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Stable Matching with Uncertain Pairwise Preferences

Haris Aziz, Péter Biró, Tamás Fleiner, Serge Gaspers, Ronald de Haan, Nicholas Mattei, Baharak Rastegari
2022 Theoretical Computer Science  
We study a two-sided matching problem where the agents have independent pairwise preferences on their possible partners and these preferences may be uncertain.  ...  In this case, the certainly preferred part of an agent's preferences may admit a cycle and there may not even exist a matching that is stable with non-zero probability.  ...  Let L denote the uncertain pairwise preference profile for all agents. We denote by I = (M, W, L) an instance of a stable marriage problem with uncertain pairwise preferences.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2022.01.028 fatcat:wuqeyxhyfffa5hjd4gzrlxdyku

The (Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments [chapter]

Nick Arnosti, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier
2015 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
It is well-known that if the clearing house implements a stable match and preferences are known, then no group of agents can profitably deviate in this manner.  ...  When, in addition, agents are uncertain about their own preferences, every mechanism is susceptible to deviations in which a single pair of agents agrees in advance to match to each other. *  ...  Any mechanism which produces a stable match with certainty is interim pairwise stable. Proof. Seeking a contradiction, suppose that φ always produces a stable match.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_4 fatcat:sjhi4mrjuzhxvkeix7vbq4ezxu

The (Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments [article]

Nick Arnosti, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier
2015 arXiv   pre-print
It is well-known that if the clearing house implements a stable match and preferences are known, then no group of agents can profitably deviate in this manner.  ...  When, in addition, agents are uncertain about their own preferences, every mechanism is susceptible to deviations in which a single pair of agents agrees in advance to match to each other.  ...  Any mechanism which produces a stable match with certainty is interim pairwise stable. Proof. Seeking a contradiction, suppose that φ always produces a stable match.  ... 
arXiv:1504.03257v1 fatcat:wmtvywbs4ja3nh52vxqykhlrwq

Pairwise Preferences in the Stable Marriage Problem

Ágnes Cseh, Attila Juhos, Michael Wagner
2019 Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science  
We study the classical, two-sided stable marriage problem under pairwise preferences.  ...  This freedom is then gradually restricted as we specify six stages of orderedness in the preferences, ending with the classical case of strictly ordered lists.  ...  [3] discussed the stable marriage problem under uncertain pairwise preferences.  ... 
doi:10.4230/lipics.stacs.2019.21 dblp:conf/stacs/CsehJ19 fatcat:5qtkabwsqnfo3ncrzrmtkhuu4y

Pairwise preferences in the stable marriage problem [article]

Ágnes Cseh, Attila Juhos
2018 arXiv   pre-print
We study the classical, two-sided stable marriage problem under pairwise preferences.  ...  This freedom is then gradually restricted as we specify six stages of orderedness in the preferences, ending with the classical case of strictly ordered lists.  ...  Stable matching with uncertain pairwise preferences. In Proceedings of the 16th Conference on  ... 
arXiv:1810.00392v1 fatcat:z2ygftz4vfgezf7yag4mmsm2wq

Pairwise Preferences in the Stable Marriage Problem

Ágnes Cseh, Attila Juhos
2021 ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation  
ABSTRACT We study the classical, two-sided stable marriage problem under pairwise preferences.  ...  JEL: C63, C78 We study the classical, two-sided stable marriage problem under pairwise preferences.  ...  [3] discussed the stable marriage problem under uncertain pairwise preferences.  ... 
doi:10.1145/3434427 fatcat:lex5ykynajhwtlw7f6e32c6j2a

Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences [chapter]

Haris Aziz, Péter Biró, Serge Gaspers, Ronald de Haan, Nicholas Mattei, Baharak Rastegari
2016 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
For each of the models, we study the computational complexity of computing the stability probability of a given matching as well as finding a matching with the highest probability of being stable.  ...  We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents' preferences due to limited information or communication.  ...  We denote by I = (M, W, L) an instance of a Stable Marriage problem with Uncertain Linear Preferences (SMULP).  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_16 fatcat:xjrv6msgcvdxjkoaw767to33ou

Mechanism and Algorithm for Stable Trading Matching between Coal Mining and Power Generation Companies in China

