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Simultaneous Single-Item Auctions [chapter]

Kshipra Bhawalkar, Tim Roughgarden
2012 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
In a combinatorial auction (CA) with item bidding, several goods are sold simultaneously via single-item auctions.  ...  We study how the equilibrium performance of such an auction depends on the choice of the underlying single-item auction.  ...  An alternative simple auction format is sequential (rather than simultaneous) single-item auctions; the price of anarchy in such auctions was studied recently in [16, 20] .  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_25 fatcat:4pwh6ac6krenhgkahdblolpmyi

Evaluating bidding strategies for simultaneous auctions

Teddy Candale, Sandip Sen
2006 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - AAMAS '06  
We study the problem of bidding for multiple items in a set of simultaneous auctions, each of which sell only a single unit of a particular item.  ...  In the real world all or most of the items of interest to an agent is not present in a single combinatorial auction.  ...  single-unit auctions.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1160633.1160852 dblp:conf/atal/CandaleS06 fatcat:jhhmcrkbq5fpjasq4lxkv6iunm

A comparison of bidding strategies for simultaneous auctions

Teddy Candale, Sandip Sen
2006 ACM SIGecom Exchanges  
We focus on bidding for multiple items in a set of auctions, each of which sell only a single unit of a particular item. Hence an agent has to bid in multiple auctions to obtain item bundles.  ...  In the real world all or most of the items of interest to an agent is not present in a single combinatorial auction.  ...  Bidding strategies for single-item auctions are well-known. For strategy-proof auctions, a rational bidder will bid its true valuation for the item.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1124566.1124572 fatcat:qbn6ilnrvnacrnxjezudnwbsfi

Efficiency and Synergy in a Multi-Unit Auction with and Without Package Bidding: An Experimental Study

Kirill Chernomaz, Dan Levin
2012 Social Science Research Network  
In the model, a global bidder bids for multiple items and can benefit from synergies, while local bidders bid for a single item.  ...  The effect of package bidding on revenues is negative when global bidders are not allowed to bid on single items (a feature of the equilibrium) and positive when the restriction is relaxed and synergies  ...  Many large-stake auctions, recently conducted, involved a seller simultaneously auctioning off multiple items or a buyer simultaneously procuring several objects.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1671640 fatcat:m2yeicojeveghbqqpswv3rnxtu

Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study

Kirill Chernomaz, Dan Levin
2012 Games and Economic Behavior  
In the model, a global bidder bids for multiple items and can benefit from synergies, while local bidders bid for a single item.  ...  The effect of package bidding on revenues is negative when global bidders are not allowed to bid on single items (a feature of the equilibrium) and positive when the restriction is relaxed and synergies  ...  Many large-stake auctions, recently conducted, involved a seller simultaneously auctioning off multiple items or a buyer simultaneously procuring several objects.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2012.07.008 fatcat:2g6oi3shnnarpkjyzgnxzpw3ku

The Price of Anarchy in Auctions [article]

Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos
2016 arXiv   pre-print
This survey outlines a general and modular theory for proving approximation guarantees for equilibria of auctions in complex settings.  ...  Combining these tools yields tight worst-case approximation guarantees for the equilibria of many widely-used auction formats.  ...  private values setting (e.g., simultaneous single-item auctions).  ... 
arXiv:1607.07684v1 fatcat:b5t3xgmk75bi7iymdoelblnnl4

Efficiency and price discovery in multi-item auctions

Vipul Bansal, Rahul Garg
2000 ACM SIGecom Exchanges  
Distributed multi-item auctions offer great opportunities for integrating fragmented online auction markets into larger markets with more efficient outcomes.  ...  We also show that the strategy constitutes a Nash Equilibrium of the system with single unit demand. We discuss the implications of our results for the design of auctions on the Internet.  ...  We also thank Arun Kumar for his interest in mediated auctions which provided motivation for this study.  ... 
doi:10.1145/844309.844314 fatcat:lumubysuxvbtpici5l42rug3wy

Simultaneous Ascending Auctions [chapter]

Peter Cramton
2005 Combinatorial Auctions  
The simultaneous ascending auction has proved to be a successful method of auctioning many related items.  ...  Simultaneous sale and ascending bids promote price discovery, which helps bidders build desirable packages of items.  ...  In a simultaneous ascending auction with a reserve price less than $80, the unique equilibrium outcome is for each to bid for a single item, so that the auction ends at the reserve price.  ... 
doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0005 fatcat:3zfphvvx5ffqvj4na6yekpzngq

Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms

John O. Ledyard, David Porter, Antonio Rangel
1997 Journal of Economics and Management Strategy  
However, in environments created to stress test the procedures, a combinatorial auction outperforms the simultaneous discrete auction.  ...  The simultaneous discrete auction process used by the Federal Communications Commission to allocate Personal Communications licenses was contrasted with a sequential auction and a combinatorial auction  ...  A simultaneous auction does eliminate single-item efficiencies.  ... 
doi:10.1162/105864097567228 fatcat:7vaaoiusw5fihbgkztgylpkmmu

Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms

John O. Ledyard, David Porter, Antonio Rangel
1997 Journal of Economics and Management Strategy  
However, in environments created to stress test the procedures, a combinatorial auction outperforms the simultaneous discrete auction.  ...  The simultaneous discrete auction process used by the Federal Communications Commission to allocate Personal Communications licenses was contrasted with a sequential auction and a combinatorial auction  ...  A simultaneous auction does eliminate single-item efficiencies.  ... 
doi:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00639.x fatcat:hx3dzpgc4ngkldixjwjmivpkhu

The Price of Anarchy in Auctions

Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos
2017 The Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research  
This survey outlines a general and modular theory for proving approximation guarantees for equilibria of auctions in complex settings.  ...  Combining these tools yields tight worst-case approximation guarantees for the equilibria of many widely-used auction formats.  ...  Section 3 considers a more complex example, the sale of multiple items via simultaneous single-item auctions.  ... 
doi:10.1613/jair.5272 fatcat:7gcmpshgivh2vj4xu2enqe3nue

Approximately optimal mechanism design

Tim Roughgarden
2015 ACM SIGecom Exchanges  
First, when is complexity -in the sense of detailed distributional knowledge -an essential feature of revenue-maximizing single-item auctions?  ...  Second, do combinatorial auctions require high-dimensional bid spaces to achieve good social welfare?  ...  Let's briefly recall the Vickrey or second-price single-item auction [Vickrey 1961 ]. Consider a single seller with a single item; assume for simplicity that the seller has no value for the item.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2728732.2728733 fatcat:mofyhzcs3bd35kcrm6vxgngz3y

Multi-item Non-truthful Auctions Achieve Good Revenue [article]

Constantinos Daskalakis, Maxwell Fishelson, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Santhoshini Velusamy
2022 arXiv   pre-print
Given a (not necessarily truthful) single-item auction format A satisfying certain technical conditions, we run simultaneous item auctions augmented with a personalized entry fee for each bidder that must  ...  Our framework can be used with many common auction formats, such as simultaneous first-price, simultaneous second-price, and simultaneous all-pay auctions.  ...  ALGORITHM 1: Simultaneous -Item-Auction with Entry Fee (EA( )) Input: A single-item auction = ( , * ). Input: For each bidder : an entry fee .  ... 
arXiv:2002.06702v5 fatcat:5norjxaqefazzo25qxw52tmgri

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design: Motivation, Examples, and Lessons Learned [article]

Tim Roughgarden
2014 arXiv   pre-print
In the first example, we consider revenue maximization in a single-item auction with heterogeneous bidders.  ...  The second example considers welfare maximization with multiple items.  ...  Does a near-optimal single-item auction require detailed distributional knowledge?  ... 
arXiv:1406.6773v1 fatcat:5czubehre5aqtgh3werd25cqxe

Multi-Dimensional Bid Improvement Algorithm for Simultaneous Auctions

Teddy Candale, Sandip Sen
2007 International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence  
While an optimal bidding strategy is known when bidding in sequential auctions, only suboptimal strategies are available when bidding for items being sold in simultaneous auctions.  ...  Bidding for multi-items in simultaneous auctions raises challenging problems. In multi-auction settings, the determination of optimal bids by potential buyers requires combinatorial calculations.  ...  We plan to study situations where a bidder can bid in both single-item and combinatorial auctions to acquire bundles. We also intend to adapt MDBI for generating bids for multiunit auctions.  ... 
dblp:conf/ijcai/CandaleS07 fatcat:tjivgn5a4nfsjiil6dzd2jxtsm
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