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Stealthy dopant-level hardware Trojans: extended version

Georg T. Becker, Francesco Regazzoni, Christof Paar, Wayne P. Burleson
2014 Journal of Cryptographic Engineering  
In recent years, hardware Trojans have drawn the attention of governments and industry as well as the scientific community.  ...  However, since there have been no reported hardware Trojans in practice yet, little is known about how such a Trojan would look like, and how difficult it would be in practice to implement one.  ...  Surprisingly, despite the major research efforts in the general area of hardware Trojans, little is known about how to built stealthy hardware Trojans at the layout level (post place&route).  ... 
doi:10.1007/s13389-013-0068-0 fatcat:xvxc7ultzjgtdctvet7szsw4eu

Side-Channel Hardware Trojan for Provably-Secure SCA-Protected Implementations [article]

Samaneh Ghandali, Thorben Moos, Amir Moradi, Christof Paar
2019 arXiv   pre-print
In this work, we present a mechanism to introduce an extremely stealthy hardware Trojan into cryptographic primitives equipped with provably-secure first-order side-channel countermeasures.  ...  Hardware Trojans have drawn the attention of academia, industry and government agencies.  ...  The work presented in [6] is concerned with building stealthy Trojans at the layout level.  ... 
arXiv:1910.00737v1 fatcat:hzlhjnztzzg7pmzqoefrs26jxu

A Design Methodology for Stealthy Parametric Trojans and Its Application to Bug Attacks [chapter]

Samaneh Ghandali, Georg T. Becker, Daniel Holcomb, Christof Paar
2016 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Over the last decade, hardware Trojans have gained increasing attention in academia, industry and by government agencies.  ...  In this contribution, we examine how particularly stealthy Trojans can be introduced to a given target circuit.  ...  For example, to detect the dopant-level Hardware Trojans additional steps are needed, e.g., the method presented by Sugawara et al. [24] .  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-53140-2_30 fatcat:xk2b3ldaz5crzn6zrhywzes7ge

Hardware Security in IoT Devices with Emphasis on Hardware Trojans

Simranjeet Sidhu, Bassam J. Mohd, Thaier Hayajneh
2019 Journal of Sensor and Actuator Networks  
A deeper understanding of hardware Trojans (HTs) and protection against them is of utmost importance right now as they are the prime threat to the hardware.  ...  This paper emphasizes the need for a secure hardware-level foundation for security of these devices, as depending on software security alone is not adequate enough.  ...  B.J.M. was responsible for guiding the hardware security part, helped in the security analysis and writing the paper.  ... 
doi:10.3390/jsan8030042 fatcat:zuzw6sf2hzgdfiz65p2joz2g6a

T-TER: Defeating A2 Trojans with Targeted Tamper-Evident Routing [article]

Timothy Trippel, Kang G. Shin, Kevin B. Bush, Matthew Hicks
2020 arXiv   pre-print
We present Targeted Tamper-Evident Routing (T-TER), a preventive layout-level defense against untrusted foundries, capable of thwarting the insertion of even the stealthiest hardware Trojans.  ...  ., inserted a hardware Trojan). Defending against a foundry-side adversary is challenging because---even with as few as two gates---hardware Trojans can completely undermine software security.  ...  Dopant-level Trojans [9, 29, 46] are the closest to such; however, they have limited controllability and are detectable [50] . tive hardware Trojan).  ... 
arXiv:1906.08842v2 fatcat:yqkqecmvb5bybmefnzvkqgvmau

Introduction to the CHES 2013 special issue

Guido Bertoni, Jean-Sébastien Coron
2014 Journal of Cryptographic Engineering  
This special issue hosts five extended versions of selected papers among those presented at the workshop.  ...  In the paper "Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans: Extended Version" by Georg T. Becker, Francesco Regazzoni, Christof Paar, and Wayne P.  ...  In the paper "Using Bleichenbacher's Solution to the Hidden Number Problem to Attack Nonce Leaks in 384-Bit ECDSA: Extended Version", Elke De Mulder, Michael Hutter, Mark E.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s13389-014-0076-8 fatcat:mosgr7jmxjdazndfiod4mwof7i

A2: Analog Malicious Hardware

Kaiyuan Yang, Matthew Hicks, Qing Dong, Todd Austin, Dennis Sylvester
2016 2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)  
In this paper, we show how a fabrication-time attacker can leverage analog circuits to create a hardware attack that is small (i.e., requires as little as one gate) and stealthy (i.e., requires an unlikely  ...  A targeted version of a process reliability Trojan is the dopant-level Trojan [4] .  ...  The most pernicious fabrication-time attack is the dopant-level Trojan [4] , [5] .  ... 
doi:10.1109/sp.2016.10 dblp:conf/sp/YangHDAS16 fatcat:rd6zdepquvhlnh7hqjcrjpn6oi

Introduction to the CHES 2014 special issue

Lejla Batina, M. J. B. Robshaw
2015 Journal of Cryptographic Engineering  
The paper Reversing Stealthy Dopant-Level Circuits was authored by Takeshi Sugawara, Daisuke Suzuki, Ryoichi Fujii, Shigeaki Tawa, Ryohei Hori, Mitsuru Shiozaki, and Takeshi Fujino.  ...  This special issue of the Journal for Cryptographic Engineering (JCEN) contains extended versions of three of the papers that were presented at this workshop.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s13389-015-0098-x fatcat:4ex3zytctzdchlmljmrpbg4vwi

