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Simple, Optimal and Efficient Auctions [chapter]

Constantinos Daskalakis, George Pierrakos
2011 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We study the extent to which simple auctions can simultaneously achieve good revenue and efficiency guarantees in single-item settings.  ...  Motivated by the optimality of the second price auction with monopoly reserves when the bidders' values are drawn i.i.d. from regular distributions [12] , and its approximate optimality when they are drawn  ...  , one gets at least the efficiency of Vickrey's auction.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_10 fatcat:sajyryuiwfctde6mouuwi6ypii

Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry

Lixin Ye
2004 Contributions to Theoretical Economics  
Furthermore, if the information potentially available to bidders after entry is sufficiently rich, then the Vickrey auction, up to its equivalent class, is also the only optimal sealed-bid auction.  ...  We consider a single object, independent private value auction model with entry. Potential bidders are ex ante symmetric and randomize about entry.  ...  entry into account, we show that the simple auctions themselves are optimal, and are uniquely optimal up to its equivalent class.  ... 
doi:10.2202/1534-5971.1158 fatcat:hskthhjwanbavhtv3ud4otf2ha

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design [article]

Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
2020 arXiv   pre-print
Optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, and also a number of killer applications.  ...  This survey reviews several common issues with optimal mechanisms, including exorbitant communication, computation, and informational requirements; and it presents several examples demonstrating that passing  ...  Acknowledgments The first author is supported in part by NSF Award CCF-1813188 and a Guggenheim Fellowship, and performed this work in part while visiting the London School of Economics.  ... 
arXiv:1812.11896v2 fatcat:5q5l34g65jf7beogswtr7nevta

Sponsored Search Auctions with Markovian Users [chapter]

Gagan Aggarwal, Jon Feldman, S. Muthukrishnan, Martin Pál
2008 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Under this model, the most efficient assignment is no longer a simple ranking function as in GSP. We show that the optimal assignment can be found efficiently (even in near-linear time).  ...  of their bid and click-through rate.  ...  We thank the anonymous reviews of a previous version of this paper for their comments and for pointing us to several references.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_68 fatcat:evc74atl7nbizkqvmjvv3ruv2y

An approximate truthfulness motivated spectrum auction for dynamic spectrum access

Qinhui Wang, Baoliu Ye, Tianyin Xu, Sanglu Lu
2011 2011 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference  
Extensive experimental results show that ETEX outperforms most popular truthful spectrum auctions in terms of social welfare, spectrum utilization and user satisfaction.  ...  Moreover, we define a general spectrum auction model using linear programming. Based on this model, we further propose ETEX, a sealed-bid auction mechanism with approximate truthfulness.  ...  [7] present a non-computationally efficient yet optimal truthful auction based on maximizing virtual valuation, and propose a computationally efficient suboptimal truthful auction, where allocation  ... 
doi:10.1109/wcnc.2011.5779137 dblp:conf/wcnc/WangYXL11 fatcat:rl4ipopmyjgddocv6f5ba4gole

The Price of Anarchy in Auctions [article]

Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos
2016 arXiv   pre-print
This theory complements traditional economic techniques, which generally focus on exact and optimal solutions and are accordingly limited to relatively stylized settings.  ...  This survey outlines a general and modular theory for proving approximation guarantees for equilibria of auctions in complex settings.  ...  This section analyzes the efficiency of the simple auction format that sells each item j simultaneously and independently using a single-item first-price auction (Section 2).  ... 
arXiv:1607.07684v1 fatcat:b5t3xgmk75bi7iymdoelblnnl4

Approximately Truthful Mechanisms for Radio Spectrum Allocation

Qinhui Wang, Baoliu Ye, Tianyin Xu, Sanglu Lu, Song Guo
2015 IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology  
We discuss the concepts of approximate truthfulness and provide approximately truthful mechanisms to improve efficiency (in terms of social welfare and spectrum utilization).  ...  Following that, we break the assumption by proposing a hard-to-manipulate auction, which makes it hard to manipulate the auction for profit gains.  ...  Auctions are widely accepted as an efficient approach to re-distribute spectrum among users due to the perceived fairness and allocation efficiency [5] .  ... 
doi:10.1109/tvt.2014.2345418 fatcat:2vc3v3hsyve5pdsb63fq6ohnvi

