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Restricted Manipulation in Iterative Voting: Convergence and Condorcet Efficiency

Umberto Grandi, Andrea Loreggia, Francesca Rossi, Kristen Brent Venable, Toby Walsh
2013 Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science  
We prove convergence of iterative voting rules when restricted manipulation is allowed, and we present experiments showing that most iterative voting rules have a higher Condorcet efficiency than their  ...  In this paper we consider the iterative version of several voting rules, where at each step one agent is allowed to manipulate by modifying his ballot according to a set of restricted manipulation moves  ...  Condorcet efficiency of restricted iterative voting The absence of any increase in Condorcet efficiency for veto (as well as 2-approval and 3-approval using M1) is a consequence of the fact that our restricted  ... 
doi:10.4204/eptcs.112.6 fatcat:2nv6yni2cffdtcypxhauvqfwea

Restricted Manipulation in Iterative Voting: Condorcet Efficiency and Borda Score [chapter]

Umberto Grandi, Andrea Loreggia, Francesca Rossi, Kristen Brent Venable, Toby Walsh
2013 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We prove convergence of iterative voting rules when restricted manipulation is allowed, and we present experiments showing that most iterative voting rules have a higher Condorcet efficiency and a higher  ...  In this paper we consider the iterative version of several voting rules, where at each step one agent is allowed to manipulate by modifying his ballot according to a set of restricted manipulation moves  ...  Condorcet efficiency of iterated voting rules with 50 voters and 5 candidates . Figure 2 : 2 Condorcet efficiency for the plurality rule. Figure 3 : 3 Condorcet efficiency for iterated STV.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-41575-3_14 fatcat:t52jigrvozeltfj2pxjexfmv3i

Learning Agents for Iterative Voting [chapter]

Stéphane Airiau, Umberto Grandi, Filipo Studzinski Perotto
2017 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Each agent is endowed with a private preference concerning a number of alternative candidates, and participates in an iterated plurality election.  ...  Agents get rewards depending on the winner of each election, and adjust their voting strategy using reinforcement learning.  ...  In order to interpret our findings, we also plot the Condorcet efficiency (CE) and Borda score of one-round plurality, best-response iterative voting, 3-pragmatists iterative voting, STV, Copeland and  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-67504-6_10 fatcat:c5jcneziu5d5hkbi5edw2zhggi

Cycles in synchronous iterative voting: general robustness and examples in Approval Voting [article]

Benoît Kloeckner
2022 arXiv   pre-print
other voting methods, including ranking methods satisfying the Condorcet criterion; an in silico experimental study of the rarity of preference profiles exhibiting bad cycles; and an example exhibiting  ...  settings for synchronous iterative voting, one of classical flavor with a discrete space of states, and a more general continuous-space setting extending the first one.  ...  In the case when strategies are restricted, [OMP + 15] gives sufficient conditions for convergence in many voting systems.  ... 
arXiv:2001.04216v4 fatcat:6lfl2d2skfc7znwmfg5l5y5yom

Strategic Voting

Reshef Meir
2018 Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning  
In an iterative Plurality voting, this provably leads to convergence.  ...  Simulations show that these heuristics almost always lead to convergence when applied in an iterative voting setting [24] , [49] .  ... 
doi:10.2200/s00849ed1v01y201804aim038 fatcat:i6l7jzya5ffsjebdplu46tb6bi

In Silico Voting Experiments [chapter]

Jean-François Laslier
2010 Studies in Choice and Welfare  
This paper presents computer simulations of voting rules: Plurality rule, Approval voting and the Copeland and Borda rules, with voters voting sincerly or strategically.  ...  ; Distributive cultures and Spatial Euclidean ones are standard in Political Science.  ...  He concludes that Approval voting has a high utilitarian efficiency and Plurality has a low utilitarian efficiency, which is improved by strategic behavior.  ... 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_13 fatcat:dpbz4qmulrd27ntiycafg4q3si

Voting systems and strategic manipulation: An experimental study

Anna Bassi
2014 Journal of Theoretical Politics  
Yet, plurality rule is the weakest performer under Condorcet efficiency, whereas approval voting and the Borda count perform remarkably well even with a small electorate.  ...  Approval voting shows intermediate levels of strategic behavior. In terms of social efficiency, plurality rule unexpectedly performs better than both approval voting and the Borda count.  ...  Table 8 reports the Condorcet efficiency score of each voting system.  ... 
doi:10.1177/0951629813514300 fatcat:lftzl6v7vbechdqg2lv7vujk5i

