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Inapproximability of Truthful Mechanisms via Generalizations of the VC Dimension
2015
Proceedings of the Forty-Seventh Annual ACM on Symposium on Theory of Computing - STOC '15
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Our results essentially unify all inapproximability results for deterministic truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions to date and establish new separation gaps between truthful and non-truthful ...
mechanisms, other types of valuations, communication complexity,. . . ). ...
We thank Subhash Khot for referring us to [2] and pointing out that the problem studied there can be reduced to k-packing promise problem (see the proof of Theorem 3.4). ...
doi:10.1145/2746539.2746597
dblp:conf/stoc/DanielySS15
fatcat:sj7e3odvlve55ebimgkl5vucxe
Interpolating Between Truthful and non-Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions
[article]
2015
arXiv
pre-print
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We study the communication complexity of combinatorial auctions via interpolation mechanisms that interpolate between non-truthful and truthful protocols. ...
just to machinery from communication complexity or the study of truthful mechanisms. ...
For all ǫ > 0, consider any (not necessarily truthful) protocol for combinatorial auctions with communication complexity O(m ǫ ) per party. ...
arXiv:1511.02831v1
fatcat:rmfcx3a5jnefxk53hiq7ssv2b4
Inapproximability of Truthful Mechanisms via Generalizations of the VC Dimension
[article]
2015
arXiv
pre-print
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Our results essentially unify all inapproximability results for deterministic truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions to date and establish new separation gaps between truthful and non-truthful ...
Algorithmic mechanism design (AMD) studies the delicate interplay between computational efficiency, truthfulness, and optimality. We focus on AMD's paradigmatic problem: combinatorial auctions. ...
We thank Subhash Khot for referring us to [2] and pointing out that the problem studied there can be reduced to k-packing promise problem (see the proof of Theorem 3.4). ...
arXiv:1412.6265v2
fatcat:4odn46dwofdmflwhc6sjrtvcli
Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
2015
Games and Economic Behavior
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In contrast, a non-truthful (1-1/e)-approximation algorithm is known [39] , and a truthful-in-expectation (1-1/e)-approximation mechanism was recently developed for the special case of coverage valuations ...
m −γ -approximation to the optimal social welfare for combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations in the value oracle model. ...
We would like to thank Tim Roughgarden and Qiqi Yan for the suggestion that we include the results of Appendix B, which appeared previously in [21] , in this paper. ...
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.007
fatcat:my7kaebujzgbzklrymwoelw7pa
Limitations of Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions
2011
2011 IEEE 52nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
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In contrast, a non-truthful (1-1/e)-approximation algorithm is known [39] , and a truthful-in-expectation (1-1/e)-approximation mechanism was recently developed for the special case of coverage valuations ...
m −γ -approximation to the optimal social welfare for combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations in the value oracle model. ...
We would like to thank Tim Roughgarden and Qiqi Yan for the suggestion that we include the results of Appendix B, which appeared previously in [21] , in this paper. ...
doi:10.1109/focs.2011.64
dblp:conf/focs/DughmiV11
fatcat:zrekxrkhyrbc5khwjez7vkl3ca
Truth Revelation in Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions
[article]
2002
arXiv
pre-print
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This is true of mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, which have in recent years assumed practical importance, and in particular of the gold standard for combinatorial auctions, the Generalized Vickrey ...
We demonstrate the latter property by identifying natural properties for combinatorial auctions and showing that, for our restricted class of players, they imply that truthful strategies are dominant. ...
Acknowledgments We want to thank Moshe Tennenholtz and Robert Wilson for their insightful remarks. ...
arXiv:cs/0202017v1
fatcat:sgih4ewe5rdoba3ufs4f3xot6q
The Randomized Communication Complexity of Randomized Auctions
[article]
2021
arXiv
pre-print
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We study the communication complexity of incentive compatible auction-protocols between a monopolist seller and a single buyer with a combinatorial valuation function over n items. ...
We also give nearly matching lower bounds on the expected communication complexity of approximately-revenue-optimal auctions. ...
So the total communication complexity is O(log(B)). To appreciate why the above mechanism is non-truthful, we provide a simple example: Example A.2 (IC vs non-IC auction protocols). ...
arXiv:2104.11275v1
fatcat:t5wkl3obpbhhzfsayritpkptcq
A Note on the Power of Truthful Approximation Mechanisms
[article]
2009
arXiv
pre-print
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We study the power of polynomial-time truthful mechanisms comparing to polynomial time (non-truthful) algorithms. ...
