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Revenue-Incentive Tradeoffs in Dynamic Reserve Pricing

Yuan Deng, Sébastien Lahaie, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Song Zuo
2021 International Conference on Machine Learning  
Adopting an incentive compatibility metric which quantifies the incentives to shade bids, we propose a novel class of dynamic reserve pricing policies and provide analytical tradeoffs between their revenue  ...  In this paper, we study how to set reserves to boost revenue based on the historical bids of strategic buyers, while controlling the impact of such a policy on the incentive compatibility of the repeated  ...  Non-linear Policy Based on the Box-Cox Transformation In the previous section, we analyzed the revenue-incentive tradeoff for linear reserve pricing policies.  ... 
dblp:conf/icml/DengLMZ21 fatcat:xwvp3jv2gffjney3mbtimxjjpa

Robust Clearing Price Mechanisms for Reserve Price Optimization [article]

Zhe Feng, Sébastien Lahaie
2021 arXiv   pre-print
In this paper, we investigate how to set an anonymous reserve price in repeated auctions based on historical bids in a way that balances revenue and incentives to misreport.  ...  Setting an effective reserve price for strategic bidders in repeated auctions is a central question in online advertising.  ...  In (Deng et al., 2021) the authors examine the tradeoffs between revenue and incentives for different reserve pricing policies, just as we do in this work; whereas we consider smoothing techniques on  ... 
arXiv:2107.04638v1 fatcat:lifhihkpc5hijeh3anjnigc6jq

Sequential Mechanisms with Ex-post Participation Guarantees

Itai Ashlagi, Constantinos Daskalakis, Nima Haghpanah
2016 Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation - EC '16  
We provide a characterization of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanisms in settings where a monopolist sells k items over k periods to a buyer who realizes his value for item i in the beginning of period i  ...  We also provide a simple dynamic mechanism that obtains at least half of the optimal revenue.  ...  study the general revenue-utility tradeoff problem in Appendix B).  ... 
doi:10.1145/2940716.2940775 dblp:conf/sigecom/AshlagiDH16 fatcat:d3axdtobuvcbrpaaknysjkanom

Sequential Mechanisms with ex-post Participation Guarantees [article]

Itai Ashlagi and Constantinos Daskalakis and Nima Haghpanah
2016 arXiv   pre-print
We provide a characterization of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanisms in settings where a monopolist sells k items over k periods to a buyer who realizes his value for item i in the beginning of period i  ...  We also provide a simple dynamic mechanism that obtains at least half of the optimal revenue.  ...  study the general revenue-utility tradeoff problem in Appendix B).  ... 
arXiv:1603.07229v2 fatcat:y3z53n3vjvbl5atzlhqc5a663a

Testing Incentive Compatibility in Display Ad Auctions

Sébastien Lahaie, Andrés Munoz Medina, Balasubramanian Sivan, Sergei Vassilvitskii
2018 Proceedings of the 2018 World Wide Web Conference on World Wide Web - WWW '18  
To bid effectively, she is interested in whether the auction is single-shot incentive compatible-a pure second-price auction, with fixed reserve price-and also dynamically incentive compatible-her bids  ...  In this work we develop tests based on simple bid perturbations that a buyer can use to answer these questions, with a focus on dynamic incentive compatibility.  ...  Dynamic reserve pricing is the chief means to link incentives in different rounds, and violate dynamic incentive compatibility.  ... 
doi:10.1145/3178876.3186047 dblp:conf/www/LahaieMSV18 fatcat:rxae5aepw5fn3cxjkjfscvze2e

Auction-based Congestion Pricing for Wireless Data Services

Saravut Yaipairoj, Fotios Harmantzis
2006 2006 IEEE International Conference on Communications  
The tradeoff between performance improvement, due to the proposed model, and revenue optimization is also investigated.  ...  In addition, the impact of the reserve prices of the auction mechanism on the mean system delay of the networks is investigated.  ...  In addition, the auction reserve prices that yield optimal tradeoff between the network performance and revenue is also investigated. II.  ... 
doi:10.1109/icc.2006.254887 dblp:conf/icc/YaipairojH06 fatcat:f6bu2ckue5et5ce2suokyynyli

An Auction-based pricing model for performance and revenue optimisation in mobile data services

Saravut Yaipairoj, Fotios Harmantzis
2006 Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management  
Tradeoff between performance improvement and system revenue The auction reserve prices influence both network performance and revenue.  ...  Furthermore, we have illustrated the tradeoff between the improvement of network performance and revenue caused by the congestion reserve price.  ...  APPENDIX LOAD REDUCTION FACTOR OF AUCTION-BASED PRICING MODEL WHEN KoN Ã According to the proposed auction-based pricing models described earlier, the offered load of GPRS networks is reduced by a reduction  ... 
doi:10.1057/palgrave.rpm.5160022 fatcat:6pg2coi73jafvdug2h4eea6eca

Artificial Intelligence and Auction Design

Martino Banchio, Andrzej Skrzypacz
2022 Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation  
We show that the difference is driven by the incentive in first-price auctions to outbid opponents by just one bid increment.  ...  We find that first-price auctions with no additional feedback lead to tacit-collusive outcomes (bids lower than values), while second-price auctions do not.  ...  It is also robust to the introduction of reserve prices (and even seemingly non-binding reserve prices increase the revenues).  ... 
doi:10.1145/3490486.3538244 fatcat:cmrue32vwvfaxolx3mccb3dbdi

