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Social Big Data Analytics of Consumer Choices: A Two Sided Online Platform Perspective [article]

Meisam Hejazi Nia
2017 arXiv   pre-print
This dissertation examines three distinct big data analytics problems related to the social aspects of consumers' choices.  ...  The first essay examines "social learning" in the mobile app store context, controlling for intrinsic value of hedonic and utilitarian mobile apps, price, advertising, and number of options available.  ...  I also find that not controlling for social influence in mobile app choices of customers results in biased customer preference estimates.  ... 
arXiv:1702.07074v1 fatcat:suq27p5v6ree5mdlzqzm5lvhpq

Theory Choice and Social Choice: Kuhn versus Arrow

S. Okasha
2011 Mind  
The second option is domain restriction, i.e. dropping condition U. It is wellknown that with a restricted domain, there may exist social choice rules that satisfy conditions P, I, and N.  ...  As noted in section 4, in the theory choice case, a natural domain restriction would apply if two of the criteria of theory choice exhibit an intrinsic trade-off (or correlation), for example, if a gain  ... 
doi:10.1093/mind/fzr010 fatcat:z6htlwekqvgd3gch6ci2yf73yy

Strategyproof Social Choice [chapter]

Salvador Barberà
2011 Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare  
The most important predecessor of modern social choice theory, M.J.A.N. de Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet, wrote on the matter from two di¤erent perspectives.  ...  But sel…shness itself is also a restriction: all together, these conditions on preferences de…ne the restricted domain for which we'll discuss the possibility of strategy-proof social choice functions.  ... 
doi:10.1016/s0169-7218(10)00025-0 fatcat:yliruv2jpjbzdayfxf5qxe7rvq

Interdomain Routing as Social Choice

R.R. Dakdouk, S. Salihoglu, Hao Wang, Haiyong Xie, Y.R. Yang
2006 26th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops (ICDCSW'06)  
We adopt the novel perspective that an interdomain routing system is one which defines a social choice rule that aggregates individual preferences of all of the autonomous systems (ASes) in a network to  ...  We also provide new insights into BGP, by "reverseengineering" its behaviors from the perspective of social choice and implementation theory.  ...  In Section 2, we define our model of interdomain routing from the perspective of social choice theory.  ... 
doi:10.1109/icdcsw.2006.65 dblp:conf/icdcsw/DakdoukSWXY06 fatcat:b65jairwuzb4ph5h6r3djms2hi

Regulate/Mandate; Two Perspectives

John T. Valauri
2013 Social Science Research Network  
REGULATE/MANDATE: TWO PERSPECTIVES  ...  and argued from the two perspectives and then trying to determine what progress toward consensus is attainable there.  ...  perspectives of the two groups.  ... 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2217883 fatcat:7pt6gejzf5blhnneesupfmluqe

Optimal social choice functions

Craig Boutilier, Ioannis Caragiannis, Simi Haber, Tyler Lu, Ariel D. Procaccia, Or Sheffet
2012 Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce - EC '12  
We adopt a utilitarian perspective on social choice, assuming that agents have (possibly latent) utility functions over some space of alternatives.  ...  In this context, one possible objective for a social choice function is the maximization of (expected) social welfare relative to the information contained in these rankings.  ...  While very common in decision analysis, this perspective is also sometimes adopted in social choice.  ... 
doi:10.1145/2229012.2229030 dblp:conf/sigecom/BoutilierCHLPS12 fatcat:7ghdlrsmxvclpph66jwevz6wie

Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains [chapter]

Michel Le Breton, John A. Weymark
2011 Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare  
This article surveys the literature that investigates the consistency of Arrow's social choice axioms when his unrestricted domain assumptions are replaced by domain conditions that incorporate the restrictions  ...  on agendas and preferences encountered in economic environments.  ...  Unrestricted preference domains Before considering simultaneous restrictions on the preference and agenda domains, it is useful to consider a number of social choice problems in which the preference domain  ... 
doi:10.1016/s0169-7218(10)00017-1 fatcat:pgtiwe4sq5bgjpo6bzbxxtzrd4

Single-Crossing, Strategic Voting and the Median Choice Rule

Alejandro Saporiti, Fernando Tohmé
2006 Social Choice and Welfare  
As a by-product, it also considers the existence of non-trivial strategy-proof social choice functions over the domain of single-crossing preferences.  ...  The main result shows that single-crossing constitutes a domain restriction over the real line that allows not only majority voting equilibria, but also non-manipulable choice rules.  ...  Now we define the two incentive compatibility properties we seek in a social choice function on SC(X).  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00355-006-0098-y fatcat:zr7sc5zuobflrkzfjz4sw3472e

