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Revenue Guarantee Equivalence

Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks, Stephen Morris
2019 The American Economic Review  
We revisit the revenue comparison of standard auction formats, including rst-price, second-price, and English auctions.  ...  If we consider all equilibria or if we allow more general models of information, then rst-price auctions have a greater revenue guarantee than all other auctions considered.  ...  This proves that revenue in the second-price and English auctions must be at least the revenue guarantee of the rst-price auction, R F P A .  ... 
doi:10.1257/aer.20180773 fatcat:yw76caos2bck3pxonpcbpavtdi

Randomization Beats Second Price as a Prior-Independent Auction

Hu Fu, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Philipp Strack
2015 Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation - EC '15  
A cornerstone in the prior-independent revenue maximization literature is a result by Bulow and Klemperer (1996) showing that the second price auction without a reserve achieves (n − 1)/n of the optimal  ...  We construct a randomized mechanism that strictly outperforms the second price auction in this setting. Our mechanism inflates the second highest bid with a probability that varies with n.  ...  For two bidders, a second price auction with zero reserve price guarantees the seller half of the optimal revenue.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2764468.2764489 dblp:conf/sigecom/FuILS15 fatcat:qo636j3bwnhixgxydwkcobarem

Lower Bounds on Revenue of Approximately Optimal Auctions [chapter]

Balasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Omer Tamuz
2012 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We obtain revenue guarantees for the simple pricing mechanism of a single posted price, in terms of a natural parameter of the distribution of buyers' valuations.  ...  This generic bound is a measure of how revenue improves/degrades as a function of the concentration/spread of Vmax.  ...  Supported in part by ONR grant N00014-98-1-0589 and a Simons Graduate Fellowship. Part of this work was done while the author was a visitor at Microsoft Research.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_42 fatcat:dxwamfg2vbd5xou3slctzc5oxa

Randomization beats Second Price as a Prior-Independent Auction [article]

Hu Fu and Nicole Immolica and Brendan Lucier and Philipp Strack
2015 arXiv   pre-print
A cornerstone in the prior-independent revenue maximization literature is a result by Bulow and Klemperer (1996) showing that the second price auction without a reserve achieves (n-1)/n of the optimal  ...  We construct a randomized mechanism that strictly outperforms the second price auction in this setting. Our mechanism inflates the second highest bid with a probability that varies with n.  ...  For two bidders, a second price auction with zero reserve price guarantees the seller half of the optimal revenue.  ... 
arXiv:1507.08042v1 fatcat:grqvoudlhbgcpaudp75ygdekua

Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions!

Kasper Leufkens, Ronald Peeters
2007 Economics Letters  
Although the second-price auction format performs better in terms of efficiency and revenue, bankruptcy problems are less severe in the first-price auction format.  ...  This paper studies the performance of auction formats when synergies are present between sequentially auctioned objects.  ...  Acknowledgement Financial support was received from the Dutch Science Foundation (NWO).  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2007.02.022 fatcat:n5duoghowbcqzo3ggljeu2cq3a

Prior-free auctions with ordered bidders

Stefano Leonardi, Tim Roughgarden
2012 Proceedings of the 44th symposium on Theory of Computing - STOC '12  
We use the framework of Hartline and Roughgarden (STOC '08) to define an appropriate revenue benchmark: the maximum revenue that can be obtained from a bid vector using prices that are nonincreasing in  ...  By design, an auction that approximates the monotone-price benchmark satisfies a very strong guarantee: it is, in particular, simultaneously near-optimal for essentially every Bayesian environment in which  ...  We also thank the anonymous STOC reviewers for a number of useful comments.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2213977.2214018 dblp:conf/stoc/LeonardiR12 fatcat:fbu3mv5fvnbi7dbejfopmsk3ay

Equilibrium transformations and the Revenue Equivalence Theorem

Balázs Szentes
2005 Journal of Economic Theory  
This provides a new approach to revenue equivalence and extends the theorem to domains where it had not previously been known, in particular to simultaneous multiple object auctions with complete information  ...  I develop a method that transforms an equilibrium strategy profile from one auction to another. The method is constructive and does not require complicated computation.  ...  strategy generates a symmetric equilibrium profile in the second-price auction.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.jet.2003.11.001 fatcat:2of7ohth2nafrlq7phoffslb2y

