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Run-Time Accessible DRAM PUFs in Commodity Devices [chapter]

Wenjie Xiong, André Schaller, Nikolaos A. Anagnostopoulos, Muhammad Umair Saleem, Sebastian Gabmeyer, Stefan Katzenbeisser, Jakub Szefer
2016 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
This paper is the first to enable the run-time access of decay-based intrinsic DRAM PUFs in commercial off-the-shelf systems, which requires no additional hardware or FPGAs.  ...  Finally, we introduce lightweight protocols for device authentication and secure channel establishment, that leverage the DRAM PUFs at run-time.  ...  The authors would like to thank Kevin Ryan and Ethan Weinberger for their help with building the heater setup used in the experiments, and Intel for donating the Intel Galileo boards used in this work.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-53140-2_21 fatcat:3tpuyvnymvg4tfnpqzjz7fkjp4

Intrinsic Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) Sensors in Commodity Devices

Shuai Chen, Bing Li, Yuan Cao
2019 Sensors  
It can be difficult to implemented in commercial off-the-shelf devices.  ...  Furthermore, we configured the DRAM PUF-based sensor in a DRAM PUF-based key generation scheme which improves the practicability of the design.  ...  Acknowledgments: We would like to thank Jakub Szefer and Wenjie Xiong for guidance and help with the PUF implementation on Rpi.  ... 
doi:10.3390/s19112428 fatcat:tded54czafff3mkm7vzr23oqfi

Improving DRAM Performance, Security, and Reliability by Understanding and Exploiting DRAM Timing Parameter Margins [article]

Jeremie S. Kim
2021 arXiv   pre-print
This dissertation rigorously characterizes many modern commodity DRAM devices and shows that by exploiting DRAM access timing margins within manufacturer-recommended DRAM timing specifications, we can  ...  Second, we find that we can uniquely identify DRAM devices by the locations of failures that result when we access DRAM with timing parameters reduced below specification values.  ...  PUF without modifying commodity DRAM devices, 2) introduce an effective DRAM PUF that is runtime-accessible at all operating temperatures, 3) demonstrate a wide variety of tradeoffs in DRAM PUFs, based  ... 
arXiv:2109.14520v1 fatcat:7hhrlz3tfjgx5fekdblfawxf3a

Dataplant: Enhancing System Security with Low-Cost In-DRAM Value Generation Primitives [article]

Lois Orosa, Yaohua Wang, Ivan Puddu, Mohammad Sadrosadati, Kaveh Razavi, Juan Gómez-Luna, Hasan Hassan, Nika Mansouri-Ghiasi, Arash Tavakkol, Minesh Patel, Jeremie Kim, Vivek Seshadri (+4 others)
2019 arXiv   pre-print
Second, a new cold boot attack prevention mechanism that automatically destroys all data within DRAM on every power cycle with zero run-time energy and latency overheads.  ...  Using a combination of detailed simulations and experiments with 136 real commodity DRAM chips, we show that our Dataplant-based PUF has 1.8x higher throughput than the best state-of-the-art DRAM PUFs.  ...  We customize Ramulator [76] to support all the mechanisms on in-order cores.  ... 
arXiv:1902.07344v2 fatcat:rpfx6htqjfbhtjirzjy76rbbia

Intrinsic Run-Time Row Hammer PUFs: Leveraging the Row Hammer Effect for Run-Time Cryptography and Improved Security †

Nikolaos Anagnostopoulos, Tolga Arul, Yufan Fan, Christian Hatzfeld, André Schaller, Wenjie Xiong, Manishkumar Jain, Muhammad Saleem, Jan Lotichius, Sebastian Gabmeyer, Jakub Szefer, Stefan Katzenbeisser
2018 Cryptography  
In this work, we extend the work of Schaller et al. by presenting a run-time accessible implementation of this PUF and by further reducing the time required for the generation of its responses.  ...  Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) based on the retention times of the cells of a Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) can be utilised for the implementation of cost-efficient and lightweight cryptographic  ...  Run-Time Row Hammer PUF Implementations in Commodity DRAM In this section, we examine in detail the different parameters and factors that can affect the operation of a Row Hammer PUF.  ... 
doi:10.3390/cryptography2030013 fatcat:ec6iyndbpfdkreqa27aj53ewna

