walrasian ones  ...  An exchange economy E = h A; fe(a); º a g a2A i is given by a set of agents and a list of their endowments and preferences.  ...  For classical exchange economies it was implicitly mentioned in Hammond (1979) . This mechanism was called a "folk" mechanism in private communications and e.g. in Jackson and Manelli (1997) .  ... 
doi:10.1006/jeth.2000.2788 fatcat:ciupmrxyvfhvfed6co2gae3lqi

Contextually Private Mechanisms [article]

Andreas Haupt, Zoë Hitzig
2022 arXiv   pre-print
We characterize choice rules that can be implemented with a contextually private protocol under different assumptions about the class of admissible protocols.  ...  a contextually private t\^atonnement-like implementation of several choice rules that are not contextually private under the stricter assumption.  ...  compatible with obviously strategyproofness [Li, 2017] .  ... 
arXiv:2112.10812v4 fatcat:r4pv3tenpvhvflkznuxffzvkxu

A Complexity Approach for Core-Selecting Exchange with Multiple Indivisible Goods under Lexicographic Preferences

Etsushi Fujita, Julien Lesca, Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
This paper investigates an exchange problem where each agent may have multiple indivisible goods, agents' preferences over sets of goods are assumed to be lexicographic, and side payments are not allowed  ...  We propose an exchange rule called augmented top-trading-cycles (ATTC) procedure based on the original TTC procedure. We first show that the ATTC procedure is core-selecting.  ...  Extended Model with Private Endowments In this section, we consider the situation where each agent can use multiple accounts, and the set of her accounts, as well as her initial endowment, are private  ... 
doi:10.1609/aaai.v29i1.9318 fatcat:6wcwv3jq3fd5phcw7ofuhpkrvi

Fixed-Rate Resource Exchange for Multi-Operator Pico eNodeB

Tomohiko MIMURA, Koji YAMAMOTO, Masahiro MORIKURA, Ayako IWATA, Takashi TAMURA
2013 IEICE transactions on communications  
With the proposed rule, each operator is not required to disclose the control information like link quality and the number of UEs to the other operators.  ...  Furthermore, the results of a throughput performance evaluation confirm that the proposed scheme improves the total throughput as compared with individual resource allocation.  ...  Let us assume that player 1 is endowed with A units of good 1 and player 2 is endowed with B units of good 2, as shown in Fig. 2 .  ... 
doi:10.1587/transcom.e96.b.2913 fatcat:2n7tum7eprel3hkho5garxt4oq
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