A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2021; you can also visit the original URL.
The file type is
In particular, we focus on payment rules based on the bidders' Shapley values. ... In this research note, we lay some groundwork for analyzing the manipulability of core-selecting payment rules in combinatorial auctions. ... To avoid such outcomes, Day and Milgrom (2008) introduced the idea of core-selecting payment rules that restrict payments to be in the core. ...arXiv:2107.01048v1 fatcat:p7bm76nzv5gwhkabf673tucmdu
A series of examples is presented to illustrate how the BWC rule works and how the payments compare to those based on competitive prices, the core, and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. ... This paper explores how the Shapley value can be used as the basis of a payment rule for auctions and exchanges. ... One approach is to select payments in the core. Day and Milgrom (2007) analyze the properties of core selecting auctions. ...doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.020 fatcat:6uf5fkv7kvaxfg6qu4otzrzeha
Hence, every allocation rule satisfying Fuzzy Core Selection satisfies Core Selection. ... Theorem 4.11 The Aumann-Shapley value is the unique allocation rule satisfying Fuzzy Core Selection on R ′ N . ...doi:10.1017/asb.2016.34 fatcat:d7cwduk3ofc5xjtuhemcstzfoq
For the particular subclasses of Weber and minimax location games we study under what conditions the pro- portionally egalitarian allocation rule selects core allocations.” 2003a:91022 91A12 Slikker, Marco ... The proof of the first main result is based on a refinement of the so-called balanced contributions property. ...
This heuristic uses a simulated annealing based acceptance rule for neighbour selection and runs for a preset number of iterations. ... Third, in all simulated instances, as well as in the real case, the core of the cooperative game is non-empty and the Shapley value belongs to the core. ...doi:10.1057/palgrave.jors.2602489 fatcat:igjokhwhvnfnvblfxzn6i73fwy
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
We examine the ways in which the colluders might share their payments, using the core and Shapley value from cooperative game theory. ... We also show that in these cases colluders can compute core imputations and the Shapley value in polynomial time. ... Finally, what bids are likely to occur for domains with an empty core? ...doi:10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_4 fatcat:jcrfx7mz2jekzbg36rshd2ausm
The former consists in a fixed payment for granting access to the standard while the latter is a payment proportional to the quantity sold of the standard-based product. ... For this purpose, we translate the problem into a cooperative game with transferable utility (or side payments) and consider two major solution concepts, namely the core and the Shapley value. ... As a rule, the nucleolus shares all but one of the original axioms underlying the Shapley value: it is symmetric and satisfies the null player property but it does not satisfy additivity. ...doi:10.1515/rle-2013-0016 fatcat:pkcoyggorraoxedxdykd7ngila
On the positive side we develop an LP-based allocation rule guaran- teeing that no coalition pays more than a times its own cost, where a is the ratio between the optimal TSP-tour and the optimal value ... A side-payment game or synonymously a TU game, called here simply a game, is a function v:2% —R. ...
We also relate the rules defined through cooperative games with rules defined directly from the problem, either through algorithms for computing a minimal tree, either through a cone-wise decomposition ... We now introduce the rule based on Boruvka's algorithm. ... Trudeau and Vidal-Puga (2019) review the main axiomatic characterizations of the rules based on the Shapley value in mcst p. There are two possible ways for defining rules in mcst p. ...doi:10.1007/s13209-021-00230-y fatcat:4hr63megcjamhcihh3oywxjd74
These properties are satisfied, among others, by the Shapley value and the nucleolus. ... In particular, we show that most classic allocation rules satisfy it. ... Then, the Shapley value, the prenucleolus, the nucleolus, the core-center, and the equal division solution select the allocation (0, . . . , 0). 5 If, moreover, v is zero-monotonic, also the τ value selects ...doi:10.1007/s00182-013-0406-6 fatcat:qgdp345v4vhrfoi2kpjs4vpmyu
After further comprehensive consideration of four factors which impact on benefit distribution, a benefit distribution model of contract for water saving in college is established based on modified Shapley ... Benefit allocation plan is solved by using shapley value method's Characteristic which assigns by contribution degree. ... The base year is selected here in 2014. As of December 2018, the project saved a total of 5.74 million tons of water and an annual water saving rate of 50%. ...doi:10.1088/1755-1315/344/1/012157 fatcat:x2qmeybxgjhgzlduibtv2c4huu
The payment rules we consider are natural interpretations of fairness based on concepts such as Shapley values and the nucleolus from cooperative game theory. ... pays agents their costs and is not committed to fair payments. ... A Shapley-fair mechanism can select the bottom two agents and pay them their Shapley payments. ...doi:10.1145/2764468.2764505 dblp:conf/sigecom/BalkanskiS15 fatcat:6ls6uqkturfqbkvad45dcxk7iu
Based on the core, the range of payoffs for each riparian can be indicated. ... Inflows Claims Rule-based allocation Downstream availability Downstream excess claims Table 6 . 6 15 The sequential CEA Rule Countries Rule-based water allocation to L i Rule-based ...doi:10.1007/978-3-030-48485-9_6 fatcat:o5rfqfvv25ecnlxhz66kwbcp5a
The plurality rule selects the option considered best by the highest number of users as the socially optimal alternative. ... The last row of Table 7 indicates which cooperative management institution is selected, based on the plurality rule, depending on the users' behavioral characteristics in the noncooperative case. ...doi:10.1029/2011wr010849 fatcat:633mwsfoyze5hf7mxpf3p7652e
In paperwork, an explanation and comparison of how to make additional profit by applying two different ways "Shapley and Equal Sharing Role". ... The concept of coalition strategy based on using of the unified Micro Grids (MGs) units primarily on the GT-CFS strategy to get over high-speed routing requirements of smart grid, increasing revenues and ... rule, a coalition decides to splitting into two coalitions S i and S j based on divided comparison set by eq ...doi:10.12720/jcm.14.3.236-242 fatcat:rmrbhd4nefdnvcrghe4kdlnnpu
« Previous Showing results 1 — 15 out of 896 results