Improvement of Auctioneer's Revenue under Incomplete Information in Cognitive Radio Networks

Jun MA, Yonghong ZHANG, Shengheng LIU
2016 IEICE transactions on information and systems  
In this letter, the problem of how to set reserve prices so as to improve the primary user's revenue in the second price-sealed auction under the incomplete information of secondary users' private value  ...  sealed auction, Dirichlet process, online learning, reserve price  ...  the second highest bid is larger than the reserve price, the reserve price dose not affect the PU's revenue in this situation.  ... 
doi:10.1587/transinf.2015edl8140 fatcat:4fwlenq3zzbofd27fzhwv45yvy

Maximizing Social Welfare in Operator-based Cognitive Radio Networks under Spectrum Uncertainty and Sensing Inaccuracy [article]

Shuang Li, Zizhan Zheng, Eylem Ekici, Ness Shroff
2012 arXiv   pre-print
We further show that the online algorithm together with a payment scheme achieves incentive compatibility for the SUs while guaranteeing a non-negative revenue for the operator.  ...  We first model the problem as a finite horizon Markov decision process when the operator knows all spectrum requests in advance, and propose an optimal dynamic programming based algorithm.  ...  Tradeoff between Social Welfare and Revenue We now study the tradeoff between social welfare and revenue generated by Auction 1. In Figure 3 , we vary the values of reservation price.  ... 
arXiv:1207.6603v1 fatcat:na733e4eb5drnisbfp2s2rh6g4

Truthful prioritization schemes for spectrum sharing

Victor Shnayder, Jeremy Hoon, David C. Parkes, Vikas Kawadia
2012 2012 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM Workshops  
We adapt a recent sampled-based mechanism for resource allocation to this setting, which is more effective in aligning incentives in a setting with variable demand than an earlier method for pricing network  ...  As the rapid expansion of smart phones and associated data-intensive applications continues, we expect to see renewed interest in dynamic prioritization schemes as a way to increase the total utility of  ...  and provides each seller with revenue at least its reserve price.  ... 
doi:10.1109/infcomw.2012.6193489 dblp:conf/infocom/ShnayderHPK12 fatcat:56zcojuyhva7pkdfhyvhdxd6pa

Maximizing social welfare in operator-based Cognitive Radio Networks under spectrum uncertainty and sensing inaccuracy

Shuang Li, Zizhan Zheng, Eylem Ekici, Ness B. Shroff
2013 2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM  
We further extend the online algorithm to an online auction scheme, which ensures incentive compatibility for the SUs and also provides a way for trading off social welfare and revenue.  ...  We first model the problem as a finite horizon Markov decision process when the operator knows all spectrum requests in advance, and propose an optimal dynamic programming based algorithm.  ...  Tradeoff between Social Welfare and Revenue We now study the tradeoff between social welfare and revenue generated by Auction 1 with a fixed reservation price.  ... 
doi:10.1109/infcom.2013.6566884 dblp:conf/infocom/LiZES13 fatcat:anqjic2mpvacvb6flzhjcclnla

A Long Way Coming: Designing Centralized Markets with Privately Informed Buyers and Sellers

Simon Loertscher, Leslie M. Marx, Tom Wilkening
2015 Journal of Economic Literature  
We compare the revenue-efficiency tradeoff in an environment with private information on one side of the market versus the tradeoff with private information on both sides of the market; we provide an impossibility  ...  The existing literature and the history of spectrum auctions, including the incentive auction currently being designed by the FCC, can be employed to analyze such mechanisms.  ...  We discuss the revenue-efficiency tradeoff for two-sided markets in Section 4.3, and then in Section 4.4, we contrast the revenue-efficiency tradeoff for two-sided markets with that for one-sided markets  ... 
doi:10.1257/jel.53.4.857 fatcat:dgkcxzjvffhsvmmpasjqw2fwni

Optimality and Efficiency in Auctions Design: A Survey [chapter]

Roger L. Zhan
2008 Pareto Optimality, Game Theory And Equilibria  
the revenue-maximizing on the seller side.  ...  In this chapter, we review the auctions design problem based on these two aspects in various information structures and circumstances. The most recent results are collected and analyzed.  ...  :Equilibrium Reserve Prices in Sequential Ascending Auctions.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-0-387-77247-9_16 fatcat:juj6f6unq5cn3m6erevwpsebiu

Truthful prioritization for dynamic bandwidth sharing

Victor Shnayder, David C. Parkes, Vikas Kawadia, Jeremy Hoon
2014 Proceedings of the 15th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing - MobiHoc '14  
A revenue pooling mechanism also aligns incentives for sellers, so that they will choose to use prioritization methods that retain the incentive properties on the buy-side.  ...  Simulation results confirm efficiency gains from dynamic prioritization relative to prior methods, as well as the effectiveness of revenue pooling.  ...  The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the Army Research Laboratory  ... 
doi:10.1145/2632951.2632956 dblp:conf/mobihoc/ShnayderPKH14 fatcat:goovuzgadfdxhgw4j5lki2mhky
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