An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions

Salvador Barber�
2001 Social Choice and Welfare  
But sel®shness itself is also a restriction: all together, these conditions on preferences de®ne the restricted domain for which we'll discuss the possibility of strategy-proof social choice functions.  ...  This is an unnecessary assumption, because strategy proof social choice rules in these (and in many other) domains are restricted to only use information on what each agent considers best.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s003550100151 fatcat:twdd5qfp5fdnrpqsqkftqpmh3i

Behavioral social choice: probabilistic models, statistical inference, and applications

2007 ChoiceReviews  
We argue for the limited theoretical relevance and demonstrate the lack of empirical evidence for cycles in mass electorates by replacing "value restriction" 2 and similar classic domain restriction conditions  ...  In particular, we seek to build upon the early integrative perspective to the decision sciences of two outstanding theorists, Duncan Luce and Patrick Suppes (see esp. Luce and Suppes, 1965).  ...  Therefore, in our approach, rather than restricting the domain of permissible preferences, we restrict the distribution of preferences (and, in fact, vastly enlarge the domain of permissible preferences  ... 
doi:10.5860/choice.44-3496 fatcat:cocndx4ivjbbvb44x6qz6uoowu

Computational Social Choice: Prospects and Challenges

Ulle Endriss
2011 Procedia Computer Science  
This "computational turn" is fuelled both by the fact that questions of social choice have turned out to be central to a range of application areas, notably in the domain of Information and Communication  ...  More recently, a research trend known as Computational Social Choice has emerged, which studies this question from the perspective of Computer Science.  ...  The Computational Turn: From Social Choice to Computational Social Choice Taking the perspective of Computer Science when analysing problems of social choice has proven tremendously successful.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.procs.2011.12.022 fatcat:dmfmtv3awze4doon42opnbuybi

Traditional and flipped classroom approaches delivered by two different teachers: the student perspective

Maria Limniou, Ian Schermbrucker, Minna Lyons
2017 Education and Information Technologies : Official Journal of the IFIP technical committee on Education  
Although all students had similar preferences on following either the traditional or the flipped classroom approach in both subject domains, a significant difference in students' views related to the teachers  ...  The aim of this investigation was for students to express their views on teaching approaches delivered by two teachers under the perspectives of Higher Order Thinking Skills (HOTS) development, their preferences  ...  The first set of the questionnaires was common for both the groups including statements about students' interest in the two domains, their general preference in teaching approach, and their learning goal  ... 
doi:10.1007/s10639-017-9636-8 fatcat:dlnsq2sfgnhbtn6l2ebhmgxss4

Topological social choice

Luc Lauwers
2000 Mathematical Social Sciences  
The main result in this area known as the resolution of the topological social choice paradox shows that a space of preferences admits of a continuous, anonymous, and unanimous aggregation rule for every  ...  The topological approach to social choice was developed by Graciela Chichilnisky in the beginning of the eighties.  ...  approach into perspective, we summarize Arrow's classical social choice model.  ... 
doi:10.1016/s0165-4896(99)00036-0 fatcat:q53ayelhqnciddfsoadwnwsbrq

Market arbitrage, social choice and the core [chapter]

Graciela Chichilnisky
1997 Topological Social Choice  
chosen by a social choice rule.  ...  This paper establishes a clear connection between equilibrium theory, game theory and social choice theory by showing that, for a well defined social choice problem, a condition which is necessary and  ...  Several ways of resolving social choice problems have been proposed by limiting the diversity of the individual preferences, a 'domain restriction' on preferences, Black, [8, 9] , Pattanaik and Sen [  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-60891-9_2 fatcat:56awynzhkrbkhl7faee62f6h5e

WICKEDNESS IN SOCIAL CHOICE

Wulf Christian Gaertner
2016 Journal of economic surveys (Print)  
In this paper we shall consider, from this very angle, the theory of social choice which is about the aggregation of individual preferences with the aim to derive a consistent social preference.  ...  We shall show that collective choice offers wicked problems of various types which differ in their degree of severity.  ...  The latter, however, can lead to a cyclical social preference or an empty choice set under unrestricted domain.  ... 
doi:10.1111/joes.12143 fatcat:v34235xlzjdxbivcbrfosjx64m
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