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Shapley-Based Core-Selecting Payment Rules
[article]
2021
arXiv
pre-print
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In particular, we focus on payment rules based on the bidders' Shapley values. ...
In this research note, we lay some groundwork for analyzing the manipulability of core-selecting payment rules in combinatorial auctions. ...
To avoid such outcomes, Day and Milgrom (2008) introduced the idea of core-selecting payment rules that restrict payments to be in the core. ...
arXiv:2107.01048v1
fatcat:p7bm76nzv5gwhkabf673tucmdu
Shapley value based pricing for auctions and exchanges
2018
Games and Economic Behavior
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A series of examples is presented to illustrate how the BWC rule works and how the payments compare to those based on competitive prices, the core, and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. ...
This paper explores how the Shapley value can be used as the basis of a payment rule for auctions and exchanges. ...
One approach is to select payments in the core. Day and Milgrom (2007) analyze the properties of core selecting auctions. ...
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.020
fatcat:6uf5fkv7kvaxfg6qu4otzrzeha
RISK REDISTRIBUTION GAMES WITH DUAL UTILITIES
2016
ASTIN Bulletin: The Journal of the International Actuarial Association
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Hence, every allocation rule satisfying Fuzzy Core Selection satisfies Core Selection. ...
Theorem 4.11 The Aumann-Shapley value is the unique allocation rule satisfying Fuzzy Core Selection on R ′ N . ...
doi:10.1017/asb.2016.34
fatcat:d7cwduk3ofc5xjtuhemcstzfoq
Page 729 of Mathematical Reviews Vol. , Issue 2003A
[page]
2003
Mathematical Reviews
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For the particular subclasses of Weber and minimax location games we study under what conditions the pro- portionally egalitarian allocation rule selects core allocations.”
2003a:91022 91A12 Slikker, Marco ...
The proof of the first main result is based on a refinement of the so-called balanced contributions property. ...
Horizontal cooperation among freight carriers: request allocation and profit sharing
2008
Journal of the Operational Research Society
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This heuristic uses a simulated annealing based acceptance rule for neighbour selection and runs for a preset number of iterations. ...
Third, in all simulated instances, as well as in the real case, the core of the cooperative game is non-empty and the Shapley value belongs to the core. ...
doi:10.1057/palgrave.jors.2602489
fatcat:igjokhwhvnfnvblfxzn6i73fwy
Collusion in VCG Path Procurement Auctions
[chapter]
2010
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
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We examine the ways in which the colluders might share their payments, using the core and Shapley value from cooperative game theory. ...
We also show that in these cases colluders can compute core imputations and the Shapley value in polynomial time. ...
Finally, what bids are likely to occur for domains with an empty core? ...
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_4
fatcat:jcrfx7mz2jekzbg36rshd2ausm
The Shapley Value as a Guide to FRAND Licensing Agreements
2014
Review of Law & Economics
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The former consists in a fixed payment for granting access to the standard while the latter is a payment proportional to the quantity sold of the standard-based product. ...
For this purpose, we translate the problem into a cooperative game with transferable utility (or side payments) and consider two major solution concepts, namely the core and the Shapley value. ...
As a rule, the nucleolus shares all but one of the original axioms underlying the Shapley value: it is symmetric and satisfies the null player property but it does not satisfy additivity. ...
doi:10.1515/rle-2013-0016
fatcat:pkcoyggorraoxedxdykd7ngila
Page 5848 of Mathematical Reviews Vol. , Issue 99h
[page]
1999
Mathematical Reviews
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On the positive side we develop an LP-based allocation rule guaran- teeing that no coalition pays more than a times its own cost, where a is the ratio between the optimal TSP-tour and the optimal value ...
A side-payment game or synonymously a TU game, called here simply a game, is a function v:2% —R. ...
A review of cooperative rules and their associated algorithms for minimum-cost spanning tree problems
2021
SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association
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We also relate the rules defined through cooperative games with rules defined directly from the problem, either through algorithms for computing a minimal tree, either through a cone-wise decomposition ...
We now introduce the rule based on Boruvka's algorithm. ...
Trudeau and Vidal-Puga (2019) review the main axiomatic characterizations of the rules based on the Shapley value in mcst p. There are two possible ways for defining rules in mcst p. ...
doi:10.1007/s13209-021-00230-y
fatcat:4hr63megcjamhcihh3oywxjd74
Understanding the coincidence of allocation rules: symmetry and orthogonality in TU-games
2014
International Journal of Game Theory
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These properties are satisfied, among others, by the Shapley value and the nucleolus. ...
In particular, we show that most classic allocation rules satisfy it. ...
Then, the Shapley value, the prenucleolus, the nucleolus, the core-center, and the equal division solution select the allocation (0, . . . , 0). 5 If, moreover, v is zero-monotonic, also the τ value selects ...
doi:10.1007/s00182-013-0406-6
fatcat:qgdp345v4vhrfoi2kpjs4vpmyu
Analysis of cooperative game of benefit distribution of contract for water saving in college based on modified Shapley value method
2019
IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environment
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After further comprehensive consideration of four factors which impact on benefit distribution, a benefit distribution model of contract for water saving in college is established based on modified Shapley ...
Benefit allocation plan is solved by using shapley value method's Characteristic which assigns by contribution degree. ...
The base year is selected here in 2014. As of December 2018, the project saved a total of 5.74 million tons of water and an annual water saving rate of 50%. ...
doi:10.1088/1755-1315/344/1/012157
fatcat:x2qmeybxgjhgzlduibtv2c4huu
Mechanisms for Fair Attribution
2015
Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation - EC '15
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The payment rules we consider are natural interpretations of fairness based on concepts such as Shapley values and the nucleolus from cooperative game theory. ...
pays agents their costs and is not committed to fair payments. ...
A Shapley-fair mechanism can select the bottom two agents and pay them their Shapley payments. ...
doi:10.1145/2764468.2764505
dblp:conf/sigecom/BalkanskiS15
fatcat:6ls6uqkturfqbkvad45dcxk7iu
Transboundary Water Resource Management
[chapter]
2020
Springer Water
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Based on the core, the range of payoffs for each riparian can be indicated. ...
Inflows
Claims
Rule-based
allocation
Downstream
availability
Downstream
excess claims
Table 6 . 6 15 The sequential CEA Rule Countries
Rule-based water
allocation to L i
Rule-based ...
doi:10.1007/978-3-030-48485-9_6
fatcat:o5rfqfvv25ecnlxhz66kwbcp5a
Cooperative institutions for sustainable common pool resource management: Application to groundwater
2012
Water Resources Research
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The plurality rule selects the option considered best by the highest number of users as the socially optimal alternative. ...
The last row of Table 7 indicates which cooperative management institution is selected, based on the plurality rule, depending on the users' behavioral characteristics in the noncooperative case. ...
doi:10.1029/2011wr010849
fatcat:633mwsfoyze5hf7mxpf3p7652e
Effective Model Operation by Joining and-Separating Technique in Smart Grids
2019
Journal of Communications
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In paperwork, an explanation and comparison of how to make additional profit by applying two different ways "Shapley and Equal Sharing Role". ...
The concept of coalition strategy based on using of the unified Micro Grids (MGs) units primarily on the GT-CFS strategy to get over high-speed routing requirements of smart grid, increasing revenues and ...
rule, a coalition decides to splitting into two coalitions S i and S j based on divided comparison set by eq ...
doi:10.12720/jcm.14.3.236-242
fatcat:rmrbhd4nefdnvcrghe4kdlnnpu
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