Ruyi Shi, Zheng Li, Zhenpeng Tang, Di Wang
2022 Applied Sciences  
of the pairwise stable matching of both sides, innovates a mechanism for trading between coal mining and power generation companies, and designs a stable trading matching algorithm.  ...  The results reveal that the trading relations between coal mining and power generation companies under the stable matching mechanism are resistant to disintegration and that the pairwise stable matching  ...  amount u(i,j) = 0; the order of preferences x ij > x im , m∈µ(S i ); and the order of preferences y ij > y nj , n∈µ(d j ), then matching µ is pairwise unstable; otherwise matching µ is pairwise stable  ... 
doi:10.3390/app12083919 fatcat:gukbukjwlzbe3gjudpghdsxmg4

Pareto Optimal Allocation under Compact Uncertain Preferences

Haris Aziz, Peter Biro, Ronald De Haan, Baharak Rastegari
2019 PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE TWENTY-EIGHTH INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE  
In this paper, we focus on three uncertain preferences models whose size is polynomial in the number of agents and items.  ...  Aziz, de Haan, and Rastegari (2017) considered this problem with the additional feature that agents' preferences involve uncertainty.  ...  Uncertainty in preferences has already been studied in voting (Dopazo and Martínez-Céspedes 2017; Hazon et al. 2012 ) and stable matching (Aziz et al. 2016a; 2017a; Miyazaki and Okamoto 2017; Chen et  ... 
doi:10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011740 fatcat:vrcvfv5cybg5vhcpo47ipnak2e

Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences [article]

Haris Aziz and Péter Biró and Serge Gaspers and Ronald de Haan and Nicholas Mattei and Baharak Rastegari
2016 arXiv   pre-print
For each of the models, we study the computational complexity of computing the stability probability of a given matching as well as finding a matching with the highest probability of being stable.  ...  We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents' preferences due to limited information or communication.  ...  We denote by I = (M, W, L) an instance of a Stable Marriage problem with Uncertain Linear Preferences (SMULP).  ... 
arXiv:1607.02917v1 fatcat:sdz2mmrjzjhg3a5azrcgamk5jq

Preference Elicitation and Interview Minimization in Stable Matchings

Joanna Drummond, Craig Boutilier
2014 PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE TWENTY-EIGHTH INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE  
a stable matching.  ...  While stable matching problems are widely studied, little work has investigated schemes for effectively eliciting agent preferences using either preference (e.g., comparison) queries for interviews (to  ...  to reach a stable matching.  ... 
doi:10.1609/aaai.v28i1.8829 fatcat:bcp5khcsl5cbfl3ywmydzqocvu

Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences

Haris Aziz, Péter Biró, Serge Gaspers, Ronald de Haan, Nicholas Mattei, Baharak Rastegari
2019 Algorithmica  
For each of the models, we study the computational complexity of computing the stability probability of a given matching as well as finding a matching with the highest probability of being stable.  ...  We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents' preferences due to limited information or communication.  ...  • MatchingWithHighestStabilityProbability Given uncertain preferences of the agents, compute a matching with the highest stability probability.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00453-019-00650-0 pmid:32214575 pmcid:PMC7066306 fatcat:bui6maov2zflflwraakurhtx2y

A game theoretic study of energy efficient cooperative wireless networks

Donald Richard Brown, Fatemeh Fazel
2011 Journal of Communications and Networks  
and endogenously forming cooperative partnerships with respect to a network with centrally optimized energy allocations and pairing assignments.  ...  Numerical results with orthogonal amplify-and-forward cooperation are also provided to quantify the energy efficiency of a wireless network with sources selfishly allocating transmission/relaying energy  ...  These payoffs then imply a preference table, known to each node, that is used to determine a pairwise-stable matching, if one exists.  ... 
doi:10.1109/jcn.2011.6157436 fatcat:sfpy2q6r3fcwdneqvviwmautzi

A Two-Sided Matching Decision Model Based on Uncertain Preference Sequences

Xiao Liu, Huimin Ma
2015 Mathematical Problems in Engineering  
In this model, we first design a data processing method to get preference ordinal value in uncertain preference sequence, then compute the preference distance of each matching pair based on these certain  ...  matching effect, and then solve it with branch-and-bound algorithm.  ...  Many researchers set the stable matching as their most important optimal objective; however stable matching under the uncertain preference sequence has some limitations.  ... 
doi:10.1155/2015/241379 fatcat:mfrjeaqwcbefzntcb4q3v6uspe

Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems

Ayşe Yazıcı
2016 International Journal of Game Theory  
Abstract We study many-to-many matching with substitutable and cardinally monotonic preferences.  ...  However, each stable match for the true preferences can be achieved as the outcome of such equilibrium.  ...  Thus, when preferences are substitutable, the set of stable matches is non-empty and coincides with the set of pairwise-stable matches.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00182-015-0525-3 fatcat:3sl6txnhyjg67pggwvtqucppay
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