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Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination
2004
Social Science Research Network
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more susceptible to collusion than are the uniform-price auctions, and so contrary to theoretical predictions and previous experimental results, the discriminatory auction provides the lowest average revenue ...
This is a robustness test since group dynamics and cohort effects may play a role in achieving perfect collusionindependent of the role of the mechanism. ...
This is a robustness test since group dynamics and cohort effects may play a role in achieving perfect collusion -independent of the role of the mechanism. ...
doi:10.2139/ssrn.564883
fatcat:6ry74b5yvbhyxatebbab6hylpe
Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination
2005
The Review of financial studies
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more susceptible to collusion than are the uniform-price auctions, and so contrary to theoretical predictions and previous experimental results, the discriminatory auction provides the lowest average revenue ...
This is a robustness test since group dynamics and cohort effects may play a role in achieving perfect collusionindependent of the role of the mechanism. ...
This is a robustness test since group dynamics and cohort effects may play a role in achieving perfect collusion -independent of the role of the mechanism. ...
doi:10.1093/rfs/hhj005
fatcat:nji3apvmwje43dn65ij6cayeu4
Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination
2003
Social Science Research Network
Preserved Fulltext
A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2017; you can also visit the original URL.
The file type is application/pdf.
more susceptible to collusion than are the uniform-price auctions, and so contrary to theoretical predictions and previous experimental results, the discriminatory auction provides the lowest average revenue ...
This is a robustness test since group dynamics and cohort effects may play a role in achieving perfect collusionindependent of the role of the mechanism. ...
This is a robustness test since group dynamics and cohort effects may play a role in achieving perfect collusion -independent of the role of the mechanism. ...
doi:10.2139/ssrn.445240
fatcat:x4w4tlk6tzhpbadrbtm7z5iso4
Rent-seeking contests with private values and resale
2008
Public Choice
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Players' valuations are endogenously determined when there is an opportunity of resale. We characterize symmetric equilibria. ...
We show that resale enhances allocative efficiency ex post at the expense of more wasted social resources since players compete more aggressively with resale possibilities. ...
For instance, σ = 0 refers to perfect negative correlation, σ = 1 to perfect positive correlation, and σ = 1 2 to independence. From (1), we have the following conditional probabilities. ...
doi:10.1007/s11127-008-9366-y
fatcat:xkdocs4fn5bitcvltfz2lz47h4
When Less (Potential Demand) is More (Revenue): Asymmetric Bidding Capacities in Divisible Good Auctions
2005
Social Science Research Network
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We have benefited from comments ...
Due to its impact on collusive outcomes, asymmetry in bidding capacities has a more powerful impact on the seller's revenue than does the auction type. ...
Pitchik and Schotter (1988) investigate experimentally the role of budget constraints in sequential auctions under perfect information. ...
doi:10.2139/ssrn.705901
fatcat:ijczf2xq6vd5bhjgbshmhbug2a
When Less (Potential Demand) Is More (Revenue): Asymmetric Bidding Capacities in Divisible Good Auctions
2006
European Finance Review
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We have benefited from comments ...
Due to its impact on collusive outcomes, asymmetry in bidding capacities has a more powerful impact on the seller's revenue than does the auction type. ...
Pitchik and Schotter (1988) investigate experimentally the role of budget constraints in sequential auctions under perfect information. ...
doi:10.1007/s10679-006-9003-x
fatcat:n2nq4qtr6favzdkujb7m2ahzo4
Contractual incompleteness in an extensive-form game under perfect information using Stackelberg model
2014
Malaysian Journal of Fundamental and Applied Sciences
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The result is that a renegotiation-proof contract exists which commits against every deviation from the equilibrium which would induce a revenue acceleration. AMS Subj. Classification: 91A40, 91A20 . ...
Likewise, for player F, ); , . ...
Consider any
revenue acceleration f' and t
h . By Lemma 2,
)
( t
h
c
which commits against f' and t
h . Therefore, f' cannot be a
sub game perfect equilibrium strategy in t
h . ...
doi:10.11113/mjfas.v3n2.29
fatcat:ojquu2ujnfdbhnsfp2hnqathoe
Game Theory: Noncooperative Games
[chapter]
2015
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences
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Conventional theory focuses on the question 'how will rational players play?', and has the Nash equilibrium at its core. ...