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design: Motivation, Examples, and Lessons Learned [article]

Tim Roughgarden
2014 arXiv   pre-print
In the first example, we consider revenue maximization in a single-item auction with heterogeneous bidders.  ...  Our goal here is similar in spirit: when is complexity --- in the form of high-dimensional bid spaces --- an essential feature of every auction that guarantees reasonable welfare?  ...  For example, see [6, 17] for revenue guarantees for auctions that make use only of welfaremaximization supplemented by reserve prices. 6.  ... 
arXiv:1406.6773v1 fatcat:5czubehre5aqtgh3werd25cqxe

Approximately optimal mechanism design

Tim Roughgarden
2015 ACM SIGecom Exchanges  
First, when is complexity -in the sense of detailed distributional knowledge -an essential feature of revenue-maximizing single-item auctions?  ...  This survey describes the approximately optimal mechanism design paradigm and uses it to investigate two basic questions in auction theory.  ...  Myerson [1981] identified the optimal auction in this context, and under mild conditions on F it is a simple twist on the Vickrey auction -a second-price auction with a reserve price r. 1 Moreover, the  ... 
doi:10.1145/2728732.2728733 fatcat:mofyhzcs3bd35kcrm6vxgngz3y

Simple versus optimal mechanisms

Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden
2009 Proceedings of the tenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '09  
These fundamental guarantees for the Vickrey auction fail to hold in general single-parameter agent mechanism design problems.  ...  The first is from Myerson [8]: the optimal auction is Vickrey with a reserve price.  ...  Revenue guarantees in more general environments require bidder-specific reserve prices.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1566374.1566407 dblp:conf/sigecom/HartlineR09 fatcat:3x2wsmdr65d2vo7pixjrxjwo3q

Simple versus optimal mechanisms

Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden
2009 ACM SIGecom Exchanges  
These fundamental guarantees for the Vickrey auction fail to hold in general single-parameter agent mechanism design problems.  ...  The first is from Myerson [8]: the optimal auction is Vickrey with a reserve price.  ...  Revenue guarantees in more general environments require bidder-specific reserve prices.  ... 
doi:10.1145/1598780.1598785 fatcat:kb7gkfmflvfddp7asbognqmxpu

Distributionally Robust Optimal Auction Design under Mean Constraints [article]

Ethan Che
2022 arXiv   pre-print
Second, when bidders are identical and the number of bidders n grows large, the seller's optimal reserve price converges in probability to a non-binding reserve price and the revenue guarantee converges  ...  We find that a second-price auction with a symmetric, random reserve price obtains the optimal revenue guarantee within a broad class of mechanisms we refer to as competitive mechanisms, which include  ...  The second-price auction mechanism S G * with the optimal reserve price G * in (9) obtains the optimal revenue guarantee out of all competitive mechanisms.  ... 
arXiv:1911.07103v3 fatcat:7cfwxw7levhdhoswhbaxr6el3a

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design [article]

Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
2020 arXiv   pre-print
Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from how governments sell wireless spectrum licenses to how the major search engines auction off online advertising.  ...  relaxed goal of an approximately optimal mechanism allows us to reason about fundamental questions that seem out of reach of the traditional theory.  ...  The second author  ... 
arXiv:1812.11896v2 fatcat:5q5l34g65jf7beogswtr7nevta

Simple, Optimal and Efficient Auctions [chapter]

Constantinos Daskalakis, George Pierrakos
2011 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We study the extent to which simple auctions can simultaneously achieve good revenue and efficiency guarantees in single-item settings.  ...  from independent regular distributions [11], we focus our attention to the second price auction with general (not necessarily monopoly) reserve prices, arguably one of the simplest and most intuitive  ...  chosen reserve prices can approximate the revenue of the optimal auction in more general settings.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_10 fatcat:sajyryuiwfctde6mouuwi6ypii

Selling to Intermediaries: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks, Stephen Edward Morris
2017 Social Science Research Network  
We characterize revenue maximizing auctions when the bidders are intermediaries who wish to resell the good.  ...  The model provides a foundation for posted prices in multi-agent screening problems.  ...  more revenue than second-price auctions, which in turn generate greater revenue than first-price auctions.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.3018883 fatcat:i3rcreetajglbebdb6bgbttqc4
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