CODIC: A Low-Cost Substrate for Enabling Custom In-DRAM Functionalities and Optimizations [article]

Lois Orosa, Yaohua Wang, Mohammad Sadrosadati, Jeremie S. Kim, Minesh Patel, Ivan Puddu, Haocong Luo, Kaveh Razavi, Juan Gómez-Luna, Hasan Hassan, Nika Mansouri-Ghiasi, Saugata Ghose (+1 others)
2021 arXiv   pre-print
To overcome these limitations, we propose enabling programmable DRAM internal timings for controlling in-DRAM components.  ...  DRAM executes the given commands using internal components (e.g., access transistors, sense amplifiers) that are orchestrated by DRAM internal timings, which are fixed foreach DRAM command.  ...  A much earlier version of this paper was placed on arXiv in February 2019 [113] .  ... 
arXiv:2106.05632v1 fatcat:57kx6f3cibckzgcbuz3dcbnosa

Fast DRAM PUFs on Commodity Devices

Jack Miskelly, Maire OrNeill
2020 IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems  
only has root access for a lim- There are several difficulties inherent in implementing a 800 DRAM latency PUF on commodity hardware.  ...  The PUF, at 735 least in the case of the proposed design, is a mean to authen-736 ticate devices, not a means in itself to secure the device from 737 illicit access.  ... 
doi:10.1109/tcad.2020.3012218 fatcat:oqjx2lby5bdf5hilt66hp4nmpq

An Overview of DRAM-Based Security Primitives

Nikolaos Anagnostopoulos, Stefan Katzenbeisser, John Chandy, Fatemeh Tehranipoor
2018 Cryptography  
size, and the easy way in which they can be accessed, even at run-time.  ...  Security primitives based on Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) can provide cost-efficient and practical security solutions, especially for resource-constrained devices, such as hardware used in the Internet  ...  This work has also been supported by Comcast Corporation, a company headquartered in Philadelphia, PA, USA, and Honeywell International Inc., a company headquarted in Morris Plains, NJ, USA.  ... 
doi:10.3390/cryptography2020007 fatcat:43ohhg2ctzhrzlv7msocufwg3e

QUAC-TRNG: High-Throughput True Random Number Generation Using Quadruple Row Activation in Commodity DRAM Chips [article]

Ataberk Olgun, Minesh Patel, A. Giray Yağlıkçı, Haocong Luo, Jeremie S. Kim, Nisa Bostancı, Nandita Vijaykumar, Oğuz Ergin, Onur Mutlu
2021 arXiv   pre-print
We experimentally demonstrate that QUAC reliably generates random values across 136 commodity DDR4 DRAM chips from one major DRAM manufacturer.  ...  QUAC-TRNG exploits the new observation that a carefully-engineered sequence of DRAM commands activates four consecutive DRAM rows in rapid succession.  ...  Our goal in this work is to develop a TRNG that uses commodity DRAM devices to generate random numbers with both high throughput and low latency.  ... 
arXiv:2105.08955v2 fatcat:64w37n2ymbbapoe4x4v4dd4tpm

D-RaNGe: Using Commodity DRAM Devices to Generate True Random Numbers with Low Latency and High Throughput [article]

Jeremie S. Kim, Minesh Patel, Hasan Hassan, Lois Orosa, Onur Mutlu
2018 arXiv   pre-print
We use our observations to develop D-RanGe, a methodology for extracting true random numbers from commodity DRAM devices with high throughput and low latency by deliberately violating the read access timing  ...  To demonstrate that our TRNG design is viable using commodity DRAM chips, we rigorously characterize the behavior of activation failures in 282 state-of-the-art LPDDR4 devices from three major DRAM manufacturers  ...  D-RaNGe runs entirely in software and is capable of immediately running on any commodity system that provides the ability to manipulate DRAM timing parameters within the memory controller [7, 8] .  ... 
arXiv:1808.04286v2 fatcat:32gvtbf56jclzh4sflno2g4cde