We discuss this concept and its interpretations, as well as refinements (perfect and stable equilibria) and relaxations (rationalizability and correlated equilibria). ...
Chess is a game with perfect information. ...
doi:10.1016/b978-0-08-097086-8.71048-8
fatcat:pmhl3esmpbatda57pktcmxb7xe
Game Theory: Noncooperative Games
[chapter]
2001
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences
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Conventional theory focuses on the question 'how will rational players play?', and has the Nash equilibrium at its core. ...
We discuss this concept and its interpretations, as well as refinements (perfect and stable equilibria) and relaxations (rationalizability and correlated equilibria). ...
Chess is a game with perfect information. ...
doi:10.1016/b0-08-043076-7/02230-0
fatcat:637xdmyzn5b5nequ3yaushucle
Simultaneous Allocation of Bundled Goods Through Auctions: Assessing the Case for Joint Bidding
2013
Social Science Research Network
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The main results show that in our experimental environment, allowing joint bidding increases efficiency by 11.3% and revenue by 9.4%. ...
Joint bidding raises the prospect of higher allocative efficiency but also reduces the number of bidders resulting in an ambiguous net impact on seller revenue. ...
If lots were perfectly independent from one another, players should bid on every lot presented to them. However, this would have been a major departure from the policy context for timber auctions. ...
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2342294
fatcat:xtrlv2shjvhc7bukoviemmwo4u
"CONFESS". Eliciting Honest Feedback Without Independent Verification Authorities
[chapter]
2006
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
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with future reports submitted about the same agent, we present a mechanism we have called "CONFESS", that discovers (in equilibrium) the true outcome of a transaction by analyzing the two reports coming from ...
Let us reconsider the strategy s from the perfect information game G ∞ according to which the players play (Dc S , c B ) with probability p and (Cc S , c B ) with probability 1−p. ...
Limits of Feasibility From a game theoretic point of view, a perfect information game models a situation in which the players are rational, their rationality is common knowledge and their payoffs are also ...
doi:10.1007/11575726_5
fatcat:pbok3nxuengxvnp4couhhlicii
Simultaneous Allocation of Bundled Goods through Auctions: Assessing the Case for Joint Bidding
2015
American Journal of Agricultural Economics
Preserved Fulltext
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The main results show that in our experimental environment, allowing joint bidding increases efficiency by 11.3% and revenue by 9.4%. ...
Joint bidding raises the prospect of higher allocative efficiency but also reduces the number of bidders resulting in an ambiguous net impact on seller revenue. ...
If lots were perfectly independent from one another, players should bid on every lot presented to them. However, this would have been a major departure from the policy context for timber auctions. ...
doi:10.1093/ajae/aav041
fatcat:5yv2pzkvwvapnaax6nov4ertp4
Career concerns in a simple experimental labour market
2006
European Economic Review
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A revised version may be available on the IZA website (www.iza.org) or directly from the author. ...
Before making second-period wage offers firms are informed about first-period profits. In a different treatment firms additionally learn the abilities of agents. ...
In that treatment firms had more information as they perfectly knew the ability before the beginning of period 2. ...
doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.10.003
fatcat:uswvltqvjbgafavyrmaenold6i
Artificial Intelligence and Auction Design
[article]
2022
arXiv
pre-print
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We also show that providing information about lowest bid to win, as introduced by Google at the time of switch to first-price auctions, increases competitiveness of auctions. ...
It is often the choice of the auctioneer how much information to reveal to the players. ...
See Dworczak (2020) for other reasons why information disclosure after an auction can affect revenues and efficiency. ...
arXiv:2202.05947v1
fatcat:pdnxp76j6jby7gxbeughh6fc3u
Something in the water: scholarly communications in a rapidly changing information economy
2008
Serials: The Journal for the Serials Community
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to demonstrate their relevance in the digital world.This paper draws examples from another information industry that has also lost its stability: newspaper publishing. ...
Conference,Torquay, April 2008 The Internet is causing scholarly communication to lose its long-standing stability, and the players in this process -libraries, publishers, and othersare increasingly challenged ...
with rapid updates and syntheses from diverse information streams. ...
doi:10.1629/2179
fatcat:agnakfvvxbbitdoroapsh4uhqu
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