Poll-Confident Voters in Iterative Voting

Anaëlle Wilczynski
2019 PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE TWENTY-EIGHTH INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE  
We consider an iterative voting model based on this behavior and study the associated "poll-confident" dynamics. In this context, we ask the question of manipulation by the polling institute.  ...  The voters are assumed to be confident in the poll and they update the communicated results with the information they get from their relatives in the social network.  ...  2 Frequency of convergence and Condorcet efficiency for local/global dynamics under different thresholds convergent profiles, in particular when the density is around 0.  ... 
doi:10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33012205 fatcat:4eokg3vxg5bdnghtyf7gaiooqa

Direct voting and proxy voting

James Green-Armytage
2014 Constitutional Political Economy  
I develop a hybrid of direct democracy and representative democracy in which each citizen may vote directly on each issue, or delegate his vote on any issue to a representative (that is, a proxy) of his  ...  I construct both an axiomatic argument for such a system and an argument based on its ability to ameliorate the information problems inherent in both direct and representative democracy.  ...  Green-Armytage (2011) , which finds that Condorcet-Hare hybrid rules are less likely to be manipulable.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s10602-014-9176-9 fatcat:3snfx45e4ndgdcmtic2fyufah4

Strategic voting and nomination

James Green-Armytage
2013 Social Choice and Welfare  
I find that Hare is least vulnerable to strategic voting in general, whereas Borda, Coombs, approval, and range are most vulnerable.  ...  Additionally, I determine how often each voting rule is vulnerable to simple voting strategies such as ‗burying' and ‗compromising', and how often each voting rule gives an incentive for non-winning candidates  ...  Given , Hare is the only one of my eight voting methods that doesn't converge towards 100% manipulability as the number of voters gets large.  ... 
doi:10.1007/s00355-013-0725-3 fatcat:npzduuzvszeqdlx2f3r5tfs6bi

Lecture Notes on Voting Theory [article]

Davide Grossi
2021 arXiv   pre-print
They cover mathematical and algorithmic aspects of voting theory.  ...  converges to p.  ...  Exercise 1.6 (Iterated voting when m = 2).  ... 
arXiv:2105.00216v1 fatcat:erkauic6bzg35d2kw7rrj5bfae

Single Transferable Votes with Tax Cuts

Eivind Stensholt
2004 SIAM Review  
The standard variation of single transferable votes (STV) is constructed to obey this principle, but other defects show up, in particular nonmonotonicity, premature eliminations, and free rides.  ...  Some tally methods for preferential elections are discussed from the following point of view: How well do they respect a wish from the voter that subsidiary votes in the ballot cannot hurt the chances  ...  Thanks to Brian Wichmann for useful email discussions and to the anonymous referee who pointed out the link to the "no-show paradox" and also caused other improvements in the presentation.  ... 
doi:10.1137/s0036144501392650 fatcat:e6lviop3uzdwxaqubvwnyqpk2y

Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings

Davide P. Cervone, Ronghua Dai, Daniel Gnoutcheff, Grant Lanterman, Andrew Mackenzie, Ari Morse, Nikhil Srivastava, William S. Zwicker
2012 Mathematical Social Sciences  
, and responsiveness for a voting rule?  ...  While the R 1 median has been studied in the context of voting, mediancentrebased rules are new.  ...  Thus, when voting on R 1 with single-peaked preferences, strategy-proofness and Condorcet efficiency provide plausible grounds for choosing the median as our voting rule.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.08.003 fatcat:d4xegosvvzbzdez6d77l6x4agm

Iterative voting and acyclic games

Reshef Meir, Maria Polukarov, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Nicholas R. Jennings
2017 Artificial Intelligence  
We consider iterative voting models and position them within the general framework of acyclic games and game forms.  ...  In particular, we show that (a) under the traditional lexicographic tie-breaking, the game converges for any order of players under a weak restriction on voters' actions; and (b) Plurality with randomized  ...  Acknowledgments The authors thank Ulle Endriss, Omer Lev, and Svetlana Obraztsova for their helpful comments.  ... 
doi:10.1016/j.artint.2017.08.002 fatcat:fjoampaknfg27dmwnq6bp7rtru

Stackelberg Voting Games: Computational Aspects and Paradoxes

Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
2010 PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE TWENTY-EIGHTH INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE  
We consider settings in which voters vote in sequence, each voter knows the votes of the earlier voters and the preferences of the later voters, and voters are strategic.  ...  We first propose a dynamic-programming algorithm for finding the backward-induction outcome for any Stackelberg voting game when the rule is anonymous; this algorithm is efficient if the number of alternatives  ...  This phenomenon is called manipulation; if the voting rule r is such that no voter can ever benefit from manipulating, then r is said to be strategy-proof.  ... 
doi:10.1609/aaai.v24i1.7626 fatcat:p3ljxq7zyjhmzp5do6tbt5o67u
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