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Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination

Orly Sade, Charles R. Schnitzlein, Jaime F. Zender
2004 Social Science Research Network  
more susceptible to collusion than are the uniform-price auctions, and so contrary to theoretical predictions and previous experimental results, the discriminatory auction provides the lowest average revenue  ...  This is a robustness test since group dynamics and cohort effects may play a role in achieving perfect collusionindependent of the role of the mechanism.  ...  This is a robustness test since group dynamics and cohort effects may play a role in achieving perfect collusion -independent of the role of the mechanism.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.564883 fatcat:6ry74b5yvbhyxatebbab6hylpe

Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination

Orly Sade, Charles Schnitzlein, Jaime F. Zender
2005 The Review of financial studies  
more susceptible to collusion than are the uniform-price auctions, and so contrary to theoretical predictions and previous experimental results, the discriminatory auction provides the lowest average revenue  ...  This is a robustness test since group dynamics and cohort effects may play a role in achieving perfect collusionindependent of the role of the mechanism.  ...  This is a robustness test since group dynamics and cohort effects may play a role in achieving perfect collusion -independent of the role of the mechanism.  ... 
doi:10.1093/rfs/hhj005 fatcat:nji3apvmwje43dn65ij6cayeu4

Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination

Orly Sade, Charles R. Schnitzlein, Jaime F. Zender
2003 Social Science Research Network  
more susceptible to collusion than are the uniform-price auctions, and so contrary to theoretical predictions and previous experimental results, the discriminatory auction provides the lowest average revenue  ...  This is a robustness test since group dynamics and cohort effects may play a role in achieving perfect collusionindependent of the role of the mechanism.  ...  This is a robustness test since group dynamics and cohort effects may play a role in achieving perfect collusion -independent of the role of the mechanism.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.445240 fatcat:x4w4tlk6tzhpbadrbtm7z5iso4

Rent-seeking contests with private values and resale

Yong Sui
2008 Public Choice  
Players' valuations are endogenously determined when there is an opportunity of resale. We characterize symmetric equilibria.  ...  We show that resale enhances allocative efficiency ex post at the expense of more wasted social resources since players compete more aggressively with resale possibilities.  ...  For instance, σ = 0 refers to perfect negative correlation, σ = 1 to perfect positive correlation, and σ = 1 2 to independence. From (1), we have the following conditional probabilities.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s11127-008-9366-y fatcat:xkdocs4fn5bitcvltfz2lz47h4

When Less (Potential Demand) is More (Revenue): Asymmetric Bidding Capacities in Divisible Good Auctions

Orly Sade, Charles R. Schnitzlein, Jaime F. Zender
2005 Social Science Research Network  
We have benefited from comments  ...  Due to its impact on collusive outcomes, asymmetry in bidding capacities has a more powerful impact on the seller's revenue than does the auction type.  ...  Pitchik and Schotter (1988) investigate experimentally the role of budget constraints in sequential auctions under perfect information.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.705901 fatcat:ijczf2xq6vd5bhjgbshmhbug2a

When Less (Potential Demand) Is More (Revenue): Asymmetric Bidding Capacities in Divisible Good Auctions

Orly Sade, Charles Schnitzlein, Jaime F. Zender
2006 European Finance Review  
We have benefited from comments  ...  Due to its impact on collusive outcomes, asymmetry in bidding capacities has a more powerful impact on the seller's revenue than does the auction type.  ...  Pitchik and Schotter (1988) investigate experimentally the role of budget constraints in sequential auctions under perfect information.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s10679-006-9003-x fatcat:n2nq4qtr6favzdkujb7m2ahzo4

Contractual incompleteness in an extensive-form game under perfect information using Stackelberg model

Anton Abdulbasah Kamil
2014 Malaysian Journal of Fundamental and Applied Sciences  
The result is that a renegotiation-proof contract exists which commits against every deviation from the equilibrium which would induce a revenue acceleration. AMS Subj. Classification: 91A40, 91A20 .  ...  Likewise, for player F, ); , .  ...  Consider any revenue acceleration f' and t h . By Lemma 2, ) ( t h c which commits against f' and t h . Therefore, f' cannot be a sub game perfect equilibrium strategy in t h .  ... 
doi:10.11113/mjfas.v3n2.29 fatcat:ojquu2ujnfdbhnsfp2hnqathoe

Game Theory: Noncooperative Games [chapter]