The proofs are almost standard in the field and follow from known results. ...
Nisan and Segal [4] show that optimally solving multi-unit auctions requires a communication complexity of m, and their proof directly extends to case of extended multi-unit auctions. ...
arXiv:0907.5219v2
fatcat:opalzsycbzfa5j4gsukveymzq4
On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design
2009
2009 50th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
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Specifically, we show that there is a setting in which: (1) there is a non-polynomial time truthful mechanism that always outputs the optimal solution, and that (2) no universally truthful randomized mechanism ...
In many settings the power of truthful mechanisms is severely bounded. In this paper we use randomization to overcome this problem. ...
Acknowledgements We thank Bobby Kleinberg, Noam Nisan, Sigal Oren, and Chaitanya Swamy for helpful discussions and comments. ...
doi:10.1109/focs.2009.42
dblp:conf/focs/DobzinskiD09
fatcat:65njd73i7bfsfhvjd36rrpqx3y
On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design
2013
SIAM journal on computing (Print)
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Specifically, we show that there is a setting in which: (1) there is a non-polynomial time truthful mechanism that always outputs the optimal solution, and that (2) no universally truthful randomized mechanism ...
In many settings the power of truthful mechanisms is severely bounded. In this paper we use randomization to overcome this problem. ...
Acknowledgements We thank Bobby Kleinberg, Noam Nisan, Sigal Oren, and Chaitanya Swamy for helpful discussions and comments. ...
doi:10.1137/090780146
fatcat:2cicr27db5b4llzuglgprmowey
The computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions
2012
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce - EC '12
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mechanisms for combinatorial auctions are provably weaker in terms of approximation ratio than non-truthful ones. ...
This question was very recently answered for universally truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions [Dobzinski 2011], and even for truthful-in-expectation mechanisms [Dughmi and Vondrák 2011a]. ...
This is the first separation in terms of computational complexity between truthful and non-truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. ...
doi:10.1145/2229012.2229044
dblp:conf/sigecom/DobzinskiV12
fatcat:udpdp3t74fekte54yrn2atulhq
On the Approximability of Combinatorial Exchange Problems
[chapter]
2008
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
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Nisan and Segal [12] present communication lower bounds for combinatorial auctions. ...
Combinatorial auctions have drawn much recent research attention (see for example the book by Cramton, Shoham and Steinberg [5]), and their computational and communication hardness are well understood. ...
The lower bounds are obtained in Yao's standard model of communication complexity. ...
doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_9
fatcat:ych3lmyo6rhnzg5ifml33kki24
On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design
[article]
2009
arXiv
pre-print
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Specifically, we show that there is a setting in which: (1) there is a non-polynomial time truthful mechanism that always outputs the optimal solution, and that (2) no universally truthful randomized mechanism ...
In many settings the power of truthful mechanisms is severely bounded. In this paper we use randomization to overcome this problem. ...
Acknowledgements We thank Bobby Kleinberg, Noam Nisan, Sigal Oren, and Chaitanya Swamy for helpful discussions and comments. ...
arXiv:0904.4193v2
fatcat:xejm7mhh7bc3xmbzpogxanh3ke
The Computational Complexity of Truthfulness in Combinatorial Auctions
[article]
2012
arXiv
pre-print
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The file type is application/pdf.
mechanisms for combinatorial auctions are provably weaker in terms of approximation ratio than non-truthful ones. ...
This question was very recently answered for universally truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions D11, and even for truthful-in-expectation mechanisms DughmiV11. ...
This is the first separation in terms of computational complexity between truthful and non-truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. ...
arXiv:1202.2789v1
fatcat:q2wa6dj6zfh3zpiqb5sq6ijxhe
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
1999
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '99
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This is true of mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, which have in recent years assumed practical importance, and in particular of the gold standard for combinatorial auctions, the Generalized Vickrey ...
We demonstrate the latter property by identifying natural properties for combinatorial auctions and showing that, for our restricted class of players, they imply that truthful strategies are dominant. ...
Anonymous watchful referees helped us improve the presentation and clarify a few points, thanks to them too. ...
doi:10.1145/336992.337016
dblp:conf/sigecom/LehmannOS99
fatcat:cnsk6ekqnnhy3fmcmtmxxarppi
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