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Securing Memory Encryption and Authentication Against Side-Channel Attacks Using Unprotected Primitives

Thomas Unterluggauer, Mario Werner, Stefan Mangard
2017 Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security - ASIA CCS '17  
In this work, we present Meas-the first Memory Encryption and Authentication Scheme providing security against DPA attacks.  ...  Memory encryption is used in many devices to protect memory content from attackers with physical access to a device.  ...  The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 681402)  ... 
doi:10.1145/3052973.3052985 dblp:conf/ccs/UnterluggauerWM17 fatcat:7qikovab6rafffoojmvxe5t7xa

MEAS: memory encryption and authentication secure against side-channel attacks

Thomas Unterluggauer, Mario Werner, Stefan Mangard
2018 Journal of Cryptographic Engineering  
In this work, we present Meas-the first Memory Encryption and Authentication Scheme providing security against DPA attacks.  ...  Memory encryption is used in many devices to protect memory content from attackers with physical access to a device.  ...  Side-channel attacks Present memory encryption and authentication schemes are designed to protect off-chip memory against adversaries with physical access assuming a microchip that is secure against all  ... 
doi:10.1007/s13389-018-0180-2 pmid:31231603 pmcid:PMC6555441 fatcat:5kuetrwwwnf7rkdhctgkpj46wa

Exploiting Unprotected I/O Operations in AMD's Secure Encrypted Virtualization

Mengyuan Li, Yinqian Zhang, Zhiqiang Lin, Yan Solihin
2019 USENIX Security Symposium  
significantly we demonstrate the construction of two attack primitives against SEV's memory encryption schemes, namely a memory decryption oracle and a memory encryption oracle, which enables an adversary  ...  to decrypt and encrypt arbitrary messages using the memory encryption keys of the VMs.  ...  The work was supported in part by the NSF grants 1750809, 1718084, 1834213, and 1834216, and research gifts from Intel and DFINITY foundation to Yinqian Zhang. Yan Solihin is supported in part by UCF.  ... 
dblp:conf/uss/LiZLS19 fatcat:3u3rod7j3ngtdofawfiln57mje

AEGIS: A single-chip secure processor

G. Edward Suh, Charles W. O'Donnell, Srinivas Devadas
2005 Information Security Technical Report  
Our architecture uses two new primitives to achieve physical security.  ...  This article presents the AEGIS secure processor architecture, which enables new applications by ensuring private and authentic program execution even in the face of physical attack.  ...  Mechanisms that are commonly used in today's smartcards can prevent side-channel attacks.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.istr.2005.05.002 fatcat:fs4yl5r63ba5tlciuudzw67oha

Pseudorandom Black Swans: Cache Attacks on CTR_DRBG

Shaanan Cohney, Andrew Kwong, Shahar Paz, Daniel Genkin, Nadia Heninger, Eyal Ronen, Yuval Yarom
2020 2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)  
More specifically, we demonstrate recovery of the CTR_DRBG state variables K and V via a cache side-channel attack against AES as used in different CTR_DRBG implementations.  ...  We find that hard-learned lessons about side-channel leakage from encryption primitives have not been applied to PRGs, at all abstraction levels.  ... 
doi:10.1109/sp40000.2020.00046 dblp:conf/sp/CohneyKPGHRY20 fatcat:d33gxdi2zrbahd7m2xyi4dlpqq

Aegis: A Single-Chip Secure Processor

G. Edward Suh, Charles W. O'Donnell, Srinivas Devadas
2007 IEEE Design & Test of Computers  
In this article, we do not consider attacks using side channels such as memory access patterns or power supply voltage. 5 To prevent side-channel attacks, the processor must be equipped with additional  ...  To defend against physical attacks, Aegis uses integrity verification (IV) and memory encryption (ME) techniques.  ...  His research interests include secure embedded processors, architectural techniques for security and verification, and new programmable substrates for simplified synthesis.  ... 
doi:10.1109/mdt.2007.179 fatcat:nkirz46au5d7jkc7w5sdjgwheu


Raoul Strackx, Frank Piessens
2012 Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security - CCS '12  
For applications that make intensive use of protected modules, and hence benefit most of the security guarantees provided, the performance cost is up to 14%.  ...  Protecting commodity operating systems against software exploits is known to be challenging, because of their sheer size.  ...  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors thank all reviewers and proofreaders of the paper for their useful comments. We also explicitly thank Gijs Vanspauwen for his work on the compiler.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2382196.2382200 dblp:conf/ccs/StrackxP12 fatcat:ihpk4zaxp5fl7pgaa4zzluus5y

Retrofitting Leakage Resilient Authenticated Encryption to Microcontrollers

Florian Unterstein, Marc Schink, Thomas Schamberger, Lars Tebelmann, Manuel Ilg, Johann Heyszl
2020 Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems  
Using this side-channel protected building block, we implement a leakage resilient authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) scheme that enables secured firmware updates.  ...  In this context attackers usually have physical access to a device and therefore side-channel attacks have to be considered.  ...  Acknowledgments The work presented in this contribution was supported by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research in the project ALESSIO through grant number 16KIS0629 and 16KIS0632.  ... 
doi:10.13154/tches.v2020.i4.365-388 dblp:journals/tches/UntersteinSSTIH20 fatcat:vly45rwqdzhrjagqernn7vhdva

SCA secure and updatable crypto engines for FPGA SoC bitstream decryption: extended version

Florian Unterstein, Nisha Jacob, Neil Hanley, Chongyan Gu, Johann Heyszl
2020 Journal of Cryptographic Engineering  
However, reported examples have shown that such cryptographic engines may become insecure against side-channel attacks at any later point in time.  ...  Depending on a side-channel evaluation of this primitive on the target platform, either a version with additional side-channel countermeasures or a more efficient variant is deployed.  ...  against side-channel attacks as it only processes public inputs and no secrets.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s13389-020-00247-2 fatcat:xgnl4djeznckzatufxling2ywq

Using quantum key distribution for cryptographic purposes: a survey [article]

Romain Alléaume, Cyril Branciard, Jan Bouda, Thierry Debuisschert, Mehrdad Dianati, Nicolas Gisin, Mark Godfrey, Philippe Grangier, Thomas Langer, Norbert Lutkenhaus, Christian Monyk, Philippe Painchault, Momtchil Peev (+9 others)
2014 arXiv   pre-print
for which the requirements, the context of use and the security properties can vary.  ...  As a key establishment primitive, QKD however does not provide a standalone security service in its own: the secret keys established by QKD are in general then used by a subsequent cryptographic applications  ...  A also acknowledges enlightning discussions with Sylvain Guilley, Philippe Hoogsvorst and Jean-Luc Danger about side-channel attacks on cryptographic hardware.  ... 
arXiv:quant-ph/0701168v3 fatcat:j3wuwqjuarav3ft6chdvdsaw5a

The Long-Short-Key Primitive and Its Applications to Key Security [chapter]

Matthew Cary, Matthias Jacob, Mariusz H. Jakubowski, Ramarathnam Venkatesan
2008 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
To address this problem, we designed and implemented a new primitive that helps provide better security for ciphers that use keys stored in easily accessible locations.  ...  Using a pseudorandom generator and additional novel software-protection techniques, we show how to implement this construction securely for AES.  ...  Also, this defends against side-channel attacks, such as cache-timing analysis. However, these methods could be slow because the random memory accesses may cause many cache misses.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-540-89598-5_19 fatcat:ty4odmmamzgz3d3p775pweap3e

Protecting IoT Devices through a Hardware-driven Memory Verification

Troya Cagil Koylu, Hans Okkerman, Cezar Rodolfo Wedig Reinbrecht, Said Hamdioui, Mottaqiallah Taouil
2021 2021 24th Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design (DSD)  
In this paper, we present embedded memory security (EMS); it protects against physical tampering of the memory of IoT devices.  ...  An adequate protection against attacks is only possible when the confidentiality and integrity of the data and applications of these devices are secured.  ...  ACKNOWLEDGMENT This work was labelled by the EUREKA cluster PENTA and funded by Dutch authorities under grant agreement PENTA-2018e-17004-SunRISE.  ... 
doi:10.1109/dsd53832.2021.00027 fatcat:b7kjxskwhfhn3hgwyslhf3b56e

A Survey on RISC-V Security: Hardware and Architecture [article]

Tao Lu
2021 arXiv   pre-print
This paper summarizes the representative security mechanisms of RISC-V hardware and architecture. Based on our survey, we predict the future research and development directions of RISC-V security.  ...  Data security and user privacy protection are common challenges faced by all IoT devices.  ...  (Section 4), ISA security extensions (Section 5), cryptographic primitives (Section 6), and protection against side-channel attacks (Section 7).  ... 
arXiv:2107.04175v1 fatcat:hr6avyprj5dvpav2pvnmfmvg2a

Physical Unclonable Functions in the Internet of Things: State of the Art and Open Challenges

Armin Babaei, Gregor Schiele
2019 Sensors  
Attacks on Internet of Things (IoT) devices are on the rise. Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are proposed as a robust and lightweight solution to secure IoT devices.  ...  In this paper, we investigate the maturity of this technology and the challenges toward PUF utilization in IoT that still need to be addressed.  ...  against invasive and semi-invasive side channel attacks.  ... 
doi:10.3390/s19143208 fatcat:urnyqelp4jgvvg75ngplzkdxxi

CIPHERLEAKS: Breaking Constant-time Cryptography on AMD SEV via the Ciphertext Side Channel

Mengyuan Li, Yinqian Zhang, Huibo Wang, Kang Li, Yueqiang Cheng
2021 USENIX Security Symposium  
to the Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX.  ...  Section 3 presents an overview of the ciphertext side channel, their root causes, and two attack primitives.  ...  implementation of the latest OpenSSL library, which has been considered secure against side channels. • It discusses the applicability of the CIPHERLEAKS attack on SEV-SNP.  ... 
dblp:conf/uss/LiZWLC21 fatcat:hggolzqh6rb7bazuoovocxrx7q
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