Eric van Damme
2015 International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences  
Conventional theory focuses on the question 'how will rational players play?', and has the Nash equilibrium at its core.  ...  We discuss this concept and its interpretations, as well as refinements (perfect and stable equilibria) and relaxations (rationalizability and correlated equilibria).  ...  Chess is a game with perfect information.  ... 
doi:10.1016/b978-0-08-097086-8.71048-8 fatcat:pmhl3esmpbatda57pktcmxb7xe

Game Theory: Noncooperative Games [chapter]

E. van Damme
2001 International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences  
Conventional theory focuses on the question 'how will rational players play?', and has the Nash equilibrium at its core.  ...  We discuss this concept and its interpretations, as well as refinements (perfect and stable equilibria) and relaxations (rationalizability and correlated equilibria).  ...  Chess is a game with perfect information.  ... 
doi:10.1016/b0-08-043076-7/02230-0 fatcat:637xdmyzn5b5nequ3yaushucle

Simultaneous Allocation of Bundled Goods Through Auctions: Assessing the Case for Joint Bidding

Daniel Rondeau, Pascal Courty, Maurice Doyon
2013 Social Science Research Network  
The main results show that in our experimental environment, allowing joint bidding increases efficiency by 11.3% and revenue by 9.4%.  ...  Joint bidding raises the prospect of higher allocative efficiency but also reduces the number of bidders resulting in an ambiguous net impact on seller revenue.  ...  If lots were perfectly independent from one another, players should bid on every lot presented to them. However, this would have been a major departure from the policy context for timber auctions.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2342294 fatcat:xtrlv2shjvhc7bukoviemmwo4u

"CONFESS". Eliciting Honest Feedback Without Independent Verification Authorities [chapter]

Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings
2006 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
with future reports submitted about the same agent, we present a mechanism we have called "CONFESS", that discovers (in equilibrium) the true outcome of a transaction by analyzing the two reports coming from  ...  Let us reconsider the strategy s from the perfect information game G ∞ according to which the players play (Dc S , c B ) with probability p and (Cc S , c B ) with probability 1−p.  ...  Limits of Feasibility From a game theoretic point of view, a perfect information game models a situation in which the players are rational, their rationality is common knowledge and their payoffs are also  ... 
doi:10.1007/11575726_5 fatcat:pbok3nxuengxvnp4couhhlicii

Simultaneous Allocation of Bundled Goods through Auctions: Assessing the Case for Joint Bidding

Daniel Rondeau, Pascal Courty, Maurice Doyon
2015 American Journal of Agricultural Economics  
The main results show that in our experimental environment, allowing joint bidding increases efficiency by 11.3% and revenue by 9.4%.  ...  Joint bidding raises the prospect of higher allocative efficiency but also reduces the number of bidders resulting in an ambiguous net impact on seller revenue.  ...  If lots were perfectly independent from one another, players should bid on every lot presented to them. However, this would have been a major departure from the policy context for timber auctions.  ... 
doi:10.1093/ajae/aav041 fatcat:5yv2pzkvwvapnaax6nov4ertp4

Career concerns in a simple experimental labour market

Bernd Irlenbusch, Dirk Sliwka
2006 European Economic Review  
A revised version may be available on the IZA website (www.iza.org) or directly from the author.  ...  Before making second-period wage offers firms are informed about first-period profits. In a different treatment firms additionally learn the abilities of agents.  ...  In that treatment firms had more information as they perfectly knew the ability before the beginning of period 2.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.10.003 fatcat:uswvltqvjbgafavyrmaenold6i

Artificial Intelligence and Auction Design [article]

Martino Banchio, Andrzej Skrzypacz
2022 arXiv   pre-print
We also show that providing information about lowest bid to win, as introduced by Google at the time of switch to first-price auctions, increases competitiveness of auctions.  ...  It is often the choice of the auctioneer how much information to reveal to the players.  ...  See Dworczak (2020) for other reasons why information disclosure after an auction can affect revenues and efficiency.  ... 
arXiv:2202.05947v1 fatcat:pdnxp76j6jby7gxbeughh6fc3u

Something in the water: scholarly communications in a rapidly changing information economy

Kevin Guthrie
2008 Serials: The Journal for the Serials Community  
to demonstrate their relevance in the digital world.This paper draws examples from another information industry that has also lost its stability: newspaper publishing.  ...  Conference,Torquay, April 2008 The Internet is causing scholarly communication to lose its long-standing stability, and the players in this process -libraries, publishers, and othersare increasingly challenged  ...  with rapid updates and syntheses from diverse information streams.  ... 
doi:10.1629/2179 fatcat:agnakfvvxbbitdoroapsh4uhqu
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