Improving Resilience by Deploying Permuted Code onto Physically Unclonable Unique Processors

Andreas Assmuth, Paul Cockshott, Jana Kipke, Karen Renaud, Lewis Mackenzie, Wim Vanderbauwhede, Matthias Sollner, Tilo Fischer, George Weir
2016 2016 Cybersecurity and Cyberforensics Conference (CCC)  
In this paper we propose the deployment of permuted code onto Physically Unclonable Unique Processors in order to resist common cyber attacks.  ...  In: 2016 Cybersecurity and Cyberforensics Conference (CCC). IEEE, Piscataway, pp. 144-150. ISBN 9781509026579 , http://dx.  ...  The data cache has direct read/write access to the DRAM, but the instruction cache accesses the DRAM via an inverse permutation unit.  ... 
doi:10.1109/ccc.2016.30 dblp:conf/ccc2/AssmuthCKRMVSFW16 fatcat:bsvx2xgydbafzlpyelncoimlau

PiDRAM: A Holistic End-to-end FPGA-based Framework for Processing-in-DRAM [article]

Ataberk Olgun, Juan Gómez Luna, Konstantinos Kanellopoulos, Behzad Salami, Hasan Hassan, Oğuz Ergin, Onur Mutlu
2021 arXiv   pre-print
Several recent works have demonstrated PuM techniques in off-the-shelf DRAM devices.  ...  Using PiDRAM, we implement and evaluate two state-of-the-art PuM techniques: in-DRAM (i) copy and initialization, (ii) true random number generation.  ...  of reduced DRAM timing operations that are fundamental to enabling PuM in current DRAM devices.  ... 
arXiv:2111.00082v3 fatcat:xafmmdqxl5gi7hcmbtumotmrzq

A Modern Primer on Processing in Memory [article]

Onur Mutlu, Saugata Ghose, Juan Gómez-Luna, Rachata Ausavarungnirun
2020 arXiv   pre-print
At the same time, conventional memory technology is facing many technology scaling challenges in terms of reliability, energy, and performance.  ...  This design choice goes directly against at least three key trends in computing that cause performance, scalability and energy bottlenecks: (1) data access is a key bottleneck as many important applications  ...  Row Decoder D-RaNGe Key Idea • A cell's latency failure probability is inherently related to random process variation from manufacturing D-RaNGe and the DRAM Latency PUF show that commodity DRAM devices  ... 
arXiv:2012.03112v1 fatcat:hq2i2xzq4nbszenq7rqmjzcjci

RowHammer: A Retrospective [article]

Onur Mutlu, Jeremie S. Kim
2019 arXiv   pre-print
It is the phenomenon that repeatedly accessing a row in a modern DRAM chip causes bit flips in physically-adjacent rows at consistently predictable bit locations.  ...  This retrospective paper describes the RowHammer problem in Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM), which was initially introduced by Kim et al. at the ISCA 2014 conference rowhammer-isca2014.  ...  We have shown, in our ISCA 2014 paper [133] , the existence of disturbance errors in commodity DRAM chips that are sold and used in the field.  ... 
arXiv:1904.09724v1 fatcat:eucfr7lbrvawrjtztthuharb5a

AEGIS: A single-chip secure processor

G. Edward Suh, Charles W. O'Donnell, Srinivas Devadas
2005 Information Security Technical Report  
We briefly assess the cost of the security mechanisms in our processor and show that it is reasonable. ª  ...  This article presents the AEGIS secure processor architecture, which enables new applications by ensuring private and authentic program execution even in the face of physical attack.  ...  manage VM (SSP cannot) TE mode: R/W access to verified memory Access to most security instructions PTR mode: R/W access to private memory Access to PUF instructions Authentication Our processor allows  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.istr.2005.05.002 fatcat:fs4yl5r63ba5tlciuudzw67oha
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