Doppelganger Obfuscation — Exploring theDefensive and Offensive Aspects of Hardware Camouflaging

Max Hoffmann, Christof Paar
2020 Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems  
We show that low-level obfuscation is in fact a double-edged sword that can also enable stealthy malicious functionalities.In this work, we present Doppelganger, the first generic design-level obfuscation  ...  Hardware obfuscation is widely used in practice to counteract reverse engineering.  ...  We show that Doppelganger can be used to inject an extremely stealthy hardware Trojan into the same cryptographic coprocessor.  ... 
doi:10.46586/tches.v2021.i1.82-108 fatcat:rzm42ok2lzc5xmy5vjj6bhlbve

A Touch of Evil: High-Assurance Cryptographic Hardware from Untrusted Components [article]

Vasilios Mavroudis, Andrea Cerulli, Petr Svenda, Dan Cvrcek, Dusan Klinec, George Danezis
2017 arXiv   pre-print
The key idea is to combine protective-redundancy with modern threshold cryptographic techniques to build a system tolerant to hardware trojans and errors.  ...  To evaluate our design, we build a Hardware Security Module that provides the highest level of assurance possible with COTS components.  ...  Hardware Trojans & Countermeasures.  ... 
arXiv:1709.03817v2 fatcat:r6bsrg3kgjgk3maccpiajz4p4y

A Touch of Evil

Vasilios Mavroudis, Andrea Cerulli, Petr Svenda, Dan Cvrcek, Dusan Klinec, George Danezis
2017 Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security - CCS '17  
The key idea is to combine protective-redundancy with modern threshold cryptographic techniques to build a system tolerant to hardware trojans and errors.  ...  To evaluate our design, we build a Hardware Security Module that provides the highest level of assurance possible with COTS components.  ...  Hardware Trojans & Countermeasures.  ... 
doi:10.1145/3133956.3133961 dblp:conf/ccs/MavroudisCSCKD17 fatcat:tmmrrppzijcetkxgdh4px6bv5a

On the unbearable lightness of FIPS 140-2 randomness tests

Darren Hurley-Smith, Constantinos Patsakis, Julio Hernandez-Castro
2020 IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security  
Deprecated by official standards, these tests are nevertheless still widely used, for example in hardware-level self-test schemes incorporated into the design of many True RNGs (TRNGs).  ...  While previous work focuses on the use of cryptographic algorithms or dopant-level hardware trojans, we identify that these tests can be fooled by significant less sophisticated trojans requiring little  ...  Both versions evaluate the following equation: [19] uses rngtest as part of their hardware cryptocurrency wallet evaluation process.  ... 
doi:10.1109/tifs.2020.2988505 fatcat:rnv4hfvzj5fkdkfow2a545akgy

SECURITY, SAFETY AND FAIR MARKET ACCESS BY OPENNESS AND CONTROL OF THE SUPPLY CHAIN SOVEREIGNTY IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

Arnd Weber, Steffen Reith, Michael Kasper, Dirk Kuhlmann, Jean-Pierre Seifert, Christoph Krauß, Steffen Reith, Steffen, Fraunhofer Singapore, Arnd Weber, Steffen Reith, Michael Kasper (+3 others)
unpublished
Fig. 2 : 2 Reverse engineered area of a stealthy dopant-level hardware Trojan Fig. 3 : 3 The schematic design of a hardware Trojan horse bypassing encryption(cf. Rajendran et al. 2010).  ...  Consider the novel types of hardware Trojan horses using dopant-level or capacitor effects (cf. Becker et al. 2014 and Yang et al. 2016; see Fig. 3 for the schematic design of a hardware Trojan).  ...  Common Criteria: a standard used for security evaluations of different levels. Compiler: Software which translates given code, typically from source code to machine code.  ... 
fatcat:y2552uanczgofmav7e3i2barx4

Obfuscating the Interconnects: Low-Cost and Resilient Full-Chip Layout Camouflaging

Satwik Patnaik, Mohammed Ashraf, Ozgur Sinanoglu, Johann Knechtel
2020 IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems  
Our scheme can be applied to any design and technology node without FEOL-level modifications.  ...  We evaluate our scheme for various designs at the physical, DRC-clean layout level. Our scheme incurs a significantly lower cost than most of the prior art.  ...  Protecting the IP can also help to mitigate other hardware-centric threats, e.g., hardware Trojans [3] .  ... 
doi:10.1109/tcad.2020.2981034 fatcat:gg5pgtmiczbyrkvs4rs4gjb5ki

Contribution of Interface Acoustic Phonons and Remote-polar Phonons in the Hole Mobility of Diamond

Giorgio Bonomo
2019
Trojan Attack Realization of two Hardware Trojan against AES encryption system through two different topologies: the first exploits toggling signals, to charge a capacitor and stealthy force a certain  ...  The exploited code does not use all the constants reported in Kanai, in order to avoid obtaining a too extended formulation: however, a version with the complete formulation has been developed without  ... 
doi:10.25417/uic.12480761.v1 fatcat:ekylo4v5xzakpesy7fybivtzue