A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies

Gian Luigi Albano, Fabrizio Germano, Stefano Lovo
2001 Economics Letters  
In an example where some bidders have superadditive values, we characterize the equilibria of a simultaneous ascending auction and compare the revenue and efficiency generated with ones generated by the  ...  sequential, the one-shot simultaneous, and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auctions.  ...  We thank an anonymous referee for useful comments; Germano acknowledges financial support from European Commission Grant ERBFMBICT972857, and Lovo from Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique, Belgium  ... 
doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(00)00394-3 fatcat:b2v3jsiolffbpnpi3h2wvawz5i

Optimality and Efficiency in Auctions Design: A Survey [chapter]

Roger L. Zhan
2008 Pareto Optimality, Game Theory And Equilibria  
Efficiency and optimality are the two primary and generally-conflicting goals in any auction design: the former focuses on the social welfare of the whole seller-bidder system, whereas the latter emphasizes  ...  and phenomena from the emerging and rapidly growing areas, such as online auctions.  ...  The Vickrey auction and most of the standard simple auction formats fail to be efficient if the private value assumption is dropped [MAS03] .  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-0-387-77247-9_16 fatcat:juj6f6unq5cn3m6erevwpsebiu

A Pareto Optimal Auction Mechanism for Carbon Emission Rights

Mingxi Wang, Mingrong Wang, Chuangyin Dang, Shouyang Wang
2014 Mathematical Problems in Engineering  
In the proposed auction mechanism, the assignment outcome is Pareto efficient and the carbon emission rights' resources are efficiently used.  ...  This paper proposes a new auction mechanism which converges to a unique Pareto optimal equilibrium in a finite number of periods.  ...  IDHT20130522), and Beijing Young Talents Plan.  ... 
doi:10.1155/2014/438104 fatcat:arrcp2ewgren3gtnaiklkdau3e

Flow auctions

Ilan Kremer, Zvi Wiener, Eyal Winter
2016 International Journal of Game Theory  
We use a simple dynamic auction model in continuous time to answer this question. We focus on the relationship between the persistency of bidders' valuations and the optimal choice of frequency.  ...  Flow goods (like electricity) are sold through auctions in a dynamic framework. An important design question is the frequency of such auctions.  ...  the relation between type's persistency and the optimal auction frequency.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00182-016-0549-3 fatcat:uo4qvz5dqzb3xbuiook24jqeo4

A General Framework for Wireless Spectrum Auctions

Sorabh Gandhi, Chiranjeeb Buragohain, Lili Cao, Haitao Zheng, Subhash Suri
2007 2007 2nd IEEE International Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks  
Both analytical and experimental results verify the efficiency of the proposed approach. We conclude that bidding behaviors and pricing models have significant impact on auction outcomes.  ...  A spectrum auction system must consider local demand and spectrum availability in order to maximize revenue and utilization.  ...  ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The research of Sorabh Gandhi, Chiranjeeb Buragohain and Subhash Suri was supported in part by National Science Foundation grants CNS-0626954 and CCF-0514738.  ... 
doi:10.1109/dyspan.2007.12 fatcat:jehc4a6hfnc2bozomrib4o2imy

Auctioning Bulk Mobile Messages

S. Meij, L.-F. Pau
2006 Computational Economics  
This leads naturally to the evaluation of auctioning for bulk SMS or MMS messaging capacity, with the intrinsic advantages therein such as reduction in acquisition costs, allocation efficiency, and optimality  ...  We compare 1and 5-round auctions, to show the learning effect and the benefits thereof to the various parties.  ...  optimality and efficiency of the multidimensional auction.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s10614-006-9032-8 fatcat:nrksdjbvqfaozcvjrgrza4pcwe

The Price of Anarchy in Auctions

Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos
2017 The Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research  
This theory complements traditional economic techniques, which generally focus on exact and optimal solutions and are accordingly limited to relatively stylized settings.  ...  This survey outlines a general and modular theory for proving approximation guarantees for equilibria of auctions in complex settings.  ...  This section analyzes the efficiency of the simple auction format that sells each item j simultaneously and independently using a single-item first-price auction (Section 2).  ... 
doi:10.1613/jair.5272 fatcat:7gcmpshgivh2vj4xu2enqe3nue

Page 9440 of Mathematical Reviews Vol. , Issue 2004k [page]

2004 Mathematical Reviews  
For the two-player case, the paper fully characterizes the equi- librium bidding functions and shows that the optimal collusive outcome is uniformly bounded away from efficient collusion for any discount  ...  Summary: “We show, in the context of a simple evolutionary bar- gaining game, that the efficiency of bargaining behavior depends crucially on the tie-breaking rule